By Sahan Foundation

Background

Somalia’s Provisional Constitution requires that a number of fundamental state building tasks be completed before the country’s political transition can be considered complete. These tasks were encompassed in the current government’s framework document, Vision 2016, which assigned them to three main categories:

• Constitutional Review
• Completion of the Federal System
• Democratization.

It is now clear that most of this agenda will not have been completed by the end of this government’s term of office. In particular, in July 2015, the Somali government announced that it will not be possible to organize a one-person one-vote (OPOV) electoral process in August 2016.

Following this policy shift, key Somali political stakeholders agreed upon the creation of a National Consultative Forum (NCF) comprising of the leaders of the federal government, regional administrations and civil society to organize public consultations on viable electoral options for 2016. Four electoral alternatives were presented to the public in order to promote a common understanding about each option, and to provide the public with an opportunity to contribute to a significant national policy decision.

The NCF failed to reach agreement, with participants polarizing around competing district-based and clan-based electoral models. A new round of negotiations at the second plenary of the NCF produced the ‘Mogadishu Declaration’, which posits a sketchy ‘hybrid option’ that balances the clan-based and district based policy positions. Additional proposals have since been put forward, including expansion of the Upper House of Parliament, based on regional representation.

The next NCF is scheduled to take place in Kismayo on 10 January 2016 with the aim of achieving consensus around a single electoral model. However, the principal stakeholders are less interested in the democratic credentials of each electoral model than the degree to which they stand to benefit in terms of control over electoral outcomes, representation in the next parliament, and influence over the election of the next president.

This briefing note takes the view that the pursuit of a compromise within the NCF should not allow political expediency to threaten Somalia’s larger state-building agenda, and should promote the ultimate objective of conducting legitimate and democratic elections in 2020, in the context of an agreed constitution and stable federal system. To avoid the pitfalls commonly associated with transitional politics, the transitional framework between 2016 and 2020 must be anchored in inclusivity and protect the basic interests of all groups. Consequently, the participants in the upcoming NCF must avoid the temptation to improvise a political ‘quick fix’ at the expense of longer-term state building goals.

Process versus Politics: The Numbers Game

The various options advanced by key political actors are ostensibly about the electoral process, but at another, more fundamental level they relate to the issue of clan representation in parliament. Although the ‘4.5 formula’ awards all major clans equal representation, some stakeholders argue that it is unfair to larger groups, placing them on par with smaller ones. Conversely, any departure from the 4.5 model will inevitably produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of representation.

The current clan-based model suffers serious shortcomings, including the absence of any link between MPs and geographic constituencies, and the opportunities that it creates for corruption in the selection of MPs. Proponents of this option argue that it protects minorities and small clans by guaranteeing them representation in the legislature, but agree upon the need for ‘enhanced legitimacy’ through decentralization of the electoral process, involvement of a larger electorate, and the participation of emerging and existing FMS in design and oversight of the process.

The district-based electoral model is also deeply flawed: it would inevitably squeeze smaller clans out of parliament, since dominant communities would share the limited number of seats (probably 3) per district. Moreover, since the mechanics of the electoral process would necessarily be virtually identical to the clan-based model, involving clan-based electoral colleges, its main difference from the 4.5 formula would be to award certain clans greater representation in parliament on the basis of arbitrary administrative boundaries, rather than demographic data or any other reliable basis for proportional representation.

A similar dispute has erupted over the constitution of the Upper House of Parliament, which is supposed to comprise an equal number of representatives from each FMS. A proposal to allocate equal representation to each of Somalia’s 18 administrative regions instead would, like the district-based electoral model for the Lower House, augment representation from some clans while diminishing others. It would also make the FMS unequal: an arrangement that would likely prove unstable, and ultimately unworkable over time.

Toward Compromise – And a Successful Transition in 2020

Framing the current negotiations as clan-versus-district is a false dichotomy. The core debate reflects the competition between regional administrations and their desire to exercise more power in relation to one another and the next federal government. However, given that these emerging and existing FMS are central both to the current political process, and to the proper functioning of the federal institutions during the transitional period (and beyond), any electoral model for 2016 must both accommodate and balance their interests. This briefing note therefore recommends:

• The Upper House should be established on the basis of equal representation of the existing
and emerging FMS;

• In the absence of one-person one vote, the next Lower House should be re-established on the basis of an enhanced version of the current 4.5 system, involving decentralized elections and a broader electorate, jointly supervised by federal and FMS institutions;

• The independent National Commissions (ICRIC, NIEC, BFC, NSC ISC, etc.) should all be constituted to provide equal representation to each of the FMS, ensuring their full participation in all aspects of the transitional process;

• Appropriate measures should be put in place and enforced to protect the interests of politically disadvantaged groups, included women, youth, and minority groups.

Sahan Foundation Ltd
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This briefing note is based upon three days of informal consultations, facilitated by Sahan Foundation, between leading policy advisers from Somalia’s federal institutions and existing/emerging Federal Member States, which took place in Nairobi from 28-30 December 2015. Although consensus could not be achieved on all issues, the participants agreed that the proposals contained herein represent a reasonable basis for compromise. Special thanks are due to those participants who drafted this summary on behalf of the group