By Tobias Hagmann, Rift Valley Institute

Summary

Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as ‘extraversion’. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional govern­ments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support.

The report highlights four findings that partly echo existing scholarship but also offer new insights for statebuilding and political settlements. Firstly, in south-central Somalia a recurrent negative relationship between external stabilization attempts and peaceful political settlements can be observed. More significantly, coercive external statebuilding has encouraged violent attempts to produce a political settlement within the country. This holds particularly true for the time periods of 1991–1995 and 2006–2016 in south-central Somalia—and inversely, also for Somaliland after 1991, where external statebuilding efforts were minimal. Secondly, while both political settlements and international interventions in Somalia have changed over time, some of the forms of extraversion have remained constant. The use of coercion, the appropriation of external resources, flight and trickery have been obstacles to more peaceful political settlements. They have led statebuilders to favour the creation of formal institutions as a prerequisite—rather than an outcome—of actual state formation. Thirdly, selective or partial recognition is the key foreign policy mechanism by which authority and resources are bestowed upon Somali constituencies in particular times and particular places. This recognition has fueled political competition, rewarded abuse and ineffective governance, and repeatedly encouraged the creation of brief­case organizations—including, most recently, federal member states. Lastly, the extraversion of foreign aid and external stabilization has been so long-standing and entrenched that donors and the range of external actors aiming to influence political developments in Somalia have become an integral part of these processes.

Read more: Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia

Rift Valley Institute