Somalia Plans New Drone and Military Bases While Political Instability Deepens

Somalia Plans New Drone and Military Bases While Political Instability Deepens

Mogadishu – (WDN)— The Federal Government of Somalia is reportedly preparing to establish military bases and drone command centers in three strategically important cities across central and southern Somalia, as part of efforts to strengthen its security capabilities and prepare for any further reduction or eventual withdrawal of African Union forces under AUSSOM.

The plan reportedly includes deploying units of the Somali National Army, particularly the Gorgor special forces, to areas in South West State where Ethiopian troops are currently providing security. The objective is to enable Somali forces to assume greater responsibility for securing key population centers and strategic locations.

The proposed drone facilities is said to provide local forces with surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities, to reduce dependence on Mogadishu for operational support. The government has also increased the use of drones at night to monitor conflict zones and other strategically important areas.

On paper, the strategy represents an important effort to strengthen Somalia’s national security architecture. A stronger Somali military, better intelligence capabilities and greater operational independence are essential if the country is to assume full responsibility for its security. But drones, military bases and armed forces cannot solve a political crisis.

The government is attempting to expand its military and technological capabilities at a time when Somalia is facing an unprecedented constitutional and electoral confrontation. Disputes over the constitutional order, the electoral framework, federal-state relations and the legitimacy of the political process remain unresolved.

More fundamentally, the government is operating under a contested and expired mandate, making the question of political legitimacy inseparable from the question of national security.

The deeper crisis is therefore not simply whether the Somali Army has enough drones, bases or weapons. It is whether the institutions commanding those forces possess the constitutional and political legitimacy required to deploy them. This distinction is critical.

A government can acquire sophisticated surveillance technology, establish military installations and deploy elite forces across the country, but none of these measures can substitute for constitutional consensus, credible elections, accountable institutions and public trust.

The security challenge is further complicated by the continuing controversy over land and property in Mogadishu and other parts of the country. The large-scale appropriation, demolition and alleged commercialization of public and privately occupied land have become one of the defining controversies surrounding the current administration.

For thousands of ordinary Somalis, the issue is not abstract constitutional theory. It is the loss of homes, displacement of families and the feeling that state institutions have been used against citizens rather than to protect them. That creates a dangerous contradiction: the government is investing in more powerful instruments of coercion while its political legitimacy and public confidence remain deeply contested.

Military power is most effective when it operates within a legitimate constitutional order. Without that foundation, even a well-equipped army risks becoming entangled in political disputes that it was never designed to resolve.

The proposed drone network may therefore strengthen Somalia’s capacity to confront Al-Shabaab and other security threats, but it cannot resolve the country’s constitutional crisis. Nor can it settle disputes between the Federal Government and Federal Member States, determine the legitimacy of electoral arrangements, or restore public confidence damaged by allegations of corruption and land grabbing.

Somalia needs both security and legitimacy. It needs a capable national army, but it also needs institutions that command public confidence. It needs drones to protect its citizens, but it also needs a political system that protects their constitutional rights.

As the country approaches another decisive political moment, the central question should not simply be how many drones Somalia possesses or how many military bases it can establish. The more consequential question is whether those capabilities will serve a constitutional state whose authority derives from a credible political process—or become instruments of a government struggling to defend its legitimacy after its mandate has expired.

Weapons can secure territory. Drones can provide intelligence. Armies can fight insurgencies. But none of them can manufacture constitutional legitimacy, democratic consent or public trust. Those must be earned through law, accountability and a credible electoral process.

WardheerNews