By Abdiqani Haji Abdi

For months, Somalia’s political crisis has been the subject of intensive mediation by the International Community (IC). Yet as negotiations drag on with little visible progress, many Somalis are beginning to ask an increasingly uncomfortable question: Is the mediation process genuinely aimed at resolving the crisis, or is it merely providing cover for unilateral political actions that could shape Somalia’s future before any agreement is reached?

The Somali public has been told that the Federal Government and the opposition are engaged in internationally facilitated talks to resolve the country’s constitutional and electoral impasse. Ordinarily, such negotiations are expected to freeze controversial political decisions until consensus is achieved.

Instead, Somalia appears to be witnessing the opposite. While discussions continue behind closed doors, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has pressed ahead with political and electoral processes in several Federal Member States despite the absence of a publicly agreed national framework.

That contradiction lies at the heart of growing public skepticism. In virtually every successful peace process, confidence-building measures come first. Parties are expected to refrain from unilateral actions that could prejudice negotiations or alter political realities before agreements are reached. Such restraint builds trust and demonstrates commitment to dialogue.

Somalia’s mediation has so far failed to produce that confidence. Critics argue that despite claims of ongoing negotiations, the President—whose constitutional mandate, they contend, expired on 15 May 2026—continues to exercise the full powers of office rather than functioning in a caretaker capacity pending a political settlement.

Among the most controversial developments has been the Federal Government’s intervention in South West State, where federal forces reshaped the political landscape, culminating in the installation of a new regional administration following an election that opposition figures argue lacked broad political consensus.

The controversy has since shifted to Galmudug. The outcome of the regional election has effectively been determined before voting has concluded. Those concerns gained additional attention after Galmudug Parliament Speaker Cali Gacal reportedly stated that the regional administration had virtually no role in managing the election, claiming instead that the process was being directed by the Federal Government.

According to his reported remarks, a single political party has dominated the process, with electronic voting through mobile applications becoming the principal voting mechanism.

Other Somali commentators have also questioned the transparency of the election. Political analyst Diini Mohamed Diini reportedly argued that the Galmudug vote cannot reasonably be described as a free or broadly accepted election. Former presidential adviser Prof. Hussein Iman similarly warned that if Galmudug’s political autonomy has effectively been surrendered, other Federal Member States could eventually face comparable political pressure.

Meanwhile, reports indicate that voter registration has already begun in parts of the Hiiraan region under similarly disputed circumstances, reinforcing concerns among critics that additional political arrangements are being established before mediation has produced a national agreement.

Beyond Elections

The electoral dispute is only one aspect of the broader crisis. Opposition figures argue that controversial policies have continued uninterrupted throughout the mediation process. These include allegations of land acquisitions, displacement of communities, corruption, political patronage, and restrictions on political freedoms.

Critics contend that demonstrations have faced increasing restrictions and that journalists and social media commentators risk detention for expressing dissenting political views. Whether every allegation ultimately proves accurate is, in many respects, secondary to the larger issue.

The cumulative effect has been to deepen public skepticism about whether meaningful political dialogue is truly taking place. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the current mediation is the apparent absence of a clearly articulated roadmap.

Successful political negotiations typically follow a logical sequence. Constitutional disputes are addressed first. Consensus is then reached on an appropriate electoral model. Electoral institutions are agreed upon. Finally, implementation begins according to mutually accepted rules.

Many Somalis struggle to identify where the current negotiations fit within such a framework. No publicly available roadmap explains what milestones have been achieved, what issues remain unresolved, or how the talks are expected to conclude.

Without that clarity, confidence in both the negotiations and the international mediators inevitably begins to erode.

A Growing Public Perception

Increasingly, many Somalis have come to believe that the mediation process is unintentionally—or perhaps knowingly—allowing the political balance of power to shift while negotiations continue.

The perception among critics is that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is being afforded sufficient time to consolidate influence over the political leadership of South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle, potentially shaping the composition of future parliamentary representation before a national political settlement is reached.

If those regional processes ultimately produce parliamentary representatives aligned with the incumbent administration, critics argue that they could play a decisive role in electing Somalia’s next president.

To many opposition figures and civil society activists, such an outcome would fundamentally undermine the credibility of the mediation process.

The Cost of Unilateralism

Events in Baidoa illustrate the potential consequences.

Fighting continues between forces loyal to former South West President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen and the authorities installed following the disputed political transition. To many observers, the conflict demonstrates how attempts to reshape regional leadership without broad political consensus can quickly evolve into armed confrontation.

Critics warn that repeating similar processes elsewhere risks further destabilizing an already fragile federation.

If disputed regional administrations are permitted to produce parliamentary representatives who later determine Somalia’s national leadership, they argue, the consequences could include:

• Further erosion of confidence in constitutional governance.
• Deepening divisions between the Federal Government and Federal Member States.
• Expansion of armed political resistance.
• Weakening the legitimacy of future national institutions.
• Prolonging Somalia’s constitutional and security crisis.

The Turkish Factor questioned

 One issue that has increasingly puzzled many Somalis is what they perceive as Turkey’s expanding influence over Somalia’s political, economic and security landscape.

Critics point to a series of developments they believe have fueled these perceptions. They note that Turkish-supplied military equipment was reportedly used by Federal Government forces during operations in Baidoa, which ultimately enabled Mogadishu to consolidate control over South West State.

They also point to widespread political speculation that Somalia’s current ambassador to Turkey is being positioned to become the next President of Hirshabelle State, while reports suggest that a close associate of Turkey could emerge as the next Speaker of the Hirshabelle Parliament.

Similar attention has focused on Galmudug, where political sources claim that Libaan Shuluq—widely viewed by critics as the Federal Government’s preferred candidate for the regional presidency—is currently in Turkey, where he is reportedly engaged in meetings as Somalia’s political negotiations continue. Those reports have not been independently verified.

Critics further note that Somalia’s military leadership maintains close ties with Turkey, whose armed forces have played a major role in training and equipping the Somali National Army over the past decade.

The current Chief of the Somali National Army is a relatively young officer who received extensive military training in Turkey and was appointed during the final days of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s constitutional mandate. Critics argue that the timing of his promotion reflected political calculations designed to preserve the administration’s security agenda and maintain close military cooperation with Turkey. They contend that the appointment was intended to advance the strategic interests of both President Hassan’s government and Ankara, although neither the Somali government nor Turkish officials have publicly acknowledged such motivations.

Taken together, these developments have fueled growing public debate over Turkey’s role in Somalia. While Ankara maintains that its engagement is intended to strengthen Somalia’s security institutions and support state-building efforts, some political observers question whether Turkey is remaining a neutral partner at a time when it is also viewed as one of the country’s most influential external actors in an increasingly contested political transition.

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The Greatest Risk the International Community Appears to Be Overlooking

The greatest risk that the International Community’s mediation team appears to be overlooking is the potential response of Puntland and Jubaland to the current political trajectory.

Both Federal Member States have, so far, exercised restraint. Rather than taking unilateral action, they have chosen to observe the mediation process from a distance, hoping that it would produce a genuinely inclusive political settlement. However, a growing number of Somalis increasingly perceive the mediation not as an impartial effort to build national consensus, but as a process heavily influenced by Turkey and designed to advance political outcomes favorable to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Whether that perception is accurate or not, it has become politically significant. In mediation, credibility is as important as neutrality. Once key stakeholders lose confidence in the impartiality of the process, the prospects for a negotiated settlement diminish rapidly.

For Puntland and Jubaland, the stakes are exceptionally high. Both administrations have repeatedly argued that Somalia’s constitutional order is being altered through unilateral decisions rather than national consensus. If they conclude that the mediation merely serves to legitimize faits accomplis instead of resolving the underlying constitutional dispute, they may begin exploring political alternatives outside the existing federal framework.

That raises an increasingly important—and uncomfortable—question:

Could Puntland and Jubaland ultimately choose a path similar to Somaliland’s?

Such a scenario, once considered politically unthinkable, is no longer dismissed outright in some political circles. If the two Federal Member States determine that the federal system can no longer guarantee constitutional power-sharing, political autonomy, or equal participation, they may decide that remaining within the current arrangement no longer serves their interests.

The consequences would be profound. Somalia would face not merely another political crisis, but the possible unraveling of the federal compact that has held the country together since 2012.

For this reason, the International Community should treat the confidence of Puntland and Jubaland as a central pillar of the mediation process rather than a secondary concern. A successful mediation cannot be built solely on agreements reached in Mogadishu. It must command the confidence of all major Somali stakeholders, particularly the Federal Member States whose participation is essential to the country’s constitutional order.

If the current mediation is perceived as facilitating unilateral political restructuring rather than fostering genuine national consensus, it risks producing precisely the outcome it seeks to avoid: a Somalia that becomes more politically fragmented, less stable, and increasingly divided.

The warning signs are already visible. Whether they are addressed through an inclusive, transparent, and genuinely impartial mediation process may determine not only the success of the current negotiations but also the future cohesion of the Somali state.

What Should Come Next?

Many Somalis believe the International Community should insist on an immediate suspension of all unilateral political actions while mediation continues. Confidence-building measures should precede political engineering.

A credible roadmap should be published, beginning with agreement on constitutional questions, followed by consensus on the electoral model, the establishment of mutually accepted electoral institutions, and only then implementation.

Without such safeguards, the mediation risks being remembered not as the process that resolved Somalia’s constitutional crisis, but as the period during which irreversible political realities were created while negotiations continued in parallel.

Somalia has overcome repeated political crises through compromise rather than coercion. That lesson remains as relevant today as ever. The credibility of the current mediation will ultimately be judged not by the number of meetings held or statements issued, but by whether it delivers a genuinely inclusive political settlement accepted by all major stakeholders.

Anything less risks leaving Somalia with institutions whose legitimacy is contested from the day they are formed—a scenario the country can ill afford.

Abdiqani Haji Abdi
Email: Hajiabdi0128@gmail.com