By Mohamed A Yasin

Allegations of clan-based appointments raise fresh questions about merit, state capture and the future of Somalia’s public institutions. How can Somalia climb out of the hole of corruption when public institutions are increasingly accused of being treated as political and clan possessions rather than national institutions?

That question has returned to the centre of Somalia’s political debate after the House of the People overturned a directive requiring senior government positions to be filled through competitive, merit-based recruitment. The directive, issued by Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre’s government, called for senior civil-service posts to be filled through competition based on qualifications, experience, competence and merit. The House of the People voted overwhelmingly to annul it on September 23, according to parliamentary reporting.

Supporters of the directive described competitive recruitment as a step toward professionalising Somalia’s civil service. Its opponents, however, argued that the government could use the process to remove existing directors and replace them with political or clan allies under the appearance of an impartial competition.

The dispute exposes a much deeper problem: whether Somalia’s public institutions can ever become genuinely professional if access to senior government positions is determined by clan connections rather than competence.

The Immigration Agency: A Case That Demands Scrutiny

The Immigration and Citizenship Agency provides a particularly striking example of the allegations now circulating. A list circulating publicly identifies 27 senior officials and staff in key positions within the agency and its overseas operations, and claims that all belong to the Murusade Hawiye clan.

The list includes the Director General, finance director, visa director, senior advisers, ICT officials, immigration-crime officials, verification and procurement officers, passport-centre officials and supervisors, as well as officials assigned to Somali diplomatic missions in Djibouti, Yemen, Sweden, Syria, South Sudan, Riyadh and Germany.

The current Director General, Hussein Qasim Yusuf, is officially confirmed as head of the Immigration and Citizenship Agency. He assumed the position in February 2026, according to the agency’s own records.

But the agency’s official sources do not establish the clan identities of the 27 individuals listed above, nor do they establish that appointments were made on the basis of clan affiliation. Those allegations therefore require independent verification. That distinction is critical.

If the allegations are accurate, however, the concentration of senior positions in one clan would raise serious questions about equal access to public employment, institutional neutrality and the professional independence of one of Somalia’s most strategically important government agencies.

A Government Agency Is Not a Clan Share

The broader accusation extends beyond immigration. Critics of Somalia’s federal government argue that a recurring pattern exists in which ministers and senior officials treat ministries and government agencies as political or clan allocations: existing officials are removed, transferred or demoted, while individuals considered politically or clan-connected to the new leadership are appointed.

The result, critics argue, is a civil service in which the question is no longer “Who is qualified?” but “Who do you belong to?” Such a system would have consequences far beyond individual appointments.

A professional civil service depends on continuity. Directors and technical officials should be able to remain in office because of competence and performance, not because they belong to the political network of the minister currently controlling their institution.

When every change of political leadership produces a corresponding change in senior officials, government institutions become vulnerable to political capture. And when clan affiliation becomes an informal qualification for employment, public institutions risk becoming extensions of clan competition rather than instruments of the Somali state.

The Parliament’s Intervention

The parliamentary rejection of the recruitment directive has therefore exposed a fundamental contradiction. On paper, competitive recruitment sounds like precisely what Somalia needs: advertise positions, establish transparent qualifications, test candidates and select the highest-performing applicants.

But the controversy demonstrates why the credibility of the institution conducting the competition matters as much as the competition itself. If existing directors believe that a recruitment exercise is designed to remove them and install politically connected replacements, confidence in the process collapses.

Conversely, if directors are protected from legitimate performance-based competition simply because they already occupy their positions, professional reform also becomes impossible. The solution cannot be either unchecked political appointments or a recruitment process that is merely competition in name.

The real requirement is an independent, transparent and enforceable civil-service system in which recruitment, promotion, dismissal and disciplinary action are governed by clear rules rather than political or clan influence.

The Corruption Problem Is Bigger Than Money

Somalia’s corruption problem is often discussed in terms of stolen public funds, procurement irregularities or misuse of government resources. But institutional patronage can be equally damaging. When public employment is distributed through political or clan networks, corruption becomes embedded in the structure of government itself.

A position can become a reward. A ministry can become a political asset. A government agency can become a source of patronage. And public employment can become a mechanism for consolidating political influence. That is why the debate over civil-service recruitment matters far beyond the fate of individual directors.

Somalia cannot build credible institutions while public positions are perceived to belong to whoever controls the ministry at a particular moment.

The Test Is Whether the Rules Apply to Everyone

The Immigration and Citizenship Agency is responsible for some of the most sensitive functions of the Somali state, including passports, border management, visas, citizenship and identity-related services. The agency itself describes its mission as safeguarding Somali citizenship and managing the country’s borders. That makes professional standards particularly important.

The same principle applies across the government. If officials are appointed because they are qualified, the government should be able to demonstrate the qualifications and recruitment procedures publicly. If officials are removed, the government should explain the legal and performance-based reasons. If positions are advertised, the selection process should be independently monitored.

And if allegations of clan concentration arise, the government should be willing to publish sufficient information to allow those allegations to be tested rather than simply dismissed. Transparency is the only credible answer to suspicion.

Can Somalia Escape the Cycle?

Somalia has spent years attempting to rebuild a functioning state after decades of institutional collapse. Yet state-building cannot succeed if political competition continues to penetrate the civil service.

The country does not need ministries that belong to one minister, agencies that belong to one political faction or public jobs that belong to one clan. It needs institutions that belong to the Somali public.

The parliamentary rejection of the government’s recruitment directive may have halted one particular process, but it does not resolve the underlying problem. The real challenge is to establish a civil service in which clan identity is irrelevant, political loyalty is not a qualification, and competence is not a threat to whoever happens to control the ministry.

Until that principle becomes enforceable rather than aspirational, Somalia’s fight against corruption will remain incomplete.

A country cannot climb out of the hole of corruption by changing the people who occupy government offices. It climbs out only when the rules governing those offices become stronger than the clans, politicians and individuals who control them.

Mohamed A Yasin
Email: moyasin680@gmail.com