By Adan Ismail
Trump made a theatrical comeback in an election victory that confounded pollsters and political experts. Described as socially conservative and ideologically nationalist, his impending takeover is expected to shake global order. He will end the Ukraine War in ways European allies and Kyiv detest, cause anxieties in NATO, start a trade war with China, vigorously engage in the volatile Middle East and attend to Africa.
The Middle East
A foretelling sign of Trump’s forthcoming policies here is his affinity for authoritarian leadership, pro-Israeli and anti-Iran attitudes and a transactional foreign policy. These have previously aligned him with both wealthy and autocratic Gulf rulers and Israel while putting Washington in diametric opposition with Iran. Another is the hawkish foreign policy pundits and hard-nosed securocrats flanking him, likely to steer his administration assertiveness with global rivals.
Since Trump departed from office, the Middle East’s geopolitical calculus has greatly evolved to diminish American influence. Compounding this lately have been Israeli’s genocidal campaigns which badly strained Arab-Israeli relations and rekindled biblical animosities. With Washington’s credibility waning due to Democrat’s emphasis on contentious issues like human rights and unconditional support for Israel’s manslaughterings, the pendulum has swung to open a window for China which emerged as an alternative power broker in the post-Trump Middle East. The landmark rapprochement deal Beijing brokered between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the recent reconciliation efforts among Palestinian political factions, exemplifies how China has penetrated the Middle East. Trump’s priority is to rewrite this unfavorable equation.
His anticipated first move is to end the Gaza and Lebanon wars, revive the Abraham Accords, and busy the Palestinians in a post-war recovery period bolstered by Israeli’s degradation of Hamas. Silencing the guns and reviving the reconciliation efforts of Arab and Israeli allies immediately projects Trump as the true ‘peacemaker’ he vigorously campaigned to be. It further signifies the restoration of America’s regional patronage. However, in the medium term, the Trump administration could prove troublesome in the Middle East, endorsing Israel’s full annexation of the West Bank to effectively kill the arguably comatose two-state solution. Noteworthy is that the Abraham Accords actively pursued by the Trump administration during its first term, was not driven by the genuine commitment to resolve the Palestinian cause — the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, the initiative was to cultivate legitimacy for Israel among Arab states, many of which equally faced grave security concerns from Iran. This alignment also offered an advantage for Americans by easing the complexities of separately managing relations with Arab and Israeli rival camps.
As Trump returns to office, his administration is expected to subject Arab states to an excruciating dilemma of either prioritizing their security needs contingent on abandoning solidarity with the Palestinians in their quest for statehood and unconditionally embrace Israel, or rigidly clinging on to the unyielding two-state solution. Given the prevailing geopolitical realities, and Trump’s resolve to wow Israel as he did in his first term when he recognized Jerusalem as the capital of the Jewish state, and moved the American embassy there, the former option appears increasingly likely. The final demise of the two-state solution is thus underpinned by three converging national imperatives. It is in line with Israel’s committed disapproval of a sovereign Palestine as much as it meets the Arab states’ desperate need for protection from Iranian hegemony. The initiative amounts to the realization of the U.S’s strategic objective of creating a formidable Arab-Israeli domestic front against rival powers, particularly Iran.
Although Trump pledged not to initiate new wars, the likelihood of avoiding one with Iran increasingly appears dim. Tehran’s multiplying network of proxies, its nuclear threshold status, and Trump’s pronounced anti-Iran stance, compounded by the ideological and sectarian hostility from Gulf Arab states and Israel — key U.S allies — could be decisive factors that provoke a war with Iran. Moreover, Israel has recently been intensifying calls for a regime change in Tehran, supporting the exiled son of the last Shah who advocates for the restoration of the Iranian monarchy. The Pahlavi dynasty heir recently cited a broad Iranian “coalition” unseating the clerics which speaks of a possibility of something akin to an Iraqi-style invasion o
Perhaps sensing this heat, Iran is currently upgrading its military relationship with proxies to the level of mutual defence and going on an armament shopping spree to Russia. Furthermore, Trump’s recent allegations that Iran sought his assassination, could possibly serve as a convenient ground for retaliatory measures against Tehran, similar to Bush Junior’s pretext for toppling Saddam Hussein after accusing him of attempting to assassinate his father. Together with the Houthi factor in the Red Sea that is complicating the region’s geo-economic and political dynamics, it is safe to project a near-certain scenario of an armed conflict with Iran during a second Trump era in the Middle East.
The African continent
Trump’s first term shows neither a strong track record nor a cohesive policy framework for Africa to build upon in this second term. A combination of racist rhetoric and general disengagement from the continent’s crises have been the defining features of his previous administration. Notably, his decision to withdraw the American military from Somalia, despite ongoing anti-terrorism efforts, signalled a broader disinterest in African affairs. Geopolitically, the United States maintained military outposts in Eastern and Western Africa and security partnerships with the North, particularly with Egypt. However, like the Middle East, America’s role in Africa has been dwindling, leaving a vacuum to be filled by rivals. The latest American military pullout from Niger exemplifies this decline. China has economically outpaced the United States in Africa through investments and credit facilities while Russia expanded its military engagements through the Wagner mercenary which built an extensive continental network.
Furthermore, a series of coups in West Africa have greatly diminished American and Western influence, paving the way for more Russian role and Turkish insertion in that region. In Southern Africa, relations between the U.S and South Africa, the continent’s economic giant, are far from benign due to differing stances on the Gaza genocide. As a founding member of the BRICS, an alternative to Western global hegemony, South Africa is emerging as African civilization’s core state in an inevitable post-Western world order. Egypt, a key American strategic ally in Africa, grapples with mounting anxiety over neo-Ottomanism-driven Turkish military activities in Libya, the ongoing civil war in Sudan and the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project that threatens Cairo’s water and food security. It is only the Horn of Africa where America maintains military bases in Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti, that can be said to be relatively an exclusive American domain in the African continent. Even here, America and its allies face mounting competition from rival powers.
American media is touting Iran making inroads to the Horn of Africa. In June 2024, CNN reported an American intelligence assessment about secret arms transfer talks between the Yemeni Houthis, an Iranian proxy, and the Al-Shabaab. A Wall Street report from October detailing the Houthi global network, reveals a direct contact with Al Shabaab through the Somali port city of Kismayu. Though some may cast doubt on the accuracy of these reports, or even render nugatory the possibility of such developments, the very existence of traces of rumours concerning Iranian outreach to the Horn of Africa suggests efforts on the part of Tehran. Such efforts, their Verifiability notwithstanding, speaks about a possible alignment between Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda affiliate, and Iran, through the Houthis, particularly as Al Qaeda’s de facto leader, Saif Al-Adl, is believed to be hiding in Iran. Even beyond this emerging security trend, the Horn of Africa represents a strategic theatre to guard against the security and economic threats stemming from Yemen.
Since the Gaza war began, the Yemeni Houthis have been targeting Israeli, American and British commercial ships transiting through the Red Sea’s Bab el Mandeb. So far, in an alleged collusion with Russia, another arch-rival of America and the West, the group has struck more than 100 ships, nearing the closure of this vital maritime corridor to America and its allies. Egypt, is particularly counting economic losses totalling to $6 billion from a year-long Houthi operations that disrupted the Suez Canal and imposed a maritime blockade on Israel and Europe.
Driven by the obligation to secure vital interests, preserve America’s greatness which is a hallmark of Trump’s rhetoric, and support allies, it is inconceivable for Trump to change Biden administration’s course of positioning the Horn of Africa as an anti-Iran operation base or a staging ground for a military campaign to dismantle the Houthi military infrastructure. Even if the actions of this group could be overlooked at the moment and treated as a temporary inconvenience linked to the ongoing genocide in Gaza, their dependence on Iran and Russia, coupled with the strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden render them an unacceptable strategic threat to the U.S. and its allies. This situation therefore necessitates a sustained American presence in the Horn of Africa.
To this end, Washington has already designated Kenya as a major Non-NATO ally and is believed to be exploring additional military basis in the country, facilitated Egyptian military deployment into Somalia under the fog of a controversial Ethiopia-Somaliland maritime deal and is fortifying military posture in Somalia and Djibouti. All these are indications that the United States is committed to maintain an indefinite regional presence in the Horn of Africa, which makes the last and the most important fortress of the U.S and Western influence in Africa. It too signals readiness to tenaciously fight to preserve America’s unrivalled regional dominance.
Trump’s “America first” rhetoric implies avoiding entanglement in foreign crises where interests are not at stake. On that note, he may not be involved in Ethiopia’s internal turmoils or engage deeply in Mogadishu’s Sisyphean state-building process. Achieving peace in Ethiopia is a complex endeavor that cannot be accomplished overnight, much like persuading Somali politicians to place national interests above personal ambitions. Consequently, it appears, that Trump may prefer to maintain the status quo, as any attempts to ameliorate could inadvertently complicate things.
Where ambiguities abound is his stance on the Ethiopia-Somalia maritime tensions. Prevailing assumptions are that Trump may avoid backing Addis Ababa’s ambitious sea access quest. It seems that the U.S’s focus on the Gulf of Aden makes it unwise for America to be part of a chaotic situation in the Horn of Africa, as that essentially amounts to a self-defeating endeavor. Apart from Israel, which operates under messianic laws, and certain Arab states lacking strategic wisdom—both of which are encouraging Ethiopia to occupy the northern coasts of Somalia—America’s interests are better served by maintaining a stable Horn of Africa or, at the very least, preserving the region’s status quo so as not to be ensnared in crises that detract attention from Yemen. In case the situation turns otherwise, either through miscalculation or a sheer policy design, that will undoubtedly mean providing Iran an expensive gift.
Regarding the self-determination question of Somaliland, a considerable change of approach is conceivable. Due to its strategic location proximate to the Bab el Mandeb, extremely vital at this juncture, and relative stability, Trump administration, perhaps with the encouragement of Arab-Israeli allies, could show leniency to Somaliland. At most, such an approach could entail separate security and development arrangements with Somaliland in exchange for military bases to secure interests from Houthi threats. That is, provided Somalia does not outrightly oppose any foreign collaboration with short of formal recognition and Hargeisa does not condition engagement with sovereign demands. In other words, the strategic ambiguity of China-Taiwan question could be replicated in the Horn of Africa. However, and certainly, just as it would be disastrous to support Ethiopia in its attempt to seize Somalia’s northern waters, it would also be costly for America to give in to such demands of Somaliland to be granted international recognition.
If the interests the U.S. and its allies seek to safeguard in the Horn of Africa are long-term, as indications are, attempting to completely sever the Somali natural inertia—the underlying deep-seated aspirations of unity among millions of ordinary Somalis—the resulting shocks could jeopardize everything. This, however, does not mean that Somalia possesses the might or even the diplomatic muscle to confront the violators of its national integrity. It is only a general consideration of the hibernating sentiments of Somali nationalism, which if awakened in the midst of tense regional geopolitics, could spark off a seismic shock with regional-wide repercussions. A reasonable balancing of the interests of foreign powers, and the historical and social dynamics of the Horn of Africa is the only safe out for everybody.
All said, it is difficult to accurately predict the actions of an administration led by an impulsive man. But what is certain is that his foreign policy will not take the form of a one-size-fits-all approach. It is likely that he will seek détente with Russia and China over Ukraine and Taiwan, respectively. However, that is possibly not the case for the Middle East and the Horn of Africa where the confluence of his personal attitudes, the role of hawkish advisors, the influence of allies, and the activities of militant actors like Iran and it’s proxies makes these two theatres of armed conflict.
Aden Ismail
Email: aden.mohedi@gmail.com
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Related articles:
Trump’s win what is the locus for Somalis in this rule of engagement twist? By Abdiqani Ahmed PhD
Trump’s Victory: Beyond Election Rhetoric By Faisal A Roble
The dawn of the Israeli era in the Horn of Africa and its inherent dangers By Adan Ismail
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