By Mukhtar Ainashe

Following is an excerpt from an article on Wardheer News by Hon. Ahmed Abdi Koshin, a serving member of Somali Federal Parliament, and Dr Abdifatah Ismael Tahir, a former member of Parliament:

“For those of us from Somaliland, Baidoa raises a key question: is this an isolated episode, or part of a broader shift in which externally backed coercive centralisation is becoming the new logic of power in Somalia? The answer lies in preparedness grounded in a comparable strategic logic. That means Somaliland must either secure, or accelerate efforts to consolidate, external backing of its own…Stated plainly, Israel could expedite the delivery of equipment such as drones and armoured vehicles, training, and operational expertise, while the UAE could help underwrite the financial costs… Somaliland would need a comparable framework of support to preserve deterrence and defend its territory effectively.”

Are the authors seriously suggesting that Somali regions should arm themselves against the Federal Government? Is this what a serving member and a former member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament are now advocating? That when political disagreements arise within our country, the answer is not dialogue or constitutional process, but the mobilisation of foreign powers, weapons, and rival security arrangements?

If that is indeed their argument, then it represents one of the most dangerous propositions in Somalia’s political discourse in recent years.  Let us be clear about what is being proposed. The authors are not simply criticising President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s use of force in Baidoa or raising concerns about over-centralisation. Those are legitimate concerns that many Somalis, myself included, share. But what they are advancing goes far beyond that.

They are calling for “Somaliland” to actively seek external military backing, explicitly naming Israel to provide drones, armoured vehicles, and training, with others financing the effort, in order to build a deterrent posture against the Somali Federal Government. In doing so, they are not only legitimising foreign military involvement in Somalia’s internal affairs, they are also reinforcing the secessionist agenda.

It is difficult to overstate how serious this is. For a serving member of Somalia’s Federal Parliament to advance such a position raises profound questions. At best, it reflects a dangerous lapse in judgment. At worst, it borders on a betrayal of the constitutional order he is sworn to uphold.

What is being proposed is not a solution. It is a call for the militarisation and further internationalisation of Somalia’s internal political order.  At its core, this proposal strikes directly at Somalia’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. These are not abstract ideals. They are the foundation of the Somali state. A nation cannot claim sovereignty while encouraging parts of itself to enter into military arrangements with foreign powers. That contradiction weakens the Somali state from within.

External actors do not enter such arrangements as neutral partners. They come with interests, agendas, and rivalries. Once embedded, they are difficult to remove. What begins as support quickly becomes dependency, and dependency leads to loss of autonomy. In that scenario, Somali actors are no longer shaping their own future. They are being shaped by those who arm and finance them.

Once external actors are invited to support competing authorities within Somalia, the country ceases to function as a unified political entity. It becomes an arena of competing spheres of influence, where power flows not from legitimacy or consensus, but from external backing.

We have seen this before. Somalia has lived this reality, and we know the cost.

The authors frame their argument in terms of deterrence and preparedness. But deterrence is a concept between sovereign states, not within a single nation. When applied internally, it does not create balance. It creates mistrust, fear, and ultimately confrontation.

If Somaliland is justified in seeking foreign-backed military capacity, then every other federal member state will feel compelled to follow. Puntland, Jubaland, and others will inevitably pursue their own external sponsors. The result will not be stability, but a fragmented country made up of competing armed centres, each aligned with different foreign interests.

That is not federalism. That is fragmentation.

Federalism is meant to manage differences through dialogue, compromise, and shared institutions. It requires political maturity and a commitment to coexistence. What is being proposed replaces that with suspicion and militarisation. It turns political disagreement into a security contest.

And once politics becomes a security contest, dialogue weakens, trust disappears, and power begins to flow from force rather than legitimacy. That is precisely the danger many Somalis already fear following developments in Baidoa. But responding to that concern with further militarisation only accelerates the very outcome we should be trying to avoid.

Equally concerning is the explicit invitation to foreign powers to become directly involved in Somalia’s internal affairs. Somalia sits in a region of intense geopolitical competition. Bringing new actors into sub-national military arrangements will not stabilise the country. It will deepen rivalries and entrench external influence in ways that are difficult to reverse Those who advocate such a path may believe they are strengthening their position. In reality, they risk surrendering control over Somalia’s future.

None of this is to deny that serious concerns exist. The events in Baidoa have raised legitimate questions, and many Somalis are uneasy about the direction of politics. But disagreement with the federal government, no matter how justified, does not warrant inviting foreign powers into our internal affairs.

Two wrongs do not make a right.

If there is a failure to confront, it is not Somalia’s unity. It is the failure of parts of the political elite to articulate a coherent, inclusive national vision and to stand firmly for Somali-led solutions. Too often, leadership has been reactive when it should have been principled, divided when it should have been united. But the answer is not to retreat into externally backed arrangements. The answer is to rebuild trust, strengthen institutions, and resolve our differences as Somalis.

Unity is not optional. It is essential

Somalia’s future cannot be built on competing foreign-backed security structures. It cannot rest on a logic of internal deterrence. And it cannot survive a political culture that treats fragmentation as a solution.

We must choose a different path. A path of dialogue, constitutional order, and national solidarity. A path that protects the integrity of our nation and preserves the dignity of Somali self-determination.

The idea being advanced by the authors is not just misguided. It is a direct threat to Our country’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

It must be rejected firmly and without hesitation.

SOOMAALIYA HA NOOLAATO!

Mukhtar Ainashe
Oslo, Norway.
Email: mainashe@gmail.com
Web: mukhtarainashe.substack.com