Briefing – January 2018 – Emily Knowles
Remote Warfare Programme
Oxford Research Group

Introduction

If you believe that fragile states breed instability and terrorism, Somalia should be worrying you. Over twenty years of conflict and a history of fractious relationships between the semi-autonomous federal member states has left the Federal Government in control of less than half of the country. By the end of 2017, around 20% of the country was estimated to be under the control of al-Shabaab. This is the jihadist group responsible for high-profile attacks like the siege of the Westgate shopping mall in neighbouring Kenya in 2013 and a double bombing in Mogadishu at the end of October 2017.

Despite concerted international backing since the September 11th attacks in 2001, neither the Somali National Army (SNA) nor the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been able to dislodge terrorist groups with any permanent effect. Worried that al-Qaeda would use Somalia as a safe haven after operations began in Afghanistan, the US sent a small team of Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to the country, liaising with local forces in a similar model to the early days of the Afghan conflict. Decades later, operations appear to be stepping up rather than winding down. In 2017, the total count of 34 US drone strikes equalled if not exceeded the cumulative number of attacks over the previous 15 years.

At the same time, AMISOM has begun to withdraw its own troops out from the country. Budget pressures,  including some disquiet over the disproportionate risks borne by regional troops versus their international backers, appear to be taking their toll. Somalia should therefore serve as a cautionary example of the difficulties of an approach that is becoming popular in Western capitals – working by, with, and through local troops to confront terrorist groups. The success of light-footprint remote warfare requires strong local buy-in, effective ground forces, and careful international support. Current signs suggest that the anti-al-Shabaab operations have fallen short on each of these key criteria – although we will focus on the last of them here.

This briefing is based on a number of interviews conducted between October 2016 and November 2017 with serving and former UK and EU military personnel with direct experience of operations in Somalia. It also draws on material gathered during a series of expert roundtables with the British military community on the opportunities and costs of remote warfare as a strategic option for the UK.

Read more: Falling short of security in Somalia

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