By Faisal A. Roble

Infantile Disorder

Despite premature jubilations and clannish triumphalism in some circles, Jubbaland is not yet out of the woods. The Interim Administration’s misappropriation of Parliamentary seats has created an intense political fiasco.

On June 5, 2015, the Somali Federal Parliament (SFP) passed a capricious (misplaced) motion to delegitimize the recently seated Jubbaland Parliament (JP). Following that decision was a chain of anarchic reactions: Interim Jubbaland President (IJP) “severed” relations with Mogadishu; PM Sharmarke, with all his maverick political goals, organized a “fact finding committee” to Kismayo. On June 8, President Hassan Sheikh called for talks to end the three-month-old crisis. Two days later, the UN, IGAD (Kenya and Ethiopia, most importantly) and donor countries all in unison called for an expedient end to the logjam.

Soon after, Puntland jumped on the frying pan and condemned Mogadishu’s actions without mentioning the wronged groups in the region. On June 20, once again Sharmarke paid a symbolic visit to Kismayo and agreed with Ahmed Madobe to start “confidence building”, notwithstanding non-committal blurbs coming from Sharmarke.

All the futile and costly moves could have been avoided with simple foresight on both sides of the story. Indeed, a lot of time has been wasted and more so for a nation that has already lost two generations in conflict and statelessness. This is no less than a classic case of politics of the “infantile disorder.”

The sources for all this disorder are two intertwined questions that are fused together: one is, whether the SFP has the constitutional powers to unseat Jubbaland’s imperfect regional parliament; and the second is the narrow composition of the Jubbaland Parliament.

Misplaced Motion

The Draft Somali Federal Constitution (DSFC) purposely limits the powers of the SFP in the sphere of making and/or dissolving regional legislative bodies. This is so for two reasons that are both historical and practical: First, at the time of constitutional making process, there was a clear intent to limit the powers of the central government in the affairs of the regions, and deliberately place more decision making instruments in the hands of the people in the regions. The intent was to create a sustainable paradigm shift from a unitary to a federal system of governance where power of regional and local governments resides in the peoples of the regions.

The second reason why the Draft Constitution declined to cede overriding powers of state formation to the Federal Parliament is because the document duly recognized that both Somaliland and Puntland had established their parliaments prior to the drafting of the constitution. The conundrum here was to either give these two states special statuses beyond the reach of the Federal Government, or equalize all states, including these two, and rather limit the Federal Parliament’s power in the process of federation and state formation. At the end of the day, the later made sense, and still makes send.

Without belaboring the issue, as the Draft Constitution stands, the Somali Federal Parliament does not have the legal mandate to nullify any regional parliament as it wishes. But it has the power to monitor and hold national institutions accountable to the people. Under Article 69, Section 2(b), the SFP has the role and moral duty to “hold accountable and monitor the national institutions, and to ensure the implementation of national laws.” In other words, if and when the SFP sees gross injustice being done by leaders or national institutions, as the case has been with the composition of the Jubbaland Parliament, it shall have the duty to intervene and hold accountable those violating the spirit of the law.

Having said that, however, the tools with which to intervene in those instances where a regional institution, like Jubbaland, is committing gross violations have not being delineated in the constitution. Nor are in place constitutional institutions that could have mediated this matter. As such, the only venue open to the SFP was to blow the whistle and call upon Interim President of Jubbaland to account for his actions. Simply put, while there is a strong moral obligation in addition to monitoring powers bestowed on it, the SFP has no constitutional mandate to delegitimize or dissolve a seating Parliament no matter how imperfect that Parliament is.

A not-so-minor irritant issue in the case of Jubbaland that vs. the Federal Parliament is Mr. Mohamed Jawari’s perceived partiality and a clear conflict of interest in this matter. Many feel that the chairman of the House acted on this matter in a manner that is political rather than judicial. The best course of action would have been to never bring the matter to the floor. Therefore, given a conflict of interest associated with Mr. Jawari and the lack of constitutional powers by the SFP to delegitimize the JP, the June 5, 2015 motion is inherently illegal and must be expunged from the record.

IJA Misstep must be Accountable

With its volatile and power- and land-grabbing history plus a constant influx of peoples from elsewhere Jubbaland has been a home to an uneasy diversity (I will discuss this phenomenon historically and politically in my upcoming article). It suffices here to say that every major warlord in Southern Somalia since the fall of the military government in 1991 has either ruled or co-ruled this region (Some of these warlords include but not limited to the late Mohamed Farah Aidid, Ahmed Omar Jees, Barre Hirrale and Walaalaha Galguduud, the latte Hassan Turki of Al-Shabab, etc.,).

A prolonged conflict has irreparably caused environmental degradations, including destroying rich flora and fauna that was the landmark of the Alta-and lower-Jubba. As a result, most of the region’s wildlife, including the East African elephant population, has been annihilated to the determent of the basin. Worse, an entire economy based on productive agricultural and fishery sectors is rendered fallow.

To come out of this conflict condition, many thought that Jubbaland would form a government that is consensus-based, with its more than 35 clans are represented in its post-conflict assembly. However, due to heavy handedness from Interim Jubbaland President, the region is today more similar to the story of George Orwell’s Animal Farm, where some clans are “more equal than others.” Along the way, it lost a lot of legitimacy and is now “limping along,” as Abdirahman Hosh put it.

In establishing the regional Parliament, Interim President Ahmed Madobe erred at several levels: first, he used a chauvinistic formula that awarded handsomely his own clan with about 30% of the seats at the expense oof a mosaic less numerous groups. This move has proven not only undemocratic but also an unwarranted source of erosion for his legitimacy to lead Jubbaland with all its complex diversity. There is no scientific reason or tally of the population in the region that can award his clan with a whopping [nearly] 30% of the seats. Simply put it, neither the numbers nor the counts of districts’ configuration supports his theory of chauvinism.

Second, Ahmed Madobe’s constant refusal to heed consultations from different angles, some in his inner circle, and his unmitigated loyalty to a narrow clan agenda make him less reliable and more dangerous; it is doubly worrisome that he does not come across as a leader who can come to the table and work out differences through mediations.

Third, his tendency to populate his government with less qualified individuals promotes a condition of endemic absence of capacity and professionalism at the ministerial as well as the managerial levels of government institutions. This culture which he has condoned has gravely impacted progress thus far. It is just unfathomable to see under the current circumstances how this state could take off any time soon.

Given the time and esteem lost thus far, not to mention declining political legitimacy in the body politic of the leadership, only bold leadership, or a change of heart on the part of the current leadership, is the only way out to right past infractions. The leadership has three alternatives:

1. Seek local mediation with those aggrieved and start regaining the confidence of the people in the region by correcting mistakes pertaining to the new Parliament. Steps that the Jubbaland can take may include renegotiating with aggrieved groups and their leaders to make amends on the composition of the Parliament.

2. Allow the Somali Federal Parliament to exercise Article 69 Section 2(b) and begin monitoring and holding accountable the Jubbland Parliament, which then can exert due moral and political pressures until such a time comes when Ahmed Madobe relents and corrects his mistakes.

3. Have the Prime Minister and the committee he had organized put political pressure on Ahmed Madobe to adopt recommendations designed in Villa Somalia.

These are bitter pills from which the leadership of Jubbaland has to choose. Either way, the Jubbland Interim leader has to be accountable either to his constituents, and choose alternative 1, or to national higher bodies as stipulated under Section 2(b) of Article 69 of the Draft Federal Constitution.

Faisal Roble
WardheerNews contributor
Email: faisalroble19@gmail.com
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Faisal Roble is a writer, political analyst and a former Editor-in-Chief of WardheerNews, mainly interested in the Horn of Africa region. He is currently the Principle Planner for the City of Los Angeles in charge of Master Planning, Economic Development and Project Implementation Division.