By Abdullahi A. Nor
Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) is grappling with profound challenges, ranging from endemic corruption to the persistent threat posed by militant groups like Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State (ISIS) in Somalia. While the government projects an image of progress and reform, its systemic flaws and the operational effectiveness of these insurgent groups raise critical questions about its stability and capacity to govern.
Here, we explore the implications of corruption, institutional dysfunction, militant adaptability, and interclan warfare for the future of Somalia.
Corruption in the FGS: An Achilles’ Heel
Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, historically distinguished as the first leader to serve two terms, has also earned notoriety for the pervasive corruption under his administration. His government has faced allegations of funneling public resources for personal and political gain, undermining the very foundations of state-building. Reports from international watchdogs and domestic observers paint a grim picture of governance plagued by nepotism, embezzlement, and unaccountability.
In unambiguous contrast, Al-Shabaab and ISIS Somalia have cultivated an image of integrity within their ranks. While their ideologies and actions are condemned globally, these groups’ leadership structures and fighters are perceived as free from corruption, reinforcing their legitimacy among some disenfranchised communities. By adhering to strict internal discipline and maintaining transparent financial systems within their networks, they exploit the grievances of populations disillusioned by government corruption, positioning themselves as viable alternatives.
A Paralytic Legislative Arm
The legislative arm of the FGS has largely been reduced to a ceremonial role, incapable of holding the executive accountable or legislating meaningful reforms. Parliament, once envisioned as a bastion of democracy and oversight, has become nominal at best. Allegations abound of lawmakers prioritizing personal enrichment over national interests, further alienating the populace.
This dysfunction exacerbates the FGS’ vulnerability, as it limits the government’s ability to enact policies addressing pressing security, economic, and social challenges. In contrast, both Al-Shabaab and ISIS boast functional and robust Shura councils that effectively oversee their executive operations. These governance structures enhance their operational coherence and appeal to communities seeking order and justice.
Judiciary: A Tale of Two Systems
The judiciary under the FGS is largely irrelevant, unable to handle civil litigations, let alone criminal cases. This vacuum has led residents, including army generals, mid-ranking officers, civilians, and diaspora returnees whose properties were confiscated during the civil war, to seek justice from Islamist courts. These courts, despite their harshness, have gained trust for delivering timely and impartial rulings.
In militant-controlled areas, the administration is not only free from corruption but also provides efficient judicial services, further solidifying its control and legitimacy among the local population. This unambiguous contrast underscores the FGS’ inability to meet even the basic expectations of governance.
The Military: A Tale of Decline
The FGS army suffers from deep-seated issues. Recruitment and promotions are clan-based rather than meritocratic, fostering corruption and eroding morale. Many soldiers, disillusioned by their leadership, have turned to drug use, and those trained under former President Farmajo and Prime Minister Kheyre have either been killed in poorly planned wars, wounded, or deserted.
Conversely, militant fighters are highly motivated, disciplined, and committed to their cause. Free from substance abuse, they are driven by a conviction to “liberate” Somalia from what they perceive as a corrupt, Western-backed regime. Their operational efficiency and high morale have enabled them to withstand and often outmaneuver government forces.
Security and Interclan Warfare
Interclan warfare has escalated across areas nominally controlled by the FGS, fueled by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud’s divisive policies. His administration has been accused of deploying federal forces to peaceful federal member states (FMS), such as Jubaland, to further political agendas, destabilizing previously harmonious regions. This level of interclan conflict has not been witnessed since the end of Somalia’s civil war.
In blunt contrast, areas under militant control are notably free from clan warfare. The strict governance imposed by Al-Shabaab and ISIS prevents such conflicts, further enhancing their appeal to communities exhausted by decades of interclan strife.
Intelligence Failures
The National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) under the FGS is plagued by incompetence and nepotism. Current leadership, characterized by tribal loyalties and political activism, lacks the capacity to gather and act on critical intelligence. Videos of NISA’s head, Mr. Abdullahi Sanbolooshe, engaging in partisan activities circulate widely, undermining the agency’s credibility. This ineffective intelligence apparatus leaves the government blind to threats and incapable of proactive measures.
By contrast, the intelligence arms of Al-Shabaab and ISIS are highly effective, enabling them to plan and execute complex operations while maintaining tight security within their ranks. Their ability to adapt and respond swiftly to changing dynamics presents a formidable challenge to the FGS.
The Role of International Donors in Enabling Corruption
Many Somali intellectuals and analysts have expressed grave concerns over the role of international donors, such as the European Union (EU) and the World Bank (WB), in inadvertently perpetuating corruption within Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS). These institutions, while providing much-needed financial assistance intended for development projects, often fail to enforce strict accountability measures. This has allowed President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud to repurpose these funds for political maneuvering, such as withholding development aid from Federal Member States (FMS) to coerce political compliance. Such actions undermine the intended impact of international aid, exacerbating inequality and mistrust between the federal government and regional administrations.
Critics argue that this unchecked misuse of aid not only empowers corrupt governance practices but also deepens Somalia’s systemic issues, ultimately benefiting extremist groups that capitalize on the populace’s disenchantment with the government. By enabling the President to manipulate these resources for personal and political gain, international donors risk becoming complicit in perpetuating corruption—a betrayal of the highest order
Can the FGS Prevail?
The FGS’ survival hinges on addressing its internal weaknesses. Corruption must be tackled head-on through robust accountability mechanisms and transparent governance. Parliament must be reformed to function as a genuine check on executive power, crafting legislation that prioritizes national interests. Equally critical is the need for a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that combines military operations with community engagement to undercut militant support.
International partners can play a pivotal role by conditioning aid on measurable anti-corruption reforms and supporting initiatives that strengthen Somalia’s institutional capacity. However, lasting change requires a grassroots movement demanding integrity and accountability from Somalia’s leaders.
Conclusion
Al-Shabaab and ISIS Somalia represent existential threats to the FGS, not only through violence but also by exploiting the government’s profound weaknesses. While their prospects of toppling the FGS outright remain limited due to international support for Somalia’s government, their ability to undermine and delegitimize state authority continues unabated. With no trace of clan warfare and administrations free from corruption in militant-controlled areas, they highlight the unadulterated failures of the FGS.
To secure its future, the FGS must prioritize governance reforms, rebuild trust with its citizens, and demonstrate a genuine commitment to addressing the root causes of militancy. Only then can Somalia’s leaders hope to shift the balance away from extremism and toward enduring stability.
Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com
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