By Dayib Sh Ahmed

Introduction

Somalia’s prolonged governance crises are too often misdiagnosed as symptoms of federalism’s failure rather than what they truly are a direct result of persistent constitutional violations, political opportunism, and institutional decay. This flawed diagnosis has prompted some political figures—most notably Puntland’s Minister of Interior and Federal Affairs, Abdinur Farah Juxa to call for a dramatic constitutional overhaul in the form of confederalism. In his proposal, Somalia is envisioned as a state where Federal Member States operate as nearly fully sovereign entities, relegating the Federal Government to a largely ceremonial role. My good friend, Abdelkarim A. Haji Hassan, captured this dilemma succinctly in his May 20, 2025 piece on WardheerNews. In “Somalia’s Federal & State Rift, Structural or Leadership-Driven?”he notes that the plan “posits a Somalia where Federal Member States function as almost fully sovereign entities, reducing the Federal Government to a largely a nominal authority” and pointedly asks, “Is the source of Somalia’s political conflict truly the federal system, or is it the failure of leaders at all levels to uphold and implement the constitutional framework of that system?”His companion essay, “No Adult in the Room, Somalia’s Zero-Sum Political Trap,” drives the verdict home, “Somalia’s greatest obstacle is not structural or financial. It is the refusal of its political class to rise above a zero-sum mindset. The country does not lack institutions; it lacks competent leaders and accountability. It does not lack frameworks; it lacks political maturity.” Together, these observations frame Somalia’s crisis not as a flaw in federal architecture nor a shortage of resources, but as a deep leadership deficit that sacrifices long-term national cohesion for narrow, short-term gains.

Such a proposition- confederation- while politically provocative, is both legally incoherent and dangerously impractical. It not only disregards the Provisional Constitution of 2012—which explicitly defines Somalia as an indivisible federal republic (Art. 1)—but also threatens to plunge the country into greater instability by weakening national unity, emboldening secessionist ambitions, and dismantling the fragile structures of collective governance that have taken years to build. This article contends that the root of Somalia’s dysfunction lies not in the architecture of federalism, but in its sustained subversion by political elites who exploit legal ambiguity and institutional weakness to concentrate power and evade accountability. The notion that Somalia’s governance crisis can be resolved through structural redesign—specifically via confederalism—is legally unfounded and politically misleading. It disregards the fact that the root causes of dysfunction lie not in the federal structure itself, but in the persistent violation and non-enforcement of constitutional norms by political actors at all levels. But this logic is deeply flawed.

If political actors routinely violate the Constitution under federalism, what assurance exists that they would respect its limits under a confederal arrangement? In fact, confederalism, by design, creates an even weaker central authority—rendering enforcement mechanisms ineffective and encouraging further political fragmentation. Such a structure would not correct Somalia’s governance failures; it would amplify them by institutionalizing elite impunity and dismantling any semblance of national cohesion.

Moreover, Somalia’s federal framework was not adopted arbitrarily. It was the result of hard-won consensus—designed to address historical grievances of overcentralization while preserving the integrity of the Somali state. Its failures lie not in the system’s intent or design, but in its implementation. The Constitution remains suspended in a liminal state: incomplete, inconsistently applied, and selectively enforced. Critical institutions like the Constitutional Court (Art. 109) and the Intergovernmental Relations Framework (Art. 51) remain non-operational, while both the FGS and FMS routinely overstep their constitutional boundaries for short-term political gain.

Confederalism would not resolve these issues—it would exacerbate them. It offers no mechanism to enforce constitutional norms, no incentive for cooperation, and no precedent of success in fragile, post-conflict states like Somalia. Rather than abandoning federalism in favor of an untested and unworkable alternative, the solution lies in strengthening constitutional federalism: completing the constitutional review process, operationalizing judicial and intergovernmental institutions, and instilling a culture of political accountability.

 Federalism in Somalia, Adopted but Never Implemented

The Provisional Constitution of 2012 declares Somalia “a federal, sovereign and indivisible republic” (Art. 1) and distributes authority on a tripartite basis—exclusive federal powers (Art. 54); concurrent powers to be exercised cooperatively by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Federal Member States (FMS); and residual powers that remain with the FMS unless explicitly transferred. This arrangement was crafted to prevent both the hyper-centralization that fueled the 1991 state collapse and the centrifugal fragmentation that unchecked autonomy could breed. Yet today’s instability stems not from flaws in this architecture but from its systematic erosion. In Mogadishu, the FGS routinely usurps state prerogatives over security, taxation, and natural-resource governance, flouting the subsidiarity mandate in Article 50 and leaving the Intergovernmental Relations Framework (Art. 51) and the Constitutional Court (Art. 109 B) dormant—so that inter-governmental disputes languish without an impartial arbiter. At the same time, several FMS negotiate external agreements, assert maritime claims, and otherwise exercise quasi-sovereign powers, even while governing internally as personalized satrapies bereft of real checks and balances.

Puntland—often cited as federalism’s longest-running success—illustrates the problem starkly. Despite operating for more than twenty-seven years as a constitutionally recognized FMS, it has never implemented the core decentralization envisioned by the federal charter. Local district-council secretaries and others key positions are still appointed unilaterally by the Ministry of Interior rather than chosen democratically by local electorates, directly contradicting the subsidiarity principle and undermining the self-governance, transparency, and accountability promised in Articles 49 and 50. It is legally inconsistent—and politically disingenuous—to champion federalism while refusing to honour its most basic obligations at the sub-national level.

Somalia’s present dilemma, therefore, is not a binary choice between federalism and confederalism but one of chronic non-compliance and institutional paralysis. Transplanting these maladies into a looser confederal model would only weaken an already fragile state rather than cure its ailments. What Somalia needs is not a new blueprint but the political will to respect, operationalize, and enforce the federal constitution it already has.

Confederalism A Legally and Practically Unviable Alternative

Some political elite proposal to replace Somalia’s federal system with a confederal arrangement is not only constitutionally untenable but also practically hazardous. Legally, the Provisional Constitution unequivocally defines Somalia as “an indivisible federal republic” (Art. 1), a foundational clause that cannot be overridden without triggering the wholesale abrogation of the constitutional order. Confederalism, by design, implies a loose union of sovereign states with the right to secede—an arrangement incompatible with Article 1’s insistence on unity and federalism. Such a transition would precipitate legal anarchy in the absence of a ratified constitutional replacement, dismantling the existing social contract and casting Somalia into further instability. It would also embolden secessionist claims, particularly from Somaliland, while undermining Puntland’s longstanding federalist stance that upholds Somalia’s territorial integrity.

Beyond legal contradictions, confederalism presents immense practical impediments. First, it would necessitate the replication of core state institutions across member states—such as independent tax authorities, customs agencies, foreign ministries, and central banks—imposing a bureaucratic and fiscal burden that Somalia’s fragile economy cannot absorb. Second, in the absence of a harmonized fiscal and economic policy, the already tenuous revenue-sharing mechanisms enshrined in Article 143 would collapse entirely, fueling disparities between wealthier, resource-rich regions and economically disadvantaged areas. The resulting fiscal fragmentation would exacerbate regional inequalities and deepen intergovernmental rivalries. Third, there is no modern precedent for a functioning confederation; even the European Union, often cited as a loose model, operates under immense strain and constant negotiation, backed by vastly stronger institutional capacities than Somalia currently possesses.

Politically, the risks are equally dire. A confederal Somalia would lack a unified chain of command in national defense, severely weakening collective security efforts against persistent threats such as Al-Shabaab and others enemies. Without an integrated military and intelligence structure, the country would become a patchwork of vulnerable territories—fertile ground for insurgents, warlords, and criminal networks. Additionally, the decentralization of foreign policy under a confederal arrangement would invite foreign meddling, with rival regional and international actors exploiting Somalia’s internal divisions to advance their own agendas. Libya’s descent into fragmented governance offers a sobering cautionary tale. Thus, far from resolving Somalia’s governance problems, confederalism would legally unravel the state, practically paralyze administration, and politically expose the nation to disintegration.

Conclusion

Confederalism, as proposed by some politician, is not a viable solution to Somalia’s chronic governance failures. It is a constitutional impossibility that directly contradicts the Provisional Constitution’s foundational commitment to an indivisible federal republic. Beyond its legal incoherence, confederalism poses dangerous political, economic, and security risks that would deepen Somalia’s fragmentation, embolden secessionist movements, and weaken collective efforts against threats such as Al-Shabaab. Rather than resolving existing dysfunction, it would institutionalize disunity, foster fiscal chaos, and open the door to foreign interference.

The path forward does not lie in abandoning federalism, but in making it work as intended. Somalia must recommit to constitutional federalism by expediting the long-stalled constitutional review process to clarify power and revenue-sharing arrangements, eliminating the ambiguities that fuel intergovernmental disputes. It must establish the long-overdue Constitutional Court to adjudicate such disputes and ensure legal accountability. Institutions tasked with safeguarding democratic processes—such as electoral and anti-corruption commissions—must be depoliticized and fully operationalized. Finally, intergovernmental coordination must be institutionalized through a binding and regular National Consultative Council mechanism. The remedy for Somalia’s instability is not structural reinvention but constitutional enforcement and principled leadership. Only through legal fidelity, institutional discipline, and genuine cooperation can Somalia’s federal system realize its promise of unity, stability, and self-governance.

Dayib Sh. Ahmed
Email: Dayib0658@gmail.com
—-
Dayib is a writer, political analyst and WardheerNews contributor.

———
Related articles

 Sub-states in Africa’s Post-Colonial Era: Challenging Statecraft By Faisal A Roble

Somalia’s Federal & State Rift: Structural or Leadership-Driven? By Abdelkarim A Hassan

State Decay: The case of Ethiopia and the Somali demand for self-determination By Faisal Roble