Mogadishu (WDN) — Somalia is preparing to revive its long-dormant national airline through a Rent-to-Buy (Lease-to-Own) agreement with LEMA Air Group that would initially provide two Airbus A320 aircraft. Under the arrangement, the government would operate the aircraft under a lease before eventually taking ownership once the agreed payments have been completed. There is very little publicly available information about the contract with LEMA Air Group or the company itself.
The plan is being presented as the first major step toward restoring Somali Airlines, which suspended operations in 1991 after the collapse of Somalia’s central government. The government has previously indicated that the national carrier could resume flights in September 2026, although technical preparations and outstanding agreements could push that timeline back.
On the surface, the revival of a national airline is an attractive symbol of sovereignty and national recovery. But beneath the symbolism lies a much harder question:
Can a government whose fiscal capacity remains heavily dependent on international support sustainably operate a national flag carrier?
The Economics Behind the Flag
Operating two Airbus A320s is considerably more complicated than acquiring or leasing the aircraft. A national airline must cover aircraft leasing or financing, maintenance, insurance, fuel, crews, airport charges, navigation fees, spare parts, regulatory compliance and ground operations. It must also survive periods of low passenger demand, fuel-price volatility and route competition from established regional carriers.
Somalia faces those challenges while still confronting severe security, institutional and fiscal constraints. The government’s dependence on international assistance makes the economics even more difficult. If external partners provide the overwhelming share of public financing, the state has limited fiscal room to absorb sustained losses from a commercial airline.
That raises a fundamental question: Who ultimately carries the financial risk if Somali Airlines fails to generate enough revenue?
The history of national carriers elsewhere offers a warning. Governments in countries with far larger economies—including South Africa, Nigeria and Australia—have at various times struggled to sustain national airlines without substantial restructuring, public support or repeated financial intervention. Somalia has neither their fiscal depth nor their aviation infrastructure.
The proposed revival of Somali Airlines has also triggered questions about the concentration of economic power in Somalia. Among the names increasingly mentioned in discussions about the country’s business landscape is businessman Sheikh Ahmed Nur Ali Jimale. Critics and business observers allege that he has accumulated significant interests across telecommunications, banking, construction, consumer goods, transportation and other strategic sectors.
The extensive list of companies and services attributed to his business interests includes Hormuud, Salaam Somali Bank, BECO, Daallo Airlines, EVC Plus, WAAFI, SomGas, Coca-Cola Somalia, TAAJ, Rikaab, and other enterprises.
These claims should not be treated as established facts without independent verification of ownership structures, shareholdings and corporate relationships. But the allegations themselves highlight a serious policy question for Somalia: Is the country creating a genuinely competitive private sector, or allowing strategic markets to become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small number of powerful business groups?
That question becomes particularly important if a private commercial actor gains substantial influence over the national airline.
The Flag Carrier Dilemma
A national airline is different from an ordinary private company. A flag carrier carries the country’s name, represents its sovereignty abroad and can become a strategic instrument for tourism, trade, diaspora connectivity and national integration. But symbolism does not pay for aircraft maintenance.
If Somali Airlines is to succeed, it will require professional management, transparent procurement, independent financial oversight, commercially viable routes and a governance structure that prevents political or private interests from capturing the airline.
The government must also clarify whether the airline will remain wholly state-owned, whether private investors will eventually acquire shares, and who will be responsible for covering operating losses. Without clear answers, the revival risks becoming another state enterprise whose political importance exceeds its commercial viability.
The most important issue may therefore extend beyond the two Airbus aircraft. Somalia needs to demonstrate that major national assets are not being allocated through informal political or commercial networks operating behind the scenes.
If powerful business interests are seeking greater influence over aviation, the public deserves transparency about ownership, contracts, financing arrangements, beneficial interests and decision-making structures.
The government should publish the full terms of the LEMA Air Group agreement and explain precisely how the lease-to-own arrangement will be financed, what guarantees the state is providing, and what happens if Somali Airlines cannot meet its obligations.
A national airline cannot become sustainable through political symbolism alone. The larger economic concern is the possibility that the revival of Somali Airlines could occur alongside increasing concentration in other strategic markets.
A functioning economy requires competition. Telecommunications, banking, aviation, energy, transport and other essential sectors should not become dominated by a handful of actors with disproportionate economic and political influence.
Somalia’s emerging private sector has played an important role in keeping the economy functioning through decades of state collapse. But that achievement could be undermined if market concentration becomes so extreme that new competitors cannot enter or existing businesses cannot compete on equal terms.
The government therefore has a responsibility not simply to revive Somali Airlines, but to ensure that its revival strengthens competition, transparency and consumer choice.
The Question Somalia Must Answer
There is nothing inherently wrong with Somalia restoring its national airline. In fact, a professionally managed flag carrier could provide significant economic and strategic benefits. But the project must be judged by the same standard applied to any major public investment:
Who owns it? Who controls it? Who finances it? Who carries the losses? And who ultimately benefits?
Those questions become even more important in a country whose public finances remain heavily reliant on international assistance.
The greatest danger would be to create a national airline in name while allowing its financial risks, commercial decisions or strategic assets to fall under the influence of a small circle of politically connected interests. Somali Airlines should become a symbol of national recovery—not another example of economic concentration.
The aircraft may be arriving under a lease-to-own agreement, but the real test will be whether Somalia can build an airline governed by transparency, competition and commercial discipline rather than political connections and private monopolies.
WardheerNews