By Abdullahi A. Nor
Background
Egypt’s interest in deploying forces to Somalia can be viewed through the lens of its broader geopolitical strategy in the Horn of Africa. The region is critical due to its proximity to the Red Sea, a vital maritime route for global trade, including oil shipments. By establishing a military presence in Somalia, Egypt could potentially strengthen its influence in the region, which would be strategically advantageous.
Another underlying motivation could be related to the Nile water dispute with Ethiopia. By positioning forces near the Ethiopian border, Egypt may seek to exert pressure on Ethiopia regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations. This presence could be perceived as a form of leverage or a deterrent against Ethiopian actions that could threaten Egypt’s water security.
The Somali government’s decision to allow Egyptian forces could be seen as an attempt to diversify its security partnerships, particularly after the withdrawal of ATMIS. However, this decision also raises questions about the impact on Somali sovereignty, as it might lead to the country becoming a battleground for regional power struggles. Somalia is in a delicate position, needing to balance its relationships with neighboring countries. Ethiopia views the instability in Somalia as a direct threat to its national security. Accepting Egyptian forces could strain Somalia’s ties with Ethiopia, a key player in its security; while Ethiopia’s primary presence is its interest of preventing Al Shabab infiltration into its country, the deployment of Egyptian forces in Somalia, could destabilize the already fragile political and security environment in Somalia and the region.
Ethiopia’s Concerns of Egyptian Forces near Ethiopia’s Border and the GERD Dispute
Ethiopia has been deeply involved in Somalia’s security landscape for years, particularly in combating Al-Shabaab and supporting regional administrations among many like South West State and Jubaland. Ethiopia’s military presence has been a stabilizing force in these regions, and its exclusion from post-ATMIS plans could undermine these efforts, potentially allowing extremist groups to regain strength.
The GERD, a massive hydroelectric dam on the Blue Nile, has been a source of intense dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. Ethiopia views the dam as essential for its economic development and energy needs, while Egypt fears it will significantly reduce its share of Nile water, which is vital for its agriculture and population.
The deployment of Egyptian forces close to Ethiopia’s border could be seen as a provocative move, potentially escalating tensions between the two countries. Ethiopia might perceive this as a direct threat, leading to a hardening of its stance in the GERD negotiations and possibly provoking military posturing or even clashes. If Egyptian forces are deployed and Ethiopian troops are withdrawn, it could diminish Ethiopia’s influence in Somalia. This shift might destabilize the region where Ethiopian forces have been key in combating Al Shabab extremist and maintaining security, creating a power vacuum that could be exploited by Al-Shabaab or other militant groups in the making.
Egypt’s Alignment with U.S. and Israeli Interests:
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s rise to power in Egypt, following the 2013 military coup, is often linked to support from the U.S. and Israel. His regime has been criticized for prioritizing the strategic interests of these countries, particularly in maintaining stability in the region and countering Islamist movements, which align with the broader U.S. and Israeli agendas.
Sisi’s government has also been heavily criticized for its role in the Gaza blockade and its policies towards the Palestinian territories. This has led to widespread resentment among many in the Muslim world, who view Egypt’s actions as complicit in the suffering of the Palestinian people. This perception could influence how Egypt’s involvement in Somalia is received, potentially reducing its ability to gain support from local populations or Muslim-majority countries.
Implications for U.S. and Israeli Strategies:
The U.S. and Israel might view an Egyptian military presence in Somalia as a way to extend their strategic footprint in the Horn of Africa. This region is crucial for global security, given its proximity to the Middle East, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Peninsula. However, this involvement could also draw them deeper into the complex web of regional conflicts and rivalries.
The deployment of Egyptian forces, perceived as aligned with U.S. and Israeli interests, could provoke backlash from local populations and neighboring countries. This could further complicate efforts to stabilize Somalia and might lead to increased anti-Western sentiment in the region, fueling insurgency and instability.
Regional and International Reactions
Sudan, which is also involved in the GERD dispute, might view Egypt’s deployment in Somalia with concern, particularly if it escalates tensions with Ethiopia. Sudan’s own stability is precarious, and it could be drawn into the conflict if regional tensions increase.
Other Horn of Africa countries, such as Djibouti and Eritrea, might react differently depending on their current relations with Egypt and Ethiopia. Djibouti, with its strategic location and military bases, might be particularly concerned about any shifts in the balance of power in the region.
Somalia’s Fragile Stability and the Future of ATMIS
The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) has played a critical role in supporting the Somali government’s efforts to rebuild state institutions and counteract extremist groups. As ATMIS phases out, there is a significant concern about the capacity of Somali security forces to maintain stability without continued international support. The withdrawal of ATMIS, coupled with the exclusion of Ethiopian forces and the introduction of Egyptian troops, could create a security vacuum in certain regions. This vacuum could be exploited by Al-Shabaab or other militant groups, leading to a resurgence of violence and further destabilizing the country.
Somalia’s Strategic Choices:
The Somali government must carefully navigate the influence of external powers to avoid becoming a proxy battleground for regional and international rivalries. Balancing relations with Ethiopia, Egypt, and other stakeholders is crucial to maintaining stability and protecting Somali sovereignty.
President Hassan’ Government has signed defense agreements with at least seven countries that have conflicting interests in the horn that includes Ethiopia, Turkey, UAE, USA, Kenya, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Surprisingly none of these agreements were presented to the Parliament. President Hassan runs the country like mad house.
The 1995 legacy of Egyptian and Libyan black market weapons
In 1995 Egypt and Libya allegedly supplied weapons to the United Somali Congress (USC) militia of the Hawiye clan, a move that exacerbated the already volatile situation in Somalia. The weapons helped fuel a campaign of violence against the South West State populations leading to mass displacement, territorial occupation, and widespread suffering. The USC militia was able to dominate and control key areas, displacing other clans and leaving lasting animosities. The communities in these regions, particularly in South West and also Gedo felt the brunt of the violence. Entire communities were driven from their homes, and land occupations were solidified through force.
Ethiopian intervention at that time is viewed as the saving grace for these communities. Ethiopia’s timely involvement halted the USC militia advances and restored some semblance of order, preventing the complete annihilation of South West FMS populations. For the last 15 years, Ethiopian non-ATMIS forces have played a crucial role in maintaining security in these areas, particularly by keeping Al-Shabaab at bay.
Ethiopian non-ATMIS forces have been stationed in the under listed critical districts and regions, acting as a bulwark against Al-Shabaab:
- Gedo Region
- Berdaale
- Xudur
- Waajid
- Qansax Dheere
- Diinsoor
In the event Ethiopia decides to withdraw its forces to the border, these six districts and regions, and potentially even more, could quickly be taken over by Al Shabab. For the past 15 years, the Ethiopian Defense Forces have been the only barrier standing between Al Shabab and the people of the South West State in this geographic area. The residents of these six districts and regions have been confined to their areas, with no hope of traveling by land due to Al Shabab forces encircling them. Air travel has been the only means of reaching these places, and the situation has rarely changed over the past 15 years.
Read more: Egypt’s Proposed Deployment to Somalia: Blessing or Disaster in the making?
Abdullahi Ahmed Nor
Email: [email protected]
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