By Abdullahi A. Nor

Somalia is approaching a critical moment. After nearly a year of confrontation between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his political opponents, international mediation has failed to produce the breakthrough many had hoped for. Meanwhile, the country’s political disagreements are increasingly spilling onto the security field.

The latest decision by Washington to allow the United Nations another 12 months to wind down logistical support for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) should therefore be understood for what it is: a postponement of a difficult security transition, not a solution to Somalia’s deeper crisis.

Under the new arrangement, the United States has agreed to a 12-month transition beginning in January 2027, giving UNSOS additional time to reduce and eventually terminate its logistical support for AUSSOM. That support includes essential supplies and services such as fuel, food, medical assistance and transportation.

The extra year is welcome breathing space for the African Union and the Somali government. But breathing space is not the same thing as political progress.

Somalia’s Real Crisis Is Political

The fundamental weakness in Somalia’s security transition is not simply a shortage of money, equipment or foreign logistical support. It is the absence of a political settlement sufficiently broad to allow the country’s institutions to function without becoming instruments of political confrontation.

For almost a year, President Hassan Sheikh and his opponents have remained deeply divided over elections, constitutional arrangements, federal relations and the future distribution of political power. International mediation has attempted to bridge those differences. So far, it has failed.

That failure matters because Somalia’s security institutions do not operate in a political vacuum. When federal and regional authorities disagree over legitimacy and political authority, military institutions inevitably become entangled in those disputes. Baidoa is the clearest warning.

Baidoa Shows What Happens When Politics Becomes Militarised

The crisis in South West State demonstrates how quickly a political dispute can become a security confrontation. Federal forces took control of Baidoa in March after relations between Mogadishu and the administration of former South West President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen collapsed. Laftagareen subsequently resigned.

But the change of administration did not resolve the underlying political dispute. On August 17, federal troops and forces aligned with Laftagareen clashed in Baidoa. Heavy weapons were reportedly used during the fighting, while residents reported civilian casualties.

On September 3, fighting erupted again around the city. The Federal Government accused armed groups, including Al-Shabaab, of involvement. That particular allegation remains unverified. A Baidoa hospital reportedly treated 71 wounded people following the fighting.

ACLED has documented the wider pattern of violence, recording at least 78 armed engagements in Bay region between February 2 and August 28, predominantly in Baidoa district.

These developments should force Somalia’s international partners to confront an uncomfortable reality: A political dispute over federal authority has developed into repeated armed confrontations involving Somali forces and rival political factions. This is no longer merely a disagreement conducted through political statements.

What Are International Weapons Being Used for?

This brings us to an increasingly important question. Somalia’s international partners are providing the Federal Government with military equipment, training and other assistance to strengthen the country’s fight against Al-Shabaab.

That assistance is justified by the continuing threat posed by the militant group. But opposition figures have alleged that drones and other military capabilities supplied to the Federal Government are also being used against political opponents, particularly in the confrontation surrounding Baidoa.

That is a serious allegation and should be independently investigated rather than automatically accepted as fact. What is already documented, however, is the use of heavy weapons during fighting in Baidoa.

That should be enough to prompt a broader question from Somalia’s international partners: Are weapons and military capabilities supplied for counterterrorism being used exclusively against armed extremist groups, or are they becoming entangled in Somalia’s internal political conflicts? The answer matters enormously.

If international military assistance is used in domestic political confrontations, donors face an entirely different problem involving civilian protection, end-use monitoring and the credibility of international security assistance.

AUSSOM Cannot Mediate Somalia’s Political Disputes

There is a tendency in international policy circles to treat Somalia’s problems primarily as security problems. That approach is increasingly inadequate.

AUSSOM can support Somali security forces. UNSOS can provide logistics. International partners can supply weapons, training and funding. But none of them can answer the fundamental political questions confronting Somalia.

Who controls political authority? How will elections be conducted? What constitutional arrangements will govern federal and regional relations? How will disputes between Mogadishu and the federal member states be resolved? And, most importantly, what political rules will all major Somali actors accept?

Until those questions are addressed, Somalia’s security transition will remain vulnerable to political shocks.

One More Year Will Not Fix the Problem

The additional 12 months of UNSOS support should be used constructively. The African Union and Somalia should use the period to establish a sustainable financing and logistical mechanism for AUSSOM. International donors should also clarify their expectations concerning the use, monitoring and accountability of military assistance. But Somalia’s political leaders must do something more fundamental. They must negotiate.

The current confrontation cannot be resolved through military pressure, constitutional manoeuvring or competing claims to legitimacy. Nor can international actors indefinitely compensate for the absence of political agreement by supplying more resources to an increasingly contested security system.

The extension of UNSOS may postpone a logistical crisis. It cannot postpone Somalia’s political crisis indefinitely.

The International Community Should Look Beyond the Battlefield

The international community has spent years helping Somalia build security institutions capable of confronting Al-Shabaab. That remains essential. But Somalia also needs institutions that are trusted across political and regional lines.

A security force that is viewed by one side as a national institution and by another as an instrument of political power cannot provide the foundation for a stable federal state. The lesson from Baidoa is therefore difficult to ignore.

When political disagreements remain unresolved, the security sector can become the arena in which those disagreements are fought out. And once that happens, every military deployment carries a political meaning.

Somalia Needs a Political Reset

The choice facing Somalia is becoming increasingly stark. It can continue down a path in which political disputes produce security confrontations, international partners provide emergency assistance and mediation efforts repeatedly stall.

Or its political leaders can recognize that no military capability—whether drones, artillery, armoured vehicles or foreign logistical support—can substitute for political legitimacy and agreement. The additional year of UNSOS support is an opportunity. But it is an opportunity that Somalia cannot afford to waste.

The country does not simply need more weapons, more funding or another extension. It needs a political settlement that allows those resources to serve the Somali state rather than become part of its political conflict. Until that happens, the international community may succeed in extending Somalia’s security transition without actually making it sustainable.

Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com