Nairobi (WDN) — Former Southwest State President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen has launched a forceful counterattack against the Federal Government of Somalia, rejecting allegations that he or forces loyal to him have collaborated with Al-Shabaab and warning Ethiopian troops serving under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) against becoming embroiled in Somalia’s political conflict.

In a lengthy statement issued in English, Laftagareen described allegations linking him and his forces to Al-Shabaab as politically motivated and accused the federal government of using counterterrorism rhetoric to justify what he portrays as a military campaign against a regional political opponent.

The allegations have not been independently substantiated in the material available, but their political significance is difficult to ignore. The accusation of an Al-Shabaab connection, if used to justify military action against a regional authority, could fundamentally alter the nature of the confrontation—from a political dispute over legitimacy and governance into a counterterrorism operation involving international forces. That is precisely the danger Laftagareen is attempting to expose.

Is AUSSOM Becoming Part of the Political Battlefield?

Laftagareen’s most consequential warning was directed at AUSSOM, particularly Ethiopian forces stationed in Baidoa. He urged Ethiopia not to allow its troops to become instruments in what he described as an internal political and military struggle in Southwest State.

His intervention follows an August 21 statement from AUSSOM acknowledging that it had received a request from the Federal Government for support in counterterrorism operations. That statement raises a fundamental question: where does counterterrorism end and political intervention begin?

AUSSOM was created to support Somalia’s security institutions and combat Al-Shabaab. It was not established to determine which Somali political faction controls Baidoa, which regional authority is legitimate, or how political disputes between Mogadishu and the federal member states should be resolved.

If international forces become perceived as enforcing the political preferences of one side, their credibility—and potentially their operational effectiveness—could suffer. For Ethiopia, the issue is particularly sensitive. Ethiopian troops have a substantial presence in Southwest State, giving Addis Ababa enormous influence over the security environment surrounding Baidoa. Any perception that Ethiopian forces are taking sides in the political confrontation could transform an already volatile dispute into a broader regional crisis.

At the center of the controversy is the dramatic escalation between Mogadishu and Southwest State. Laftagareen has strongly condemned the circumstances surrounding his removal from power, portraying it not as a legitimate political transition but as the product of coercion and military pressure.

The federal government, meanwhile, has portrayed the security dimension of the confrontation through the lens of Al-Shabaab and national security. That creates a potentially dangerous political equation: a regional political opponent is accused of links to a terrorist organization, federal forces mobilize, and international troops are asked to provide counterterrorism support.

The obvious question is whether the security justification is independently verifiable—or whether counterterrorism language is being used to provide political cover for a struggle over power. No serious government can afford to blur that distinction.

The Al-Shabaab Question

Laftagareen has categorically denied cooperation with Al-Shabaab, including allegations that his forces have conducted joint operations with the militant group. Those claims and counterclaims require evidence, not political declarations.

Al-Shabaab remains Somalia’s most dangerous insurgent organization, and any credible evidence of collaboration between political actors and the group would represent a grave national-security matter. But the opposite is equally important: accusations of terrorism cannot be allowed to become a political weapon without transparent evidence.

If the federal government possesses intelligence demonstrating operational cooperation between Laftagareen’s forces and Al-Shabaab, the appropriate response should be to present credible evidence and pursue the matter through lawful national and international mechanisms.

If such evidence does not exist, then invoking Al-Shabaab to justify military action against political opponents risks damaging the very institutions that Somalia and its international partners claim to be building.

AUSSOM Faces a Test of Neutrality

The controversy comes at an especially delicate moment for Somalia’s international security architecture. AUSSOM is operating in a country where political divisions, disputes over federal authority, contested electoral arrangements and security challenges increasingly overlap. The mission therefore faces a difficult balancing act: it must support the Somali government’s fight against Al-Shabaab without becoming entangled in disputes between Mogadishu and the federal member states. That distinction may prove decisive.

If AUSSOM is seen by significant sections of the Somali public as taking sides in a political conflict, its legitimacy could erode rapidly. Armed groups could exploit the resulting divisions, while regional authorities could become less willing to cooperate with the mission.

The consequences would extend far beyond Baidoa. Laftagareen’s statement ultimately forces a question that Somalia’s international partners cannot afford to ignore:

Is the fight against Al-Shabaab being conducted separately from Somalia’s political crisis—or is the war against terrorism gradually becoming entangled with the struggle for political control?
The answer matters enormously.

Somalia needs international forces to fight Al-Shabaab. It also needs those forces to remain sufficiently neutral to command the confidence of Somalia’s deeply divided political landscape. Turning counterterrorism forces into instruments of political confrontation could achieve a short-term military objective while creating a much larger strategic problem.

For now, Laftagareen has put the issue squarely on the table. He denies the allegations against him, challenges the federal government’s justification for military action, and is warning Ethiopia and AUSSOM not to cross the line between supporting Somalia’s security and becoming participants in Somalia’s political war.

Whether Mogadishu can provide credible evidence for its accusations—and whether AUSSOM can demonstrate that its operations are driven by counterterrorism imperatives rather than political calculations—may determine what happens next in Baidoa. The most dangerous outcome would be for Somalia’s political battles to acquire the language, weapons and international military machinery of a counterterrorism campaign.

WardheerNews