By Balal Mohamed Cusman

Somalia is currently confronting a moment that may be more critical to its future as a unified nation-state than at any other time in its recent history. The country faces multiple challenges simultaneously, drought, insecurity, and growing political tension, compounded by the ever-increasing complex geopolitical rivalries and wars unfolding across the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. While none of these challenges are new to Somalia, the convergence of these pressures at this particular political moment risks pushing the country toward deeper fragmentation and instability. If the current political impasse remains unresolved, the danger is not simply a delayed electoral process or the paralysis of the already fragile institutions. The real risk is that Somalia could gradually sleep work toward the balkanization of the state into small clan-based political enclaves, undermining the fragile unity that has been slowly rebuilt over the past two decades.

It is well known that Somalia’s political recovery since the collapse of the central government in 1991 has never followed a linear path. Instead, it has been the result of incremental political settlements built through dialogue and compromise among Somali stakeholders with the assistance of international partners. For instance, the Arta Conference (2000) in Djibouti represented the first major attempt to reunite Somalis politically after years of state collapse, resulting the Transitional National Government led by President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, whereas, The Embakasi Conference (2004) in Kenya produced the Transitional Federal Government and the Transitional Federal Charter, laying the foundation for Somalia’s current federal system and enabling the government to return to Villa Somalia – Mogadishu. In 2009 Somali stakeholders endorsed the draft provisional constitution through 850 delegates representing all different segments of Somali society. This process resulted in the election of President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and marked the first peaceful political transition conducted inside Mogadishu. In 2012 Somalia witnessed another improved electoral process that resulted in the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 1.0 then for President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo in 2017, then Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 2.0 in 2022 and all of them peaceful transfer of power. These milestones demonstrate that Somalia’s political progress has historically been gradual, negotiated and consensus‑based.

Additionally, any effort to finalize Somalia’s constitution cannot be considered legitimate or sustainable without the meaningful participation of all the regions that constitute Somaliland. While it is true that some members of parliament originating from Somaliland may have voted in favour of the recent amendments to the provisional constitution, this should not be interpreted as a formal endorsement or ratification by the Somaliland administration itself, hence, parliamentary representation alone does not substitute for the institutional consent of regional administrations. A similar situation can be observed with representatives from Puntland and Jubbaland. Although some members of parliament from these regions may have supported the amendments, their respective administrations have nonetheless expressed legitimate concerns regarding both the process and the unilateral nature of the constitutional changes. For the constitution therefore to achieve national legitimacy and durability, it must emerge from an inclusive and consensual process that meaningfully involves all key stakeholders, including the Somaliland administration. Without such participation, attempts to finalize the constitution risk lacking the political consensus necessary to serve as a unifying national framework.

Mindful of Somalia’s complex political journey and the huge risks that unilateral decisions may carry in the Somali political context, I humbly offer – below – what I perceive to be a practical and pragmatic pathway that could help narrow the gap between the country’s political actors, particularly between the president, federal member state leaders and other authentic presidential contenders, as the current government’s mandate approaches its conclusion. While this pathway may not satisfy every actor fully, it is presented as an amicable compromise intended to help avoid a constitutional crisis. It is my hope therefore that these reflections may contribute, however modestly, to a constructive dialogue that supports a stable political transition and strengthens Somalia’s national cohesion.  However, any attempt to further complicate the situation, whether through parallel political processes or by persistently pursuing a unilateral universal suffrage election without broad consensus, risks undermining the already fragile political cohesion of the country. Such actions could deepen mistrust among stakeholders and weaken the delicate foundations of the state. In the worst-case scenario, they could accelerate fragmentation and push the country toward further division along clan lines, potentially resulting in the emergence of competing local fiefdoms rather than a unified national framework.

Regardless of other outstanding concerns, the current political tensions in Somalia ultimately revolve around three critical issues outlined below. These matters cannot be deferred and therefore require immediate attention and agreement among the relevant stakeholders. 

1) The election models
2) The appointment of the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC)
3) The unilateral amendment of the provisional constitution

The disagreement stemming from these issues have significantly widened the political divide and further created uncertainty about how the next political transition will unfold. Therefore, to enable the holding of credible national elections in the country, it is essential, at a minimum, to remove or neutralize any pursuit of personal or factional political advantage from these three key issues. Doing so would help restore trust among political actors and, in turn, strengthen public and institutional confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. In fragile political environments such as Somalia, constitutional amendments must never be perceived as favouring a particular political actor or group. For this reason, at this critical moment, one of the key solutions could be that the constitutional amendments approved by certain segments of the federal parliament members should be deferred and only take effect after the national elections in 2026, providing adequate time for careful review and broad-based consensus-building, with only exceptions of the three critical provisions highlighted above, which are indispensable for ensuring the proper organization of the upcoming elections and therefore require urgent and focused attention.

Allowing to postpone the constitutional amendment – with the exception of the three key issues – ensures that no political actor, including the incumbent president, benefits directly or indirectly from the constitutional changes made during the current government’s mandate, whilst, on the other hand, rejecting all the amendments outright or refusing to show the flexibility necessary to reach an amicable understanding with other political stakeholders risks deepening political contestation and creates instability. In such circumstances, the only real beneficiaries would be extremist groups, such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS and of course, other actors seeking to exploit divisions within the country. Therefore, given the limited time remaining before the next elections, agreeing the deferral of the amended articles in the constitution, on one hand and reaching agreement on these three key provisions, on the other hand, could help transform the current constitutional debate from a source of confrontation into a collaborative national effort aimed at safeguarding stability, fairness and the integrity of the electoral process.

Assuming all other factors remain unchanged and after agreeing the deferral of the implementation of constitutional changes, following are the potential solutions for the other key sticking points – election models and NIEC – that could help achieve an amicable solution to create a conducive political environment where the country can overcome this impasse and conduct elections with broad consensus timely.

Election Model: this is a contentious issue that requires immediate attention to organise elections and should be agreed upon by all stakeholders. On one hand, the government insists on implementing a one-person-one-vote system, arguing that it represents the constitutional aspiration of the Somali people and a major step toward democratic consolidation. On the other hand, the presidential candidates and other political stakeholders argue that the current conditions, including security challenges, incomplete voter registration, limited of administrative and financial capacity and the absence of a fully functioning political party system make such a system impractical at this stage – Both positions contain legitimate concerns. With regard to the former argument of one-person-one-vote elections, although, the aspiration for Somalia to eventually hold universal suffrage elections is both admirable and necessary for the country’s democratic future, but attempting to implement such a system prematurely could result in logistical failure leading political contestation and thereby instability, further complicating the already fragile security situation both in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa region. Similarly, simply repeating the previous indirect electoral model without improvement would ignore the modest progress Somalia has made. Therefore, the following compromise which I call “an enhanced cross-clan electoral model” may offer the most realistic path forward, which builds on the previous indirect system while expanding participation and legitimacy.

Under this model:

1) Each federal member state would establish at least four electoral districts.
2) Each district would elect a minimum of five parliamentary seats.
3) Each seat would be elected by 301 delegates, compared to the previous 101.
4) Delegates from across the district would vote for all seats in that district.

For example, if a district has five seats, 1,505 delegates would collectively vote for each seat, thereby broadening participation and reducing the influence of individual sub-clans.

As usual, delegates could be selected through a combination of representatives from:

1) Traditional elders
2) Civil society organizations
3) Intellectuals and professionals
4) Business leaders  
5) Youth and women representatives
6) Religious leaders
7) Community representatives, including marginalized groups.

Such a model would help reduce sub-clan domination, corruption and the influence of other actors seeking to exploit the weakness of the previous electoral models, further encouraging broader political engagement and strengthen both national and regional cohesion.

This model would also serve as a transitional step toward a future one-person-one-vote system while remaining realistic about Somalia’s current conditions. At the same time, it would provide reassurance to all parties that the arrangement does not favour any particular group or candidate.

National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC): Another key contentious point of disagreement concerns the appointment of the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC). The principles of appointment NIEC strongly suggest that the appointment process should involve consultation among key stakeholders. Therefore, in addition to those requirements stipulated by the provisional constitution, possible additional compromises could be:

1) Shared nomination rights between the federal government and federal member states 
2) Consultation with legitimate presidential contenders 
3) Vetting of nominees by an independent panel of jurists and respected civil society figures 
4) And finally parliamentary confirmation through a supermajority vote.

Such a structure would prevent any single political actor from dominating the electoral body and would therefore enhance the credibility of the electoral process.  If these three key contentious points – election model, NIEC and the postponement of the articles passed by the parliament to the next term – are agreed, it will substantially reduce the possibility of manipulating the electoral process, therefore, it should be acceptable to all parties seeking a fair and free elections. Political settlements in fragile states tend to succeed when no party feels humiliated and each side can claim some degree of success, particularly, in Somalia’s recent political history shows that peaceful transfers of power are possible, even under imperfect systems, provided that stakeholders trust the process. With this in mind, I believe the proposal outlined here reflects that reality – a compromise where no side obtains everything it desires, but no side walk away with empty-handed.

Today, Somalia stands another critical crossroads. One path leads toward renewed political polarization and instability that extremist groups could exploit. The other path leads toward gradual democratic consolidation built on compromise, dialogue and responsible leadership. Ultimately, the direction Somalia takes will not be determined solely by constitutional provisions or electoral formulas, rather, it will depend on the political will of Somali leaders to place national stability above short-term political advantage. History demonstrates that when Somali leaders engage constructively, they are capable of reaching political agreements that preserve the nation – often with the assistance of international partners, therefore with genuine commitment to Somalia’s unity and survival, a path forward is always possible. 

Balal Mohamed Cusman
Email: bcusman@gmail.com
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Balal is former State Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somalia. X:@BalalCusman