By Faisal A. Roble

The specter of a diminishing hope for general elections in 2016 is hovering over us. Villa Somalia is slowly but methodically testing public reaction in the event that it publicly announces its newly acquired position on elections. As part of that campaign, the Minister for Interior has already indicated that no general elections will take place in Sept, 2016.

Moreover, a recent visit to the office of PM Sharmarke by some political groups did not produce any tangible outcome. There does not seem to be any feasible commitment from the PM whether he will hold elections.

On the other side of the coin is Mr. Nicholas Kay, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia (SRSG), who has been managing Somalia for some time now. In a recent press release, he too sounded noncommittal about elections. At this juncture, it is not clear whether the two positions (UN and Villa Somalia) are coordinated.

According to a recent article by the Economist, Western benefactors of Somalia are already disparaging the President’s failure for the last two years and combing through the possibilities of no-election by 2016. Some even go as far as recommending a form of clan-based representation.

When one carefully scrutinizes Mr. Kay’s recent statement on the future of Villa Somalia, it is obvious he is emphatically opposed only to “time extension for the President and the Parliament.” “I am encouraged by the firm commitments I have heard from the President, Prime Minister, Speaker and the leaders of Puntland, the IJA and the ISWA to delivering Somalia’s Vision 2016 plan without any extension of the term of the Parliament or President in September 2016,” he said in a recent statement intended for press consumption.

Yet, on the fate of general elections in 2016, he sounded noncommittal. As a matter of fact, he spoke as if elections are suspended until a mission consisting of a “High-Level Partnership Forum in June in Mogadishu” first “reviews progress towards elections.”

Predicting what could come out of the High-Level partnership Forum in June is difficult. It is pretty safe though to ascertain that Villa Somalia has already sent out feelers to donors about its intentions not to hold elections as promised. As of today, it is plausible that elections as promised will not happen. If that is true, one can therefor argue that both the UN and Villa Somalia has failed the Somali people alas they both did not meet their own timelines.

Constitutional Mandate

The source for the novel but overly optimistic goal to hold elections and seek inclusivity is the so-called New Deal Somali Compact (the Compact). Mainly reflective of donor countries’ view of the reconstruction of Somalia’s failed state as opposed to what Somalis want it is a document that establishes an unequal relationship between a rent-seeking neocolonial state (Somalia) and Western donors. Nonetheless, it is the only blue print at hand so far, signed and agreed upon by Somalia’s leaders, to guide their country to “achieve a stable and peaceful federal Somalia through inclusive political system.” One of the objectives Somali leaders accepted via this document is to fulfill “political inclusivity” is by holding elections in 2016.

The Compact emphasizes that the government is expected to work out a “political framework” in the following sequence:

• Completing revisions to the Draft Constitution,
• Ratifying and Adopting of the Federal Constitution; and
• Preparing the country for the envisaged credible elections in 2016.

To date, neither constitutional revision nor its adoption has been achieved. Moreover, the federal government failed to implement Title two, Article 47 of the Draft Constitution that provides for the “enactment of special laws and Electoral Commission enacted by the House of the People” so as to regulate political parties, their registration, elections at the federal level.”

Only sixteen months into the D-day, neither these instruments nor the institutions that would have helped implement elections are adequately in place. Even the so called embryonic national parties have no significant and credible reach beyond Mogadishu city.

Political Hurdles

Despite the temporary impasse on the establishment of his cabinet, the newly nominated Prime Minister, Omar Abdi Rashid Sharmarke, the third since August 2012, has the unenviable burden of carrying out his promises, most importantly holding the elections by September 2016. To bout, he has many woes facing him, some impossible to overcome.

One such a woe is time; he has only about 16 months and this is simply a woefully short time to do anything that could be classified as transformational. In addition, he is faced with the following structural problems that augment his challenges.

First, Somaliland, still legally part of Somalia, nevertheless may not participate in any elections in the foreseeable future, because of its unresolved “secession” stance. To the contrary, Somaliland arguably had conducted several of its own presidential and district level elections. Therefore, there is no probable cause to believe that it will participate in Mogadishu-originated elections any time soon.

Second, the on-again off–again strained relationship between Garowe and Mogadishu is another significant hurdle. The degree to which the ever-deteriorating relationship and impervious misunderstanding between the two has been underscored by an interview the speaker of the Puntland’s house of representative gave on March 20, 2016. He said: “Mogadishu and Garowe have no relationship at all; we have no binding agreements on anything.” This is a major setback for Prime Minister Sharmarke who was expected to narrow the gap between Villa Somalia and his home base, which is Garowe.

Thirdly, two potential boundary demarcation issues complicate matters more. The question of Khatumo, in relation to both Somaliland and Puntland, is a massive political headache that is looming large. A related but more vexing issue is the ever non-stable Glamdug region and its border dispute with Puntland. All these unresolved low intensity conflicts point to the failure of Villa Somalia to federate the country prior to the promised elections.

In other words, there is a plausible fear that 2016 may arrive before Villa Somalia ever readies herself for a serious business such as the 2016 elections.

On the optimistic side, there is a silver lining in all these. If Villa Somali is determined – which it is not given it’s past history of incapacity – and starts working on giving voice to the Somali people, there are several alternative ways to conduct elections, which I will come to later on.

But here are the silver lining facts. To start with, Jubbaland and the newly formed Southwest state are both peaceful and can manage to host credible elections. Both also enjoy a measure of political honeymoon and can work with the federal government to field national candidates in their respective regions.

To do so would require that Villa Somalia double its efforts to help Ahmed Modobe liberate more districts in the not-distant future. A successful campaign to help Madobe in the security sector may translate to creating larger geography that is favorable for electoral environment.

Add to this the appreciable stability and security in Puntland, which is as safe as any sub-Saharan African country, and you get a picture where majority of the Somalis can participate in peaceful general elections. Stability can also be enhanced if Mogadishu shares international aid equitably with the rest of the federal regions between now and the election time.

Fulfilling these goals greatly depends on how much pressure donor countries put on Villa Somalia in channeling more of the Stabilization fund to the regional governments. In short, the chances for improving the security sector (food and military wise) of the regions are within our reach.

All these are encouraging signs to hold elections. Yet this glimmer of hope can easily be squash by the lack of desire on the part Villa Somalia to hold elections. In the final analysis, how Villa Somalia behaves in the coming few months are of paramount significance to Somalia’s promised elections in 2016.

Modalities of Elections

The overarching purpose of having “free” and “fair” elections is to lend legitimacy to the weak central government in Villa Somalia. “The mere fact of holding reasonably free elections, though insufficient for democratization … introduces the principles of democratic legitimation that neither the regime nor their most extreme enemies can easily exorcise,” writes Giuseppe Di Palma in To Craft Democracies. That is to say, holding elections will give a huge boost to any regime that comes to Villa Somalia.

In spite of challenges, Villa Somali must not be allowed to postpone elections. Also, regional governments, Puntland in particular, must challenge Villa Somalia not to flip flop on the timeline as established in the Compact lest the Mandates in this document are shared responsibilities between the regions and the Federal entity. As such, residents of the regions expect their leaders to seriously engage Villa Somalia.

There are no credible findings to support the executive branch in Villa Somalia to extend its regime. With equal import is that neither the draft Constitution nor the Compact framework, two documents that make up the legal and reconstruction framework in the country, justify President Hassan Sheikh to renege on the promised elections.

Notwithstanding their disapprovingly docile attitude on national issues, the federal regions should exercise their constitutional powers on issues of democratic transition and be consulted on election matters. In legal terms, election timelines cannot be changed without the full acquiescence of these regions. Therefore, one wonders whether the regions have a clear stand on this question!

The Somali Compact ensures that the country institute an “inclusive political system.” Political inclusivity through election is the best way to achieve good governance. Therefore, it is worth of note to look at relevant election models. Two election models are at hand – direct and indirect elections.

1) Direct Elections: In direct elections, voters directly cast votes for the individual, individuals or parties. That is the system the Compact envisioned. Given the challenges facing Somalia, including but not limited to the absence of infrastructures that make such elections possible, and the recently surfaced noncommittal position by the UN office to this goal, hopes of a direct or general elections of one-man one vote is dismal.

2) Indirect Elections: The second model is indirect elections. This system is inherently undemocratic in that it preserves the status quo, and has the lowest representation threshold.

a) One variant of indirect elections that Villa Somalia may favor and put forth to the High-Level Partnership Forum in this coming June in Mogadishu — getting legislatures be elected from districts as enumerated in the 1991 redistricting (see Kamal Gutale). This variant raised many potential conflicts one of which is whether the populations assigned to each district are accurate and agreeable to all.

b) The other variant of indirect elections could be one where legislators are nominated by the existing regional governments of Puntland, Jubbaland, Southwest and Galmudug, provided the later region gets established. The issue of Mogadishu will still remain a solvable problematic issue in this formula. This variant again gives undue powers to regional leaders some of whom have limited appeal to their constituents.

The above two approaches have lower thresholds for satisfying Somalia’s post-civil war reconstruction whose long term goal is a broad-based democratization of the polity.

3) Regional-based Elections: The most democratic and viable alternative model of elections to achieve a meaningful political inclusivity in contemporary Somalia is by way of holding elections in the stable regions under the auspicious of existing regional governments of Puntland, Jubbaland, Southwest and Galmudug. Also, Mogadishu should get special electoral votes as the national capital with the intent of representing its residents beyond clan identity. In all these areas, a one-man one- vote is easily attainable.

If implemented, this alternative a) will give voice to the regions; b) will bring legislators closer to their voters. Most importantly, it will do away with the current carpetbagger-type legislators who have no relationship with their “constituents.”   By directly electing legislators and the President also represent the beginning of deemphasizing the Mogadishu-centered politics and moves the country a bit closer to a federalist system.

Finally, this alternative is an investment for future democratization of the country in that it starts laying down the foundation for capacity building for future elections and democratic governance in the periphery regions. It is a system of rebuilding Somalia from bottom-up.

Not holding elections will erode the little trust Somalis may have in Villa Somalia. Also, if regional governments fail to resist Mogadishu’s wish on this matter and remain intentionally docile, they may also risk losing their own legitimacy. This election is a historic political milestone that could break or mend Somalia.

Faisal Roble
WardheerNews contributor
Email: faisalroble19@gmail.com
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Faisal Roble is a writer, political analyst, and a former Editor-in-Chief of WardheerNews, mainly interested in the Horn of Africa region. He is currently the Principle Planner for the City of Los Angeles in charge of Master Planning, Economic Development and Project Implementation Division.