Thursday, March 28, 2024
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SSC, Somaliland: How Somalia Fares in the Era of Sino-US Rivalry

By Faisal A. Roble

The Lasanod (phonetic Laascaanod) conflict which took full shape in the past 30 days could have a far reaching consequence for Somalia’s stability and for the Horn of Africa (for a detailed timeline on the latest events, see Markus Hoehnr’s article on African arguments). 

Lasanod is the administrative seat for the region known as SSC, alias Sool, Sanag, and Cayn. The political crisis emanating from this region could only be better understood within the context of resuscitating the collapsed Somali state, the unilateral secession of Somaliland from Somalia, and the renewed Sino-US cold war which is about to take center stage. 

Somaliland is determined to be a state that is separate from Somalia; the SSC region, on the other hand, says it wants to remain part of the motherland of Somalia. The Sino-US rivalry seems to see some of their strategic benefits in this conflict of brothers and sisters in some of the most underdeveloped regions of Africa. 

The conflict of SSC and Somalis hanker back to what is becoming contending historical narratives. Each side makes its own irreplaceable respective case based on both past and modern histories. The SSC side invested in a pan-Somali narrative while Somaliland disowns Somali unity. Meanwhile, the renewed Sino-US rivalry in the Horn of Africa complicates matters and adds more fuel to the feud. This feud could possibly create a window of opportunity for Somaliland by exploiting US’s hunger and anchor in the Red Sea, while the goal of US could possibly undermine Somalia’s fragile stability.

Current Conflict Beyond Anthropology

I.M. Lewis, one of the founding fathers of Somali Studies, painted an idyllic picture of British “Cinderrela” in Somalia when he studied this region from an ethnographic point of view (see I.M.Lewis; A Pastoral Democracy). He studied a society that was hundred percent pastoral and lineage-based rural society. Individual traits were easily traceable through the father’s lineage. Lewis’ study of one Ali Geri clansman painted a Cinderella of Somalia where everything was determined by that kinship lineage. In the eyes of many students of Somalia, that made sense in the 1940s

Contemporary social system of SSC, however, is largely urban, small town dwellers, and diaspora communities linked to their home base. This could also  be said for many other regional groups in the Somali peninsula.  Most contemporary Somali communities are far removed from the 16th century pastoral communities of Mongolia but much closer to America’s Irish communities that are both diaspora and linked to their home base solidly.

Both Somaliland and the SSC regions are highly urbanized; both communities register a high rate of diaspora communities living outside their home regions. However, before urbanization expanded in both regions and generations X and beyond dominated the two populations, anthropological analysis of the past which hinged on ethnographic relationships such as intra-clan intermarriages and diya-paying networks made sense. Both Somaliland and the SSC region are dominated by a younger population who share less inter-clan marriage and diya-paying based connections that in the past existed. 

Invariably, past anthropological connections between the two communities were utilized as tools to resolve conflicts. However, because of weakened historical connection, traditional  mechanisms cannot withstand political goals of contending sides and the interference of global forces whose purse power is capable of breaking past ties of the two sides. For today’s contemporary political entanglement between Somaliland and the SSC region, we have to identify new tools beyond past anthropological mechanisms.

Contending Historical narratives

The SSC region sits in the belly of Somalia both geographically and historically. Geographically, it joins former British Somaliland with Italian Somaliland. Until recently, residents of SSC and the rest of Somaliland were one of the most integrated clans in the Somali peninsula. The inter-marriage between the major clans in SSC and the central districts of Somaliland was unparalleled. However, thirty years of separation, clan animosity, and fast based urbanization with over 70% of the both populations being under 25, past positive relations have given way to a contaminated and politically driven agenda. Today, the SSC and Somaliland political axis are the most hot spots in the region.

Contending views about the history of Sayyid Mohammed Abdul Hassan and Somali unity are at the center of the Somaliland vs SSC contested narrative. Whereas elites from SSC hold the Sayyid as the father of pan-Somali unification, those from Somaliland disown both the Sayyid and pan-Somali unity. This difference was latent in the past. SInce the 1990 civil war, however, it fuels the burning of the bones of relationships inherited from past traditional ties.

Called  by the derogatory nickname of “the Mad Mullah,” the irked British colonial administrator in Somaliland armed one clan against another. The vestiges of that colonial policy negatively impacts the two versions of history held by these brotherly communities; the pitfalls from such distant days remain a dangerous latent power in the political history of the region.  

The Sayyid persona as the uncontested father of modern pan-Somali concept holds a tight grip on the political position of the people in the SSC region so much so it calls its ragtag militia oppssing Somaliland the “derwish forces.” This represents a throwback to the Sayyid’s army that bitterly fought the British empire in the first few years of the 19th century. That rebellious army was also called the “Darwish.” The english version is “dervish.” The mythical power of the belief in the person of the Sayyid is unbreakable to some.

On the contrary, Somaliland elites, which in 1991 unilaterally claimed to have seceded from the rest of Somalia, disowned this narrative of pan-Somali history. The Sayyid is a villain to the elites of Somaliland. As far back as the 1940s, some Somaliland elites, mainly those in former British East Africa, showed their discomfort with pan-Somali ideology. Again in 1960, the union with Somalia was a tortured and rushed process for some politicians. The merits and demerits of the unification of 1960 are still debated in Hargeisa to this day. 

In 1961, a revolt led by a junior officer in the name of Hassan Kayd sought to dissolve the nascent union between what was known as British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. This in spite of a clause in the Union Act that recognized the unification to be “unconditional,”  (See Faisal Roble- “Global and Local Norms: The Unilateral Secession of Somaliland,” Horn of Africa Journal, 2007.

Owing to a bitter war against the military rule of Sayyad Barre that started in the 1980s, finally a victorious rebel group called Somali National Movement (SNM) declared in 1991 a unilateral secession from the Republic of Somalia (what is now the Federal Somali Government).

Somaliland remains unrecognized after 30 years. However, it claims it has established a safer and better governed society than that from which it seceded. Zit claims to have satisfied the 

Both Somaliland and Somalia have been re-organized following the civil war and the collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic. Somaliland feels that it has established a democracy based on one person one vote. Somalia, owing to a complex clan calculus, has thus far failed to show success in forging ahead with one person one vote system of governance. 

Somaliland adamantly argues that it does not need to go back to a “dysfunctional union” that cannot unify its territory.  Somalia, on the other hand, vows to stick to the Act of Union of 1960 and UN Resolutions. (see Roble, Faisal: Global and Local Norms: The Unilateral Secession of Somaliland, 2007). Both instruments arguably protect Somalia’s solemn sovereignty despite temporary setbacks inherited from the military dictatorship era. It is within this context that Somalia categorically denies any declaration of Somaliland’s unilateralism for secession.

Meanwhile, residents of the SSC region fall between rock and hard place. On the one hand, they say they are treated as second class citizens in what they call a “clan fiefdom” state of Somaliland. On the other hand, the federal Somali government to which they ceded their loyalty has done little or nothing for over 30 years. When former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, whose mother hails from SSC was asked what he is doing for SSC, he held back by saying “don’t ask me that question.” The current president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud,walks on eggshells and carefully calls on both sides to tone down the rhetoric and create a peaceful space to talk. Nonetheless, the federal government has little or no leverage thus far to change the status quo in the question of SSC.

One therefore wonders why SSC leaders show so much loyalty to the FSG, even after they accuse the central government of secretly working with Hargeisa? Are SSC leaders putting all their eggs in one basket? Others may ask how much resilience is left in the patriotic sentiment of the leaders of SSC? What would happen if the current uprising, which called for a  “maximum” result that is complete liberation of SSC falls short? None of these skepticism, however, seem to dampen the fervor and vigor of SSC people who seem to be determined to disown Somaliland as much as Somaliland disowned Somalia. Such extremity in political positions could melt into the new Sino-US rivalry where contending African and indigenous issues became convenient instruments for the big powers to achieve their global strategic goals.

The flare up over Lasanod comes at a time when the former Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia and now a member of the parliament of the federal government mistakenly referred to Somaliland as a neighboring country.  Mr. Mahdi hails from Somaliland but officially ceded loyalty to one-Somalia and rejects secession. It may not have been intentional on Mr. Mahdi’s part to call Somaliland a “country.” But, with mistrust shrouding the political landscape of Somalia, this created an uproar inside the parliament and in social media. 

With or without Mahdi’s true feeling towards Somaliland as a country, this hitherto peaceful enclave had enjoyed a de facto recognition from the central government for the last 20 years. Mogadishu always treated Hargeisa with kid gloves mainly because of a recognition of what had happened to the people in Somaliland under the Barre regime. Hargeisa on the other hand took advantage of this deference by Mogadishu and often played the tough card. And that all along gave Somaliland ample opportunity to garner official diplomatic engagement with many countries. There are about eigh diplomatic missions functioning in Somaliland including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, UAE, Turkey. The US has also started to seriously engage Somaliland. The federal Somali Government never challenged these countries for violation of its territorial integrity.

The resumption of Sino-US rivalry for world dominance also plays a role in strengthening Somaliland. With the acquiescence and admiration of the United States of America, Somaliland has cemented relations with Taiwan. Taiwan is a top strategic ally of the US. To that end, the new legislation of Title XIII says that the US calls for “(A) bolster cooperation between Somaliland and Taiwan.” AS such the United States has decided to earmark funds to strengthen the security capability of Somaliland. 

In the Omnibus legislation of Title XXXI, Congress Adam Smith of Washington State sponsored the following language to be added to the end of Subtitle B: 1 SEC. 13l. FEASIBILITY STUDY AND REPORT RELATING TO 2 SOMALILAND. 3 (a) FEASIBILITY STUDY. It reads this:

“The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall conduct a feasibility study tha (1) includes consultation with Somaliland security organs;  (2) determines opportunities for collaboration in the pursuit of United States national security interests in the Horn of Africa, the Gulf of Aden, and the broader Indo-Pacific region.”

Furthermore, it goes on to say that “a United States diplomatic and security engagement partnership with Somaliland would have a strategic impact, including by protecting the United States and allied maritime interests in the Bab-el Mandeb Strait and at Somaliland’s Port of Berbera.”

The Federal Government of Somalia has thus far played safe and President Hassan Sheikh Mohmoud called for the creation of a peaceful space. Meanwhile, Mogadishu is not showing any signs of urgency to engage China as much as Somaliland is engaging Taiwan. Also, the US is double-dipping by engaging both Mogadishu and Hargeisa to the detriment of the stability of Somalia at large. And this gives SSC leaders constant heartburn where even some accuse Mogadishu of closely and secretly working with Hargeisa.

If Mogadishu is slow to capitalize on the Chinese factor in the Horn of Africa, both Ethiopia and Kenya have active and strong diplomatic relations with China. They are already in the thick of the new cold war calculus. 

Way Forward

  1. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud should double his diplomatic efforts to bring pacification in Lasanod and help create a safe place for the two sides to talk.
  2. The AU in collaboration with the UN must look into this matter before it becomes a calamitous disaster that could end up in massive famine, displacement and death of innocent civilians in a large scale.
  3. If not nibbed in the but, this conflict over SSC could deteriorate to a large-scale clan conflict involving multiple region in Somalia which could easily undermine both Somaliland’s relative stability and the recovery of Somalia as well as the political ambitions of the residents of SSC.
  4. A non-conventional recommendation to both sides to the conflict is to not put on the table “maximum” political demands on the table and seek peaceful talks mediate but preceded by silencing the guns of Lasanod.

Faisal A. Roble
Email: [email protected]
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Faisal Roble, a writer, political analyst and a former Editor-in-Chief of WardheerNews, is mainly interested in the Horn of Africa region. He is currently the Principal Planner for the City of Los Angeles in charge of Master Planning, Economic Development and Project Implementation Division.

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Referrences

Referrence: Hoehne, Markus V, https://africanarguments.org/2023/02/crisis-in-lasanod-insecurity-border-disputes-and-the-future-of-somaliland/ “Crisis in Lasanod: Border Disputes, Escalating Insecurity and the Future of Somaliland, African Arguments,”  February 6, 2023.

Faisal Roble. https://wardheernews.com/local-global-norms-challenges-somalilands-unilateral-secession/ “Global and Local Norms: The Unilateral Secession of Somaliland,” Horn of Africa Journal, 2007.

I.M. Lewis: Blood and Bone, The Call of Clan and Kinship in Somali Society, Red Sea Press, 1994.

Hussein Adam: From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali Experience. The Red Sea Press, 2008.

I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965).

Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam, 2010


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