By Wilo Abdulle Osman
26 January/Another Sunday
On December 16, 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made remarks during a UN Security Council meeting concerning the situation in Somalia, held in New York City. The immediate issue at that time was piracy, instability and security. Rice highlighted that piracy was not merely a maritime problem but rather a symptom of a larger issue: the instability and lack of governance within Somalia. She emphasized the need to address the root causes of insecurity by stabilizing Somalia through a unified government and international support. Rice argued that a security vacuum in Somalia would not only exacerbate piracy but also undermine the progress made by the Djibouti process and AMISOM.
This insight remains deeply relevant, as Somalia’s internal instability today continues to impact its sovereignty and security. The recent clashes in Doolow between Somali federal forces and Jubaland troops, compounded by Ethiopia’s alleged violations of Somali territorial sovereignty, are contemporary manifestations of the same governance vacuum that Rice identified. To tackle its challenges, Somalia must once again focus on internal unity through improved leadership and assert its sovereignty against external pressures as of December 2024. In 2008,
Condoleezza Rice called for a comprehensive strategy that included enhanced peacekeeping and coordinated support for Somali governance. She warned that without these efforts, Somalia risks remaining trapped in a cycle of instability and exploitation, a situation reminiscent of what she highlighted in 2008. The current circumstances in December 2024 mirror those of 1991, with key figures such as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre, and Ahmed Mohamud Islam leading factions that echo past conflicts. Puntland is viewed negatively, and regions like SSC Khatumo are struggling under Somaliland oppression, unable to defend themselves. This narrative suggests a troubling return to the chaos of the 1991 civil war, a year marked by violence and suffering among the Somali people. As January 26, 2025, approaches—a Sunday, just like in 1991—it raises concerns about what may unfold.
International Cooperation and UN Peacekeeping
Rice advocated for stronger international cooperation to address Somalia’s instability. She called for a solid UN peacekeeping force to support AMISOM, suggesting that “blue-hatting” AMISOM troops could strengthen their capacity. However, Rice acknowledged the limitations of international willingness to provide troops, noting that African nations had expressed more interest than others in contributing to Somali stabilization.This mirrors the current reality, where AMISOM (now replaced by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, ATMIS) continues to bear the brunt of stabilizing Somalia.
However, the absence of a UN peacekeeping force and the reliance on regional actors like Ethiopia have created vulnerabilities. Ethiopia’s significant presence in Somali affairs, including its military involvement in Doolow and agreements with Somaliland, highlights the challenges of relying on neighboring states with their own geopolitical interests rather than neutral international forces.
Somali Governance and Internal Divisions
Rice emphasized the critical importance of unity within Somali leadership, urging the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to resolve internal disputes and prioritize stability for the Somali people. She asserted that the Somali people “deserve better,” which is better articulated as their right to life, peace, sovereignty, and security, rather than enduring infighting among their leaders. Such conflicts undermine international support and jeopardize the Djibouti peace process. This critique remains relevant today.
The ongoing power struggles between the Somali federal government and regional administrations, such as Puntland and Jubaland, compounded by the incompetence of the federal leaders, have severely fragmented governance. The current government led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is creating a security vacuum throughout the country. The conflict in Doolow and Raaskamboni where federal forces clashed with troops aligned with Jubaland, demonstrates that Somalia’s current leadership has not yet addressed the divisions that Rice identified as significant obstacles to stability.These internal divisions diminish Somalia’s ability to resist external interference and manage its own affairs, as exemplified by Ethiopia’s influence in Jubaland.
Eritrea’s Role and External Influences
Rice briefly mentioned Eritrea’s destabilizing role in Somalia, noting that Eritrean policies were contributing to internal conflict. While Eritrea’s involvement in Somali affairs has waned in recent years, the broader point about external interference remains relevant. Today, Ethiopia plays a more significant role in Somali politics, with its military presence in regions like Doolow and agreements with Somaliland raising questions about its long-term intentions.
Ethiopia’s actions, such as supporting regional administrations like Jubaland and allegedly violating Somali sovereignty through military attacks, reflect a continuation of the external pressures that Rice identified as undermining Somalia’s stability. These actions are often justified by Ethiopia as necessary for its national security but are perceived by many Somalis as violations of their sovereignty.
Connecting Rice’s Insights in 2008 to Current Somali-Ethiopian Dynamics
Current Situation in Somalia
- Ongoing Clashes: The recent clashes in Doolow, where Somalia has accused Ethiopia of sending troops to the border, highlight the persistent tensions between the two nations. This situation reflects Rice’s concerns about the internal divisions and external pressures that undermine Somali stability[1]
- Controversial Agreements: Ethiopia’s deal to build a port in Somaliland has sparked significant outrage in Somalia, raising fears of wider conflict. This agreement illustrates the external interference that Rice warned about, as it complicates Somalia’s sovereignty and governance[2] .
- Political Tensions: The political landscape in the Horn of Africa remains fraught with tension, particularly following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. This deal grants Ethiopia sea access in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty, further entrenching the divisions that Rice identified as obstacles to stability[3].
- Regional Implications: The involvement of various players in the Horn of Africa’s security dynamics, as noted in recent analyses, underscores the complexity of the situation. Ethiopia’s ambitions and the reactions from Somalia demonstrate the fragile balance of power in the region, echoing Rice’s warnings about the potential for conflict arising from these unresolved issues.
The current events in Somalia serve as a stark reminder of the challenges outlined by Rice, emphasizing the need for internal unity and effective leadership to navigate the ongoing crises. The situation in Somalia today, particularly the ongoing constitutional crisis, the clashes in Doolow and Raaskamboni, along with Ethiopia’s controversial agreements, exemplifies the unresolved issues that Condoleezza Rice described in 2008. Her insights into the challenges of governance, leadership incompetence, and external interference remain highly relevant.
The constitutional crisis has exacerbated tensions within the Somali government, leading to disputes over power-sharing and governance structures. This instability has made it difficult for the government to effectively address the needs of its citizens and maintain order.The clashes in Doolow and Raaskamboni further illustrate the fragility of the security situation in Somalia. These conflicts not only reflect the internal divisions within the country but also highlight the influence of external actors, particularly Ethiopia, which has engaged in controversial agreements that complicate Somalia’s sovereignty and governance.
Ethiopia’s involvement, particularly through agreements that grant it access to strategic resources and influence in regions like Somaliland, underscores the external interference that Rice warned about. Such actions threaten to undermine Somalia’s efforts to establish a cohesive and stable government.In summary, the current events in Somalia serve as a stark reminder of the challenges outlined by Rice, emphasizing the urgent need for internal unity, effective leadership, and a concerted effort to reclaim sovereignty in the face of external pressures.
Security Vacuum and Piracy
While piracy off Somalia’s coast has declined since its peak in the early 2000s, the security vacuum that enabled it persists. The absence of a unified Somali government, combined with regional conflicts such as those that occurred in December 2024 in Raaskamboni and Doolow, creates ongoing vulnerabilities that external actors, including Turkey and Ethiopia, exploit.
Ethiopia’s alleged attack on Somali forces in Doolow represents a direct challenge to Somali sovereignty and stability, echoing Rice’s warning about the dangers posed by a security vacuum.
Fragmentation of Somali Governance
Rice’s call for Somali leaders to resolve their internal disputes resonates in the context of the federal government’s clashes with Jubaland troops. The power struggle between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Jubaland and Puntland leaders Ahmed Madobe rand Said Abdullahi Deni eflects the same divisions that Rice criticized in 2008. These divisions undermine Somalia’s ability to form a cohesive national strategy and instead invite external actors to exploit the fragmentation.
Ethiopia’s Role and Regional Ambitions
Ethiopia’s military presence in many regions such as Doolow in Gedo and its agreements with Somaliland reflect its broader regional ambitions, particularly its aggression of having access to sea – maritime trade routes. Rice’s acknowledgment of the regional context, including the importance of Somali sovereignty, underscores the need for Somalia to assert control over its own affairs and borders. Ethiopia’s agreements with Somaliland, which Somalia considers part of its territory, parallel the external interference Rice warned about.
International Cooperation and Peacekeeping:
Rice’s call for a solid UN peacekeeping force remains unfulfilled. Instead, Somali security is largely managed by AMISOM/ATMIS and bilateral agreements with neighboring countries like Ethiopia. This reliance on regional actors has created a situation where Ethiopia, in particular, has disproportionate influence over Somali security and politics, often acting in ways that exacerbate tensions rather than resolve them.
Conclusion
Condoleezza Rice’s remarks in 2008 provided a prescient analysis of the challenges facing Somalia, many of which remain unresolved today. The ongoing tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, including the clashes in Doolow and Raaskamboni in December 2024, as well as the controversial agreements with Somaliland, illustrate the persistence of the governance vacuum, leadership incompetence, external interference, and internal divisions that Rice identified as key obstacles to Somali stability.
To address these challenges, Somalia must prioritize internal unity through improved leadership and assert its sovereignty in the face of external pressures. Simultaneously, the international community must revisit Rice’s call for a comprehensive strategy that includes stronger peacekeeping efforts and coordinated support for Somali governance. Without such initiatives, Somalia risks remaining trapped in a cycle of instability, fragmentation, and external exploitation, much like the situation Rice warned about in 2008. We find ourselves back to square one.
The current narrative of what is happening in Somalia in December 2024 closely resembles the events of 1991: Today, Hassan Sheikh leads the USC, Hamsa leads the SPLM, and Ahmed represents Hassan Turkey in Jubas. Puntland is described as a Dhafoorqiiq, and the Mareehaan are seen as remnants of Farmaajo. SSC Khatumo is new; it is not contributing anything to the ongoing destruction and is suffering as a result of Somaliland oppression. It cannot harm anyone and cannot protect itself alone, as it did before 1991 and after that, Hirshabelle and South West are in the same situation. They are not trustworthy in terms of predicting where the wind will take them.
The message conveyed in this narrative is unmistakable. I see nothing in today’s events that distinguishes them from those of 1991, the year when the Somali nation collapsed on January 26. During that time, the Somali people massacred one another, leading to chaos and profound suffering[4]. Let us wait until January 26, 2025, and see what it brings. Surprisingly, it is again a Sunday.
Wilo Abdulle Osman
Email: wilo.abdulle@gmail.com
Nairobi Kenya
[1] https://apanews.net/somali-accusations-amid-negotiations-with-ethiopia/
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo
[3] https://acleddata.com/2024/01/26/somalia-situation-update-january-2024-the-complexities-of-the-somaliland-ethiopia-sea-access-deal/
[4] https://wardheernews.com/the-memory-of-1991-a-nations-struggle-and-the-risk-of-reliving-dark-days/#google_vignette
We welcome the submission of all articles for possible publication on WardheerNews.com. WardheerNews will only consider articles sent exclusively. Please email your article today . Opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of WardheerNews.
WardheerNew’s tolerance platform is engaging with diversity of opinion, political ideology and self-expression. Tolerance is a necessary ingredient for creativity and civility.Tolerance fuels tenacity and audacity.
WardheerNews waxay tixgelin gaara siinaysaa maqaaladaha sida gaarka ah loogu soo diro ee aan lagu daabicin goobo kale. Maqaalkani wuxuu ka turjumayaa aragtida Qoraaga loomana fasiran karo tan WardheerNews.
Copyright © 2025 WardheerNews, All rights reserved
