By Bashir M. Sheikh-Ali, PhD, J.D
I. Introduction
This essay explores the Somalia-Ethiopia seaport access dispute within the broader geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, where strategic interests in port access, regional alliances, and historical rivalries create a complex network of interactions. With Ethiopia’s increasing demand for diversified port access as a landlocked nation, Somalia’s ports have become critical, not only for economic reasons but also for the strategic leverage they provide within the region. The recent Turkey-brokered Ankara Declaration [2] fosters dialogue and introduces opportunities for cooperation, but it also adds a new layer of complexity and ambiguity to the relationship, leaving key issues unresolved and open to varying interpretations.
The essay begins by asking how the interests and interactions of key regional and international players—Egypt, Eritrea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya, European Union (EU) and its members, the United States, and Turkey—are using the seaport access dispute to shape the broader Ethiopia-Somalia conflict. An intriguing question is whether game theory can provide insights into the behavior of Somalia’s federal and regional governments and predict how their interactions will shape the conflict’s outcome. This essay explores various scenarios and highlights key priorities Somali leaders should address to mitigate the growing risk of negative consequences stemming from this conflict.
Analyzed through a game-theoretic perspective, the Somalia-Ethiopia seaport dispute highlights the interplay of deep internal mistrust among Somali players, historical Ethiopian interference, and the growing involvement of other external actors like Egypt, the UAE, and Eritrea. Much like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Somali stakeholders face strategic choices shaped by mistrust, where immediate self-preservation often takes precedence over long-term collective benefit. This mistrust creates a challenging environment for cooperation.
In the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma,[3] mutual trust leads to the best outcome—both parties refusing to confess and maximizing their shared gain. For Somalia, this would mean unified efforts among federal and regional actors to harness the potential of its seaports for collective economic and political growth. However, entrenched mistrust within Somalia drives self-serving decisions, where each faction seeks to secure its own interests, fearing betrayal by others. Ethiopia’s historical role in deepening Somali divisions further intensifies these dynamics, preventing a unified approach.
Complicating this landscape is the involvement of external players like Egypt, the UAE, and Eritrea, each pursuing their strategic objectives. These actors introduce additional incentives and pressures, altering the calculus of Somali stakeholders. For instance, alliances with these external powers may provide short-term advantages to certain Somali factions but risk deepening internal divisions and undermining prospects for national unity.
Game theory underscores how this convergence of internal mistrust and external manipulation creates a zero-sum dynamic, where fragmented, competitive actions dominate over cooperative strategies. Overcoming these challenges will require not only fostering trust among Somali actors but also managing the influence of external players to align incentives toward a shared and mutually beneficial outcome. As Somalia navigates this complex strategic “game,” its ability to unify internally and balance external pressures will determine whether it can achieve a stable and prosperous future.
II. Background of the Somalia-Ethiopia Seaport Dispute
The Somalia-Ethiopia seaport dispute arises from Ethiopia’s purported need for alternative port access routes to support its growing economy and reduce its reliance on Djibouti, which currently handles over 90% of Ethiopian trade. Somalia, with its long coastline and strategic location along international shipping routes, provides a range of port access options. Ethiopia sees the political fragmentation and security challenges in Somalia as an opportunity to secure access to seaport.
Historically, Ethiopia has also sought to maintain influence over Somalia as part of its regional strategy. Since the Somali government’s collapse in 1991, Ethiopia has intermittently intervened, supporting various factions, backing Western policies like the drive against the Islamic Courts, and working with regional administrations. These efforts are framed as attempts to create a stable buffer along its borders and prevent hostile groups from gaining a foothold near Ethiopian territory.
Ethiopia views Somalia’s ports as crucial for its trade diversification strategy. However, Somalia’s federal government, now backed by Egypt, conflicts with Ethiopia’s strategy of aligning with individual Somali regions and instead aims to centralize control over these strategic assets. The Ethiopia-Somalia conflict naturally attracts other international and regional players, including the UAE, which has economic ambitions tied to port control, and Eritrea, whose rivalry with Ethiopia motivates it to disrupt Ethiopian interests.
III. Key Players, their Interests, and Strategic Goals
a) Ethiopia: Regional Dominance
As a fast-growing, landlocked country, Ethiopia faces the pressing need to establish a diversified network of trade routes to diminish its dependence on neighboring Djibouti. [4] This strategic initiative is driven by the desire to mitigate the risks associated with relying on a single access point to global markets. By gaining control or influence over ports in Somalia, Ethiopia would not only broaden its logistical options but also enhance its economic resilience, enabling it to better withstand potential shifts in Djibouti’s political landscape or changes in its economic policies. Diversifying trade pathways, therefore, is essential for Ethiopia’s long-term economic stability and its aspiration to emerge as a self-sufficient regional player in East Africa.
Ethiopia considers the Horn of Africa a vital sphere of influence, leveraging strategic alliances to secure economic gains and bolster regional security. By supporting autonomous regions within Somalia, from Somaliland to Jubaland, Ethiopia bypasses the centralized authority in Mogadishu, gaining significant leverage in Somali politics and strengthening its regional dominance. This strategy enables Ethiopia to shape Somalia’s political landscape in ways that align with its own interests, often at the cost of Somalia’s fragile federalism. Even in the south, where Ethiopia is not perceived as seeking direct seaport access (such as in Southwest State and Jubaland), its primary focus remains on weakening the Somali national government. By ensuring a divided and more easily influenced Somalia, Ethiopia limits the central government’s ability to consolidate power, thereby hindering Somalia’s progress toward national cohesion and effective statehood.
b) Somalia: Central Authority
Despite its limited power, the federal government in Mogadishu is determined to reassert control over its national territory, focusing especially on Somaliland, as well as Puntland and Jubaland to a similar, albeit distinct, degree. Regaining authority over vital trade hubs in these regions would bolster Somalia’s sovereignty, curtail foreign intervention, and offer a pathway to increased revenue streams for the central government. Centralized management of these ports could not only strengthen Somalia’s economic foundation but also consolidate its political presence, positioning it as an autonomous federal government and an influential player in the regional landscape.
Somalia’s internal divisions, rooted in clan-based politics and the existence of semi-autonomous regions, create significant challenges in establishing a cohesive national approach to foreign partnerships. This fragmented political landscape hinders the Somalia’s federal government’s ability to present a unified stance, which opens avenues for Ethiopia and other foreign powers to circumvent central authority. By engaging directly with regional administrations, these external actors can effectively tailor negotiations to their interests, exploiting the decentralized and fragmented structure to secure influence and strategic advantages and sidestep the federal government’s authority. This dynamic underscores the complex interplay between Somalia’s internal politics and the regional ambitions of neighboring nations.
c) Somali Regions: Localized Autonomy
The Somali regions, particularly Puntland and Somaliland, play a pivotal role in the Ethiopia-Somalia seaport access dispute and broader regional stability. These regions host key ports, such as Berbera and Bossaso, which are central to Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Their autonomous governance allows them to engage directly with external actors like the UAE, exemplified by the UAE’s investment in Somaliland’s Berbera port, often bypassing Somalia’s federal government. [5] These agreements boost regional economies, undermine national unity, and provide Ethiopia with opportunities to exploit regional divisions for favorable seaport access terms.
Additionally, the regions’ contributions to regional stability, such as Puntland’s anti-piracy efforts and Somaliland’s relative political stability, underscore their strategic importance. However, external actors’ engagements, whether for economic or security reasons, risk deepening Somalia’s fragmentation unless these interactions align with a cohesive national strategy.
Bashir Ali, Ph.D., J.D.
Email: BashirMSheikhAli@gmail.com
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Ali is an international trade lawyer.
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