President Rejects Any Comparison Between Israel and Türkiye — Yet Leaves the Door Open to Future Relations with Israel

MOGADISHU (WDN) — President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s latest interview with Al Jazeera has exposed a striking tension in Somalia’s foreign-policy messaging: while he presents Türkiye as fundamentally different from Israel and rejects any suggestion that the two countries could be treated alike, he also acknowledges that Somalia could one day establish relations with Israel.

The apparent contradiction is significant because Hassan Sheikh has adopted an increasingly uncompromising position toward Israel since Israel recognized Somaliland.In his latest Al Jazeera interview, the president said Somalia would not accept an Israeli presence “under any circumstances” and accused Israel of seeking a military foothold in Berbera. He described Israel as a destabilizing force and said Somalia would resist attempts to draw the country into wider Middle Eastern conflicts.

Yet the president’s position appears more nuanced when he discusses the possibility of diplomatic relations. He has indicated that Israel could, under different circumstances, become a country with which Somalia maintains relations in the future, while insisting that Israel could never replace Türkiye as Somalia’s principal strategic partner.

That raises a straightforward question: If relations with Israel are fundamentally unacceptable, under what circumstances could they become possible? Türkiye Is Different — But Why? Hassan Sheikh’s distinction between Türkiye and Israel is clear.

Türkiye is a Muslim-majority country with longstanding political, economic and security ties to Somalia. Ankara has become one of Mogadishu’s most important international partners, particularly in defense, development and diplomatic affairs.

Israel, by contrast, recognized Somaliland in December 2025, becoming the first country to do so. Somalia regards Somaliland as part of its sovereign territory and has strongly condemned Israel’s decision. The president therefore has a clear political basis for treating the two relationships differently.

But the difficulty emerges when the argument moves from “Israel is not Türkiye” to “Israel could never have the same relationship with Somalia” and then to “perhaps Somalia could have relations with Israel in the future.” Those positions can coexist, but only if the conditions for such a future relationship are clearly explained. At present, they remain largely undefined.

The President’s message has changed with circumstances. The evolution of Hassan Sheikh’s statements is also important. After Israel recognized Somaliland, he described the decision as a dangerous strategic move and suggested that Israeli objectives extended beyond diplomatic recognition. He also raised concerns about possible Israeli military and population-transfer plans involving Somaliland. Those claims were presented by the president as intelligence-based concerns, but some of the specific allegations have not been independently established.

In his latest interview, Hassan Sheikh went further, saying Israel planned to establish a naval base in Berbera and use the city’s airport. Al Jazeera reported those statements as claims made by the president; Israel’s alleged plans were not independently established in the report. At the same time, the president leaves open the theoretical possibility of future relations.

That creates a foreign-policy question that deserves a clearer answer: What would have to change before Israel moves from being described as a threat to becoming a possible diplomatic partner? Would Israel have to reverse its recognition of Somaliland? Would it have to abandon any military ambitions in Berbera? Would Somalia require a change in Israeli policy toward Somaliland before diplomatic relations could even be considered? The president has not publicly provided a detailed framework for such a transition.

Somaliland Is the Central Fault Line

The contradiction becomes even more important because Somaliland sits at the center of the dispute. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland fundamentally changed the diplomatic environment surrounding the territory.

News wires  reported earlier this year that Somaliland expected expanded economic relations with Israel and was seeking investment and technology cooperation, although at that stage no formal economic agreement had been concluded and Somaliland’s president said military bases had not been discussed.

For Mogadishu, however, the issue is not simply bilateral relations between Israel and Somaliland. It is a question of Somalia’s territorial integrity. That explains why Hassan Sheikh has responded so strongly to Israel’s involvement. But it also means that any future discussion of Somali-Israeli relations would almost certainly have to address the Somaliland question first.

The Bigger Question: is foreign policy being driven by principles or circumstances?  This is where the president’s statements raise a broader issue. Somalia’s foreign policy cannot simply be defined by whether a country is Muslim, non-Muslim, friendly or hostile.

States normally assess foreign relationships according to national interests, sovereignty, security, economic benefits and diplomatic objectives. Türkiye’s partnership with Somalia is an example of this pragmatic approach. Somalia has built deep security and economic relations with Türkiye because successive governments have viewed Ankara as an important strategic partner.

The same principle could theoretically apply to any other country. But if Somalia is prepared to consider relations with Israel in the future, the government should explain what national-interest conditions would make such a relationship acceptable.

Without that explanation, the public is left with two apparently competing messages: Israel is unacceptable — but relations with Israel may one day be possible.

A government can reject a country’s current policies while leaving open the possibility of future diplomatic relations if those policies change. But that distinction needs to be made clearly. Somalia’s president has been unequivocal in condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and in warning against Israeli military involvement in the Horn of Africa.

If his government nevertheless believes that relations with Israel could eventually be established, then the conditions for such a transformation should be stated openly. Otherwise, the issue risks becoming less about foreign policy and more about political messaging. And that is the real inconsistency exposed by the interview.

The question is not whether Türkiye and Israel are the same. They clearly are not. The question is whether Somalia’s foreign policy has a consistent principle for deciding when a country is a strategic partner, when it is a threat, and when it can become a partner in the future.

For Hassan Sheikh, that distinction now requires a clearer explanation. Because in foreign policy, leaving the door open while publicly declaring the relationship unacceptable may be politically convenient—but it also invites questions about what is really behind the door.

WardheerNews