By Mohammed Hassan

Robert Kagan’s essay, Power and Weakness, has been widely described as thought provoking and persuasive in approach. According to Beaumont (2008), Kagan is an essayist, diplomat, and has advised John McCain, the Republican Party candidate in the 2008 US presidential elections, on foreign policy issues and he hails from the neo-conservatism school of thought. He has been linked to the Iraqi war and is thought to have given his intellectual blessings to the Bush administration to action regime change in Iraq. The timing of this essay could not have been more convenient and valuable to the Bush administration as it was delivered at the right time. At a time when America was determined to use military force to get rid of Saddam Hussein and his dictatorial regime nonetheless the idea of military was strongly opposed on the other side of the Atlantic by America’s European allies. It can be suggested that the authour was motivated to compose this essay in order to sway the opinions of the wavering Europeans who were opposed to the Iraqi war.

Robert Kagan’s (2002) central argument revolves around the divergence in how power is perceived by both camps in the transatlantic alliance. Europeans favour more multilateralism, negotiations, cooperation, rule of law and diplomacy in the resolution of conflicts and other international issues. This is so because Europeans are patient and can withstand the frustrations of failures and are inclined to resolve conflicts through peaceful means.

Conversely the Americans tend to adopt foreign policy based on unilateralism, have no enthusiasm for multilateralism or international institutions as they could be deemed constraining the advancement of American interests. Hence, they are, as opposed to their European allies, impatient and prefer speedy resolution to issues and tend to see problems solved and threats removed by the use of their military prowess. Moreover, their divergence is more pronounced in how they perceive issues. Americans divide the world into a dichotomy of good and evil, friend and adversary, whereas the Europeans are more pragmatic, understand the world is much more complex than the Americans do and approach it accordingly.

The authour claims that the main reason why the Europeans and the Americans differ in their perception of power is because the Europeans are weak and they act and behave like so. World War II contracted their global influence and mass decolonisation ensued, in the aftermath of the war, as sustaining the colonies was unrealisable. The authour pointed out that Europe and America swapped places. Historically, when Europeans were powerful in about three centuries ago, the Americans felt threatened and preached peace and the rule of law. Now that America is strong Europeans are feeling threatened and hence are reciprocating Americans with the preaching of peace, norms and the opposition of power. Kagan stresses that Europeans abandoned power politics and focused on the integration project while Americans shouldered their security and protection, thereby, making them “believe that power was no longer important” (Kagan, 2002, p.26) as the American power looked after them. The conclusion arrived by the authour after his lengthy analysis therefore suggests that the division between the European and the Americans on ideological fronts is a bearable one since America can handle world issues without assistance from their European allies.

The authour reflects on the work of British diplomat and a former advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Robert Cooper’s (2002) proposition for a new liberal imperialism. In his analysis, Cooper has classified the world into three zones, namely; modern, premodern and postmodern.

According to Cooper, the modern world is characterised by the classical state norms where the ideology of empire and the primacy of the national interests are the driving factors of the international order. In this zone, he argues, stability must be maintained by balancing the powers of the hostile actors in the world system. He claims states like China, India and Pakistan are typical examples of actors operating in the modern world zone. Cooper is not yet sure of where the United States stands in the continuum of modernism, probably the United States lie somewhere in the middle as it exhibits the characteristics of both modern and postmodern zones.

The Postmodern world zone is one which is characterised by the rejection of force as a means of conflict resolution. Where the gap between domestic and international affairs has narrowed down, where balance of power has no relevance in maintaining order and stability and where security depends on interdependence, transparency and mutual vulnerability. The EU is a good example of an actor in postmodern zone.

The premodern world however is characterised by chaos, anarchy and disorder and a typical example of the states that operate in this zone are what Cooper calls “failed states” for instance Somalia and The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). States in this league are weak, have no control over their own territories and are not themselves a direct threat to the international order. They, however, tend to provide favourable conditions for the growth of non-state actors such as terrorists, drug and organised crime groups. These groups may launch attacks from the premodern zone to harm the more orderly world zones (postmodern and modern). Threats from premodern zone are to be dealt with by defensive imperialism as Cooper suggests. The war on Afghanistan is an example of defensive imperialism from Western perspective. To deal with threats from the premodern world zone Cooper suggests that the West or more specifically, Europeans must be prepared to employ “double standards” (Copper, 2002). Cooper asserts that within the EU a ruled based culture and an “open cooperative security” (Cooper, 2002) must be observed but when dealing with “outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, and deception” (Cooper, 2002).

Kagan must have found Cooper’s essay truly inspiring and compelling evidence to back up his Power and Weakness essay with. Firstly, The New Liberal Imperialism essay grouped the world into three zones. It placed United States in both the modern and postmodern zones. This classification has presented a good case for Kagan’s essay for three main reasons. Firstly, it urged double standards and the use of the law of the jungle when operating in the jungle (premodern zone). It suggested the execution of defensive imperialism which could be used to justify the war on Iraq. Secondly, placing America in the modern zone resonates well with Kagan’s thesis in that, Europeans swapped places with the Americans. This historical linkage has given the context for the thesis. Europeans have moved away from power and wholeheartedly embraced “Kant’s perpetual peace” (Kagan, 2002, p.3), however Cooper acknowledges “In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state” (Cooper, 2002), this danger as a European weakness further endorses Kagan’s thesis. And thirdly, it can be understood from Cooper’s statement “whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself” (Cooper, 2002) that a foreign policy based on unilateralism, is justifiable.

Kagan was selective in his choice of evidence and has kept his focus on power and weakness in a strictly narrow sense which is neither reflective nor representative of the broader dynamics of the transatlantic relationship. “Americans generally see the world divided between good and evil…” (Kagan, 2002, p.4; VOA, 2009; Baker, 2003) so is Kagan, a typical American who sees the transatlantic rifts are purely based on the power gap. “Yet for all the commentary surrounding Kagan’s thesis, there is more to the Transatlantic relationship than just power and weakness” (Jones, 2004, p.602). The Americans and their Europeans allies share many things in common. They are liberal democracies and espouse human rights, rule of law, civil liberties and are closer to one another than people from other parts of the world.

Many commentators and scholars have converged that the EU has normative as well as civilian power and could have projected its influence more effectively if it had increased its military capability (Sjursen, 2006; Howorth, 2010; Hill, 1993). Although EU integration is slow, some progress has been made in the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP). And since the Lisbon Treaty went into effect in 2009, further progress is anticipated. Keeping their differences on the Iraqi war aside, the Americans and the Europeans have the potential to work together for the greater good of the world.

Mohamed Hassan
Email:mnoor_15@yahoo.co.uk

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References
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