The killing of al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane in an airstrike by US forces last week is a significant development in the Somali conflict. It must not be wasted.

The hawkish elements in Amisom, the African peacekeeping effort in the country, will see this as a vindication of the military offensive and perhaps seek to press forward their advantage on the battlefront.

Tempting as this might be, Godane’s death should provide an opportunity for us to start discussing how to get out of Somalia, not how to get more entrenched.

While this might seem counter-intuitive, there are good reasons to quit when we are ahead.

The death of any leader in a fighting outfit often affects morale and can sometimes trigger an implosion as happened, for instance, with Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA rebels in Angola.

This might as well still happen in al-Shabaab but the group survived the similar killing of Godane’s predecessor in 2008 and has already appointed a successor.

The lessons from al-Qaeda and the wider canvas of violent extremism couched in religious ideology are illustrative. Al-Qaeda had not been able to carry out any spectacular attacks along the lines of 9/11 by the time Osama bin Laden was killed, or since, but the group has continued to inspire low-intensity and highly decentralised attacks across the Middle East, on top of inspiring franchises like al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

Assassinating the leaders of terror groups delivers psychological blows but it is unlikely to destroy the ideology of violent extremism. In fact, it often inspires more extremism and the radicalisation of more followers, as has happened at the Kenyan coast.

The solution, in Somalia, as in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, will be political, not military. Godane’s death, therefore, while a military operation, should be seen as an opportunity to accelerate the political programme in Somalia.

Amisom troops have been in Somalia for seven years now and are showing signs of overstaying their welcome. A recent report by Human Rights Watch accused Ugandan and Burundian troops of rape and other sexual atrocities against civilians in Somalia.

Previous reports have accused Amisom officers from both countries of selling arms and ammunition to al-Shabaab. Senior Ugandan military officers are on trial for allegedly stealing and selling food meant for their charges while Kenyan military commanders are quietly said to have taken over control of the lucrative sugar trade and smuggling operations out of Kismayo Port.

Many rank-and-file soldiers earning better pay in Amisom privately confess that they do not want the conflict to end until they have completed their houses or other personal projects back home. Far from Pan African liberators, many have slowly turned into soldiers of fortune.

This kind of profiteering and indiscipline was always going to be inevitable in such a protracted conflict. It must be brought to an end before it turns the people of Somalia against Amisom and plays into the al-Shabaab propaganda that presents it as an occupying army.

First, we must lean on the notoriously corrupt Somali Transitional Government to roll out a political programme that seeks to reconcile the different political, ethnic and military factions in the country. That process should also reach out to the moderates in al-Shabaab to try and demilitarise what is fundamentally a political contest.

Then we must indicate a clear roadmap that leads to our exit and allows Somalis to take charge of their destiny, politics and country. The time to initiate dialogue with al-Shabaab is now, when it is at its weakest, not after its next attack, whenever that comes, when it will be less willing to talk.