By Ahmed A. Yusuf

Former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continues to insist that Somalia is on the path toward a nationwide one-person-one-vote election. Yet a fundamental question remains unanswered: if this was truly his vision, what exactly did he spend the last four years doing to make it a reality?

A democratic transition of that magnitude requires years of preparation, broad political consensus, credible institutions, legal reforms, and public trust. Critics argue that rather than laying the foundations for such a historic transformation, Hassan Sheikh spent much of his presidency dismantling the very institutions that could have made it possible.

His administration became defined not by consensus-building but by confrontation, centralization, and unilateral decision-making. The political slogan most associated with Hassan Sheikh’s presidency was, “We are moving forward, and we will not wait for anyone.” What supporters viewed as determination, opponents saw as a refusal to consult, compromise, or accommodate dissenting views.

The result was increasing political isolation. Many of the allies who helped return him to power eventually distanced themselves, citing what they described as an unwillingness to listen to advice or accept alternative viewpoints.

Among the decisions that severely undermined government institutions was the dismantling of the existing Federal Electoral Commission, an institution that had spent years building capacity and receiving international training. Rather than reforming and strengthening it, the administration dissolved it and replaced it with a new structure viewed by many stakeholders as politically aligned with the presidency.

The National Economic Council (NEC), a body staffed by professionals with experience in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, was also effectively dismantled, removing a critical layer of economic foresight and strategic guidance. Former President Hassan Sheikh moved the NEC under the direct authority of his office, transforming what was once an key economic advisory institution into an extension of the presidency, thereby weakening its role as a body entrusted with shaping and safeguarding the country’s economic strategies.The same pattern extended to other institutions. The Independent Anti-Corruption Commission was abolished without any plans to reform it, despite its legal mandate and importance in promoting accountability.

Security policy became another source of controversy. The hard-won gains achieved by the security sector under previous administrations were squandered through poorly planned military campaigns and strategic miscalculations. Instead of consolidating security gains, Somalia found itself facing renewed instability in multiple regions.

Perhaps no issue generated more public anger than the sale and privatization of public land in Mogadishu. Opponents accuse the administration of forcibly evicting vulnerable communities from government-owned property before transferring prime public assets to politically connected business interests. They describe it as one of the largest public asset transfers in Somalia’s modern history.

At the same time, the government faced accusations of replacing experienced civil servants with individuals selected primarily on the basis of family connections, personal loyalty, or political affiliation. Critics argue that meritocracy was sacrificed in favor of patronage, weakening state institutions at a time when Somalia required stronger governance.

The constitutional process became another major flashpoint. Rather than pursuing broad national consultations, Hassan Sheikh’s administration pushed through constitutional changes that many opposition figures and federal member states rejected as unilateral. Similar concerns surrounded the creation of a new electoral framework that opponents argued lacked legitimacy because it was not the product of national consensus.

Throughout his presidency, Hassan Sheikh traveled extensively abroad, signing agreements with foreign governments whose details often remained unclear to the Somali public. Critics questioned the transparency of these deals, particularly when agreements appeared to involve countries with competing geopolitical interests, such as Egypt and Ethiopia.

Against this backdrop, the promise of one-person-one-vote elections increasingly resembled a political slogan rather than an achievable national project. The political reality on the ground appeared to move in the opposite direction.

Relations between Villa Somalia and federal member states deteriorated dramatically. Jubaland openly rejected federal initiatives and charted its own course. Puntland severed cooperation with Mogadishu on key constitutional and electoral issues. Somaliland remained outside the federal framework. Hirshabelle struggled with internal challenges, while South West State became the scene of escalating tensions and armed confrontations. Most recently, political tensions in Galmudug intensified amid allegations of federal interference in regional leadership contests.

Critics and ordinary people alike therefore ask a simple question: How can a nationwide democratic election be organized when there is no agreement on the constitution, no agreement on the electoral framework, no agreement with federal member states, and no political consensus among Somalia’s major stakeholders?

In their view, the crisis is not simply the result of domestic political failures. They also place responsibility on the international community, which finances much of Somalia’s state budget and security architecture. According to this argument, international partners failed to intervene effectively when constitutional deadlines approached and political negotiations repeatedly collapsed. Rather than applying meaningful pressure for compromise and consensus, they watched from the sidelines as political divisions deepened.

Some critics go even further, arguing that the international community’s reluctance to act has fueled suspicions that powerful foreign actors may be increasingly comfortable with a fragmented Somalia composed of weak regional administrations that are easier to influence and whose natural resources can be accessed on favorable terms.

Whether such fears are justified or not, Somalia now faces a stark reality. The dream of universal suffrage cannot be achieved through presidential declarations alone. It requires functioning institutions, political consensus, constitutional legitimacy, and cooperation among all major national stakeholders.

Without those foundations, critics argue, the promise of one-person-one-vote remains less a roadmap for Somalia’s future and more a symbol of four years of missed opportunities, political polarization, and growing uncertainty about the country’s direction.

Ahmed A. Yusuf
Email: aayuusuf44@gmail.com