Replacing 14 October Forces With Gorgor Raises Fears That a Political Dispute Could Become a New Security Crisis in Lower Shabelle

MARKA (WDN) — A new security confrontation is taking shape in Marka, where the deployment of Somali National Army Gorgor forces has triggered growing tension and raised fears that a political dispute over the emerging North-South State could turn into an armed confrontation.

The central question is no longer simply why additional troops have arrived. It is why the 14 October Brigade was moved out, why Gorgor was brought in, and whether national military forces are being used to resolve a political dispute that should instead be addressed through dialogue.

Local reporting says Gorgor forces have established positions in Marka after security responsibilities previously associated with the 14 October Brigade were transferred. The deployment has already generated opposition among some local communities and political actors.

For supporters of the emerging North-South State, the arrival of Gorgor is being interpreted not as a routine counterterrorism deployment but as an attempt to prevent their political project from taking shape. That interpretation remains an allegation, not an established fact. But the perception itself is becoming a security concern.

Why the 14 October Brigade Matters to Marka

The 14 October Brigade has a different history in Lower Shabelle. The unit was established during former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmaajo’s administration and became involved in military operations against Al-Shabaab in the region.

For many residents of Marka and surrounding communities, the brigade’s presence has therefore been associated with the fight against Al-Shabaab rather than with an internal political dispute.

Government reporting has previously described the 14 October Brigade operating alongside Gorgor and NISA against Al-Shabaab in the Marka area. In January 2026, Somali government forces said their joint operation had pushed Al-Shabaab fighters out of the Jilib Marka area, with residents welcoming the national forces.

That history helps explain why the removal of the 14 October Brigade is politically sensitive.
For residents who credit the unit with fighting Al-Shabaab, replacing it with another federal formation raises a different question: what has changed in the mission?

The North-South State Changes the Equation

The deployment comes as sections of the local population in the Shabelle regions have begun advocating for a new political administration they call the North-South State. The movement has transformed Marka from simply a security front into a political flashpoint.

Supporters say they are seeking a new political arrangement and greater local authority. Federal authorities, meanwhile, have not recognized the emerging administration as an established federal entity.

That disagreement should ordinarily be resolved through political dialogue. Instead, the presence of heavily armed national forces has created fears among supporters of the new administration that military pressure could be used to prevent the political project from advancing.

The danger is that a political disagreement could become a security confrontation before the political issues are even negotiated.

The Most Dangerous Consequence

The greatest risk is not simply another clash in Marka. It is what could happen afterward. If Gorgor forces are perceived by local communities as humiliating, attacking or killing people associated with the North-South State movement, the political balance could change dramatically.

Communities that currently regard the Federal Government as a political opponent may begin to view it as a direct security threat.

That could create incentives for local actors to seek alternative alliances, including arrangements with armed groups that the government is fighting. Somalia has already seen how quickly political alienation can undermine counterterrorism campaigns.

Hiiraan provides an important warning. Local clan militias initially played a major role in pushing Al-Shabaab out of parts of the region. But EUAA reporting documented how political disputes, inter-clan tensions and inadequate support for local forces contributed to the weakening of the counteroffensive and allowed Al-Shabaab to regain territory.

More recently, reports have emerged of an understanding between sections of the Hawadle community and Al-Shabaab after prolonged conflict, although the scope and significance of that understanding remain contested and should not be interpreted as representing the entire Hawadle community.

The lesson is not that every political dispute produces an alliance with Al-Shabaab.
The lesson is more basic: When communities lose confidence in the political and security system, Al-Shabaab can find opportunities that did not previously exist.

The Army Should Not Become the Political Battlefield

This is why the Marka deployment deserves close attention. The Somali National Army’s primary responsibility is to protect citizens and fight armed groups threatening the state. Using national forces in a political dispute risks blurring that mission.

If the federal government believes the Gorgor deployment is necessary to protect Marka from Al-Shabaab, it should clearly explain the security threat and the military’s mandate. If the principal objective is instead to prevent the North-South State from organizing politically, then the government faces a fundamentally political problem that cannot be resolved through military deployment.

Political movements are not defeated permanently by soldiers. They are resolved through negotiations, representation and legitimate political agreements.

A Warning From Hiiraan

The developments in Hiiraan make this moment even more sensitive. Hawadle elders and political leaders have recently demanded that the Hirshabelle political process in Hiiraan be suspended until an agreement is reached over representation and power-sharing. They have explicitly called for dialogue and community consultation.

The situation demonstrates how political grievances can become intertwined with security questions. The danger for Lower Shabelle is that the same pattern could emerge there: a community begins with political demands, the government responds with security measures, confrontation deepens, and local actors begin searching for alternative ways to protect their interests. That is precisely the cycle Somalia should avoid.

The Choice Before Mogadishu

The government still has an opportunity to prevent the Marka dispute from becoming a wider security crisis. It can make the mission of the Gorgor forces transparent, guarantee the protection of civilians and political actors, and open direct dialogue with the communities supporting the North-South State initiative.

Most importantly, it can avoid turning the national army into the mechanism through which a political disagreement is settled. Because the consequences could extend far beyond Marka.

If local communities come to believe that the Federal Government is using national forces to suppress their political aspirations, the government may not simply lose political support. It could weaken the very local cooperation that is essential to keeping Al-Shabaab out of Lower Shabelle.

The experience of Hiiraan demonstrates the danger of allowing political grievances and security operations to reinforce each other. For Marka, the warning is therefore clear: Do not turn a political disagreement into a military confrontation.

The 14 October Brigade’s legacy in Lower Shabelle is tied to the fight against Al-Shabaab. The arrival of Gorgor should not create a new battlefield between the Somali state and the communities it is supposed to protect.

Because if political pressure turns into humiliation, violence and bloodshed, the political table could be overturned—and the space created by that confrontation could be exploited by Al-Shabaab.

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