By Mohamed A Yasin

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has announced that Türkiye has begun building a spaceport in Somalia, describing the project as a historic partnership that will strengthen Ankara’s independent access to space and contribute to Africa’s emerging space sector.

The announcement is extraordinary in itself. But in Somalia, it raises a question far beyond rockets and satellites: How deeply has Türkiye invested itself in Somalia’s political future—and what happens to that relationship when the political leadership in Mogadishu changes?

Erdoğan made the announcement at the opening of the 77th International Astronautical Congress in Antalya, saying Somalia’s geographical position gives Türkiye strategic advantages for space launches. Turkish officials have previously described the planned facility as a way for Ankara to secure independent access to orbital launch capability.

The spaceport is only the latest expression of an extraordinary expansion of Turkish influence in Somalia. Türkiye has moved from humanitarian assistance and development cooperation into defence, training, infrastructure, energy, diplomacy and strategic security cooperation.

That expansion once made Ankara one of the most popular foreign partners among many ordinary Somalis. But the political environment is changing. And so is the public perception of Türkiye.

From Humanitarian Partner to Strategic Power

Türkiye’s relationship with Somalia was initially built on an image very different from that of a conventional foreign military power. Erdoğan’s highly publicised visit to Mogadishu in 2011, at the height of Somalia’s famine, generated enormous goodwill.

Türkiye subsequently invested heavily in hospitals, schools, roads, infrastructure and humanitarian programmes. It also established one of its most important overseas military training facilities in Mogadishu, while Turkish companies became increasingly involved in Somalia’s economy.

The relationship deepened further through defence agreements and broader strategic cooperation. By 2026, the partnership had become far more than development assistance. Türkiye had become a major security partner of the Federal Government. That transformation has created enormous strategic influence—but it has also created political risks.

Somalia’s current crisis is not simply an insurgency against Al-Shabaab. It is also a political confrontation over constitutional authority, elections, federalism and the distribution of power between Mogadishu and the federal member states.

EUAA reporting describes Somalia’s political environment in 2026 as deeply divided, with Puntland and Jubaland opposing Hassan Sheikh’s government and the Federal Government deploying forces to regain control of Baidoa after relations with former South West State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen collapsed. That is where Türkiye’s growing security role becomes politically sensitive.

Military assistance intended to strengthen Somalia’s national security institutions becomes far more controversial when those institutions are deployed in conflicts involving Somali political factions. The distinction is crucial. Helping Somalia fight Al-Shabaab is one thing. Becoming associated with one side of Somalia’s internal political confrontation is another.

The F-16 and Drone Question

Opposition figures and supporters of former President Hassan Sheikh’s political opponents have alleged that Turkish-supplied or Turkish-linked military capabilities, including advanced drones and F-16 aircraft, have been used in operations against opposition forces. Those allegations have generated considerable anger and concern among communities affected by the fighting. But they require careful verification.

There is currently clear evidence of Turkish defence cooperation with Somalia, and there is independent evidence that the Federal Government has increasingly used air and drone capabilities during the country’s security operations. EUAA, citing ACLED data, recorded a sharp increase in air and drone strikes in Somalia, reaching 433 incidents between April 2025 and March 2026.

There is also clear evidence that Baidoa has become a battlefield between federal forces and forces aligned with Laftagareen. Reuters reported that federal troops and opposition forces fought inside Baidoa on August 17, with residents reporting deaths including civilians. The city also contains large numbers of displaced people already suffering from severe humanitarian conditions.

What remains essential is establishing which aircraft conducted particular strikes, who authorized them and whether foreign-supplied military equipment was used in political rather than counterterrorism operations. Those questions cannot be answered by political claims alone. But Perception Can Be as Powerful as Proof.

There is another problem for Türkiye. Even where allegations remain unproven, perception matters. If ordinary Somalis begin to associate Turkish military assistance not with the defence of the Somali state but with the suppression of political opposition, Ankara risks losing the public goodwill accumulated over more than a decade. That would represent a dramatic reversal.

The Turkish flag once carried associations with humanitarian assistance, hospitals, development and solidarity. It now increasingly appears alongside questions about military power and political influence. For Ankara, this is a dangerous transformation. Foreign governments can negotiate agreements with presidents. They cannot easily negotiate with public opinion.

What Happens After Hassan Sheikh?

This may ultimately be the most important question in the entire relationship. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will not remain president forever. Every Somali government eventually changes. Every political alliance eventually shifts. Every foreign partnership must therefore survive political transition if it is genuinely a partnership with the Somali state rather than a relationship with one administration.

The deeper Türkiye becomes identified with the political and security choices of the current Federal Government, the more vulnerable its long-term position becomes if a future government takes a different view of Ankara. That is not an argument against Turkish involvement in Somalia. It is an argument for institutional neutrality.

A foreign power seeking a permanent relationship with Somalia has an interest in maintaining relations not only with the government in power, but also with opposition leaders, federal member states, civil society and the Somali public. Otherwise, today’s strategic partner can become tomorrow’s political target.

The Spaceport Makes the Question Even Bigger

The planned spaceport dramatically expands the horizon of the relationship. Türkiye is not merely training Somali soldiers. It is developing infrastructure that Erdoğan says will contribute to Türkiye’s independent access to space.

Turkish officials have explicitly described Somalia’s equatorial geography as strategically advantageous for launch operations. That means Ankara’s long-term interests in Somalia could extend well beyond the political lifespan of any current Somali administration. Ports, Energy, Defence, Infrastructure, Aerospace, Security, Diplomacy.

The relationship is becoming extraordinarily broad. And the broader the relationship becomes, the more important it is that it be seen as a relationship with Somalia, rather than with one political camp.

Civilian Casualties Change the Equation

For ordinary Somalis, strategic partnerships are ultimately judged by what they mean for everyday life. A spaceport may represent technological ambition. A military aircraft may represent national defense. A drone may represent counterterrorism. But for a civilian caught beneath a strike, none of those distinctions matter if a home is destroyed or a family member is killed.

The reported civilian casualties surrounding political and military confrontations in Baidoa therefore deserve independent investigation, regardless of which side is responsible. Reuters reported civilian deaths during the August fighting, while Baidoa remains one of Somalia’s major displacement and humanitarian centres.

If foreign-supported military capabilities are involved in operations that cause civilian harm, the political consequences can extend far beyond the battlefield.

Türkiye Should Ask a Difficult Question

Ankara has every right to pursue its strategic interests in Somalia. Somalia also has the right to seek Turkish investment, training, technology and security assistance. But a sustainable partnership requires something more than agreements between governments. It requires public confidence.

Türkiye therefore faces a strategic choice. It can become identified primarily with the political administration currently controlling Villa Somalia. Or it can position itself as a long-term partner of the Somali state—one capable of maintaining constructive relations regardless of who occupies the presidency. The second approach would be considerably safer for Ankara.

A Strategic Partnership Cannot Depend on One President

The central paradox of Türkiye’s growing presence in Somalia is now becoming clear. The more Ankara invests in Somalia, the more it needs Somalia’s political stability. But the more its military and strategic involvement becomes associated with one side of Somalia’s political conflict, the greater the risk that its long-term interests will become entangled with the fate of that political side. That is the danger.

Hassan Sheikh will eventually leave office. The Federal Government will change. Political alliances will change. Federal-state relations will change. But Türkiye’s investments, military facilities, infrastructure agreements and proposed spaceport are designed to last much longer. That makes political neutrality not merely a diplomatic virtue for Ankara. It is a strategic necessity.

Türkiye’s relationship with Somalia was once built largely on humanitarian solidarity and development. Today it is becoming a relationship of military power, strategic infrastructure and geopolitical ambition. The question facing Ankara is therefore no longer whether it can expand its influence in Somalia. It is whether it can expand that influence without becoming identified with Somalia’s internal political struggle.

Because if Türkiye becomes seen by ordinary Somalis as a party to the political conflict rather than a partner of Somalia itself, the consequences may last long after the government that invited Ankara into the centre of Somali affairs has gone. The spaceport may be designed to reach far into the future. Türkiye’s political strategy in Somalia should be designed the same way.

Mohamed A Yasin
Email: moyasin680@gmail.com