By Abdisaid M. Ali

Reports of a possible Turkish strike against suspected hijackers along Puntland’s coast present a dangerous test of Somalia’s sovereignty. The M/V LUTUF was reportedly seized 3.5 nautical miles off Marraya. Turkish vessels approached the area as aircraft maintained surveillance. An airstrike later killed four people, wounding two. Responsibility for the strike remains open, as does the victims’ involvement.

Location determines the governing law. At 3.5 nautical miles, the seizure falls under Somali jurisdiction as armed robbery at sea. International piracy authority applies beyond national jurisdiction. Turkey’s 2026 naval mandate likewise applies beyond Somalia’s territorial waters. Public reporting identifies the seizure location; the strike location awaits confirmation.

A foreign use of force within Somalia requires valid Somali consent, Security Council authority or lawful self defence. The conduct of any operation then engages necessity, proportionality, protection of life and public accountability. Public reporting has yet to identify the legal basis or authorising institution. Confirmation of Turkish responsibility would therefore raise a direct question about who authorised foreign force, under what limits and through which mechanism of accountability. Sovereignty becomes real when national institutions control these decisions.

The episode exposes a wider imbalance. Foreign forces can monitor Somali waters using advanced aircraft and naval vessels. International trawlers extract marine resources under fragmented scrutiny. Piracy triggers warships, aircraft and international coordination. Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, opaque licensing, damaged livelihoods receive a weaker response.

This imbalance echoes what our IGAD fieldwork revealed during the height of Somalia’s piracy crisis. From 2008 to 2010, I served as senior research team leader for an IGAD programme. I led the work that produced the Somalia Inland Strategy to Prevent and Counter Piracy for 2010 to 2015. Ours was the sole international research team at the time to enter the places then described as “pirate havens.” Fieldwork covered Eyl, Bosaso, Garowe and the wider Nugal region. Interviews drew participants from the Puntland government, security institutions, justice authorities, traditional leaders, religious figures, fishing communities and prisons. In Eyl, we visited former pirate centres, examining the shore networks sustaining piracy.

That research showed that piracy extended far beyond crime at sea. It rested on an inland political economy linking international financiers, regional financiers, recruiters, negotiators, armed protectors, corrupt facilitators and coastal communities facing few legitimate economic opportunities. Industrial fishing entered this system as both grievance and enabling structure.

The enabling chain

Unlicensed vessels operate beside licensed fleets that enter coastal grounds, conceal catches, use prohibited gear or exceed quotas. Some industrial trawlers carry government documents while breaching Somalia’s fisheries law. Violations take the form of trawling or incursions into waters reserved for Somali fishermen. A licence establishes permission to fish. Its public value depends on credible surveillance, stock assessment and catch verification. Some activity is plainly illegal. Other operations hold formal authority yet remain poorly regulated, environmentally destructive and socially costly.

Many international trawlers depend on Somali agents, licence brokers, political contacts, armed guards, coastal suppliers and informal payment networks. Their money sustains intermediaries who convert weak public authority into private protection.

Somali brokers arrange licences, local representation, payments, political protection and contact with coastal authorities. Trawler owners benefit from these arrangements. They also carry responsibility for the legal compliance of their licences, agents and operations. Some officials at federal or Puntland level issue overlapping, opaque or improperly priced licences. Public authority becomes private access for incumbents. Owners profit; brokers receive commissions; officials collect revenue or side payments; coastal communities inherit depleted fishing grounds with few visible benefits.

Armed Somali guards discourage fishermen from approaching, provide knowledge of patrol movements and connect vessels to coastal power networks. Their presence allows foreign operators to fish under weak public surveillance. The seizure of a Chinese trawler in 2024, after its Somali guards reportedly joined local armed men, illustrates how hired protection can mutate into armed predation. The same skills, weapons, boats & coastal contacts used to protect a trawler can be redirected towards seizing it.

Opaque ownership arrangements, disabled tracking systems, concealed catches and incursions beyond authorised zones further weaken enforcement. Such practices blur the boundary between licensed commerce and organised maritime illegality.

Industrial vessels that enter artisanal grounds or destroy local gear strip income from coastal communities. They deepen the belief that foreign interests receive stronger protection than Somali fishermen. Pirate networks turn that grievance into recruitment, local tolerance and claims of coastal defence. Present day piracy remains an organised ransom enterprise, separate from community fisheries enforcement.

Pirate groups have seized Yemeni, Iranian and other fishing vessels for use as mother ships.

These vessels provide fuel, food, navigation equipment, concealment and longer endurance at sea. They allow attacks on commercial shipping farther offshore. Industrial fishing therefore contributes through extraction, grievance and logistical opportunity.

Responsibility remains unequal. Vessel owners profit from access. Officials authorise it. Brokers arrange protection. Guards enforce private claims at sea. Pirates convert grievance into violence and ransom. Each actor occupies a different position within the same maritime economy.

Selective enforcement at sea

International naval missions protect navigation, responding quickly when commercial vessels are attacked. Their mandates prioritise observation of suspicious fishing, leaving enforcement of Somali fisheries law to national authorities.

This creates a visible imbalance. A hijacked merchant ship attracts warships, aircraft and international coordination. A trawler entering Somali coastal waters can make repeated incursions under weak enforcement.

Somali authorities retain primary responsibility for fisheries enforcement. Fragmented authority across federal and Puntland institutions permits overlapping licences, producing uneven control. The wider imbalance reveals an architecture designed around the safety of international commerce. Coastal communities see marine wealth leave their waters as foreign shipping receives extensive protection. This perception strengthens the narrative used by pirate groups.

Reclaiming maritime authority

Puntland should replace the licensing system controlled by the presidency with an independent statutory fisheries authority. Published criteria should govern every licence. Fees should pass through the Treasury. A public register and annual audit should record every vessel, owner, agent, permitted species, authorised zone, quota, fee and expiry date. Coastal districts and fishing associations should receive a defined share of revenue.

Puntland should enforce the trawling ban across Somali waters, protecting the coastal zone extending 24 nautical miles. Continuous vessel tracking, electronic catch reporting, gear inspection and port verification should become licence conditions. Foreign industrial fishing for bottom dwelling species should pause pending independent stock assessments. Performance bonds, prosecution of the enabling chain and court ordered confiscation should give enforcement real weight.

A permanent maritime enforcement unit should coordinate surveillance and prosecution, confiscate vessels after serious violations, return a defined share of revenue to coastal communities and preserve legitimate trade with Yemeni buyers. Yemeni vessels can purchase Somali catches while foreign crews remain outside protected coastal grounds. This distinction supports local livelihoods, protects an established trading economy and strengthens compliance.

Established under President Abdirahman Farole during the 2010 to 2011 piracy emergency, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) was designed to strike pirate networks onshore, protect marine resources and police Puntland’s coast. Puntland should withdraw the PMPF from domestic political disputes and restore its original maritime mandate. Under statutory civilian oversight, the PMPF should protect coastal communities, enforce fisheries law, suppress piracy and confront illegal fishing. The central issue is maritime governance, encompassing foreign force, resource extraction and piracy. Somalia’s sovereignty at sea will become credible when public institutions govern access, apply the law impartially, protect coastal livelihoods and control every decision involving foreign force.

Abdisaid M. Ali
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Abdisaid is the chairperson of Lomé Peace and Security Forum and Former Somalia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Somalia. X:@4rukun