By Mohamed A Yasin

Somalia stands at one of the most consequential crossroads in its modern history. The national debate has moved well beyond elections, constitutional amendments, or the rivalry between competing political camps. The fundamental question now is whether the Somali state can preserve its political cohesion while confronting an insurgency that has spent nearly two decades exploiting every weakness in governance. From where I stand, Somalia’s greatest challenge is no longer primarily military—it is political.

The political strategy unfolding across the country’s Federal Member States has become increasingly predictable. First comes the restructuring of regional political institutions, followed by tightly managed electoral processes whose outcomes appear evident long before the first ballot is cast. Once new regional administrations are installed, parliamentary representation follows, ultimately shaping the balance of power in Mogadishu and determining who occupies Villa Somalia.

South West State provided the first major example. Galmudug has now followed an almost identical path. Hirshabelle increasingly appears destined to become the next chapter in what has become a familiar political script.

Viewed through the lens of electoral arithmetic, the strategy possesses its own internal logic: consolidate influence over enough Federal Member States to secure the parliamentary numbers necessary to shape Somalia’s next presidential election. Viewed through the lens of state-building, however, the implications are far more troubling. The three Federal Member States central to this political strategy—South West State, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle—remain among the region’s most heavily affected by Al-Shabaab’s insurgency.

Despite repeated military offensives, Al-Shabaab continues to exert influence across vast rural areas, collect taxes, recruit fighters, conduct sophisticated attacks, and challenge state authority. Military operations have undoubtedly produced tactical successes. Yet strategically, the picture remains deeply concerning.

Again and again, government forces have liberated territory only to relinquish it months later because liberated communities were never provided with functioning administration, effective policing, justice systems, or sustainable public services. This cycle has repeated itself so frequently that it can no longer be dismissed as a temporary operational setback. It has become one of the defining structural weaknesses of the Somali state.

That concern was recently echoed by General Dagvin Anderson, Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), who expressed disappointment that areas previously liberated had once again required military operations after falling back under Al-Shabaab’s influence. His remarks reflected a lesson well understood in modern counterinsurgency: military victories rarely endure unless they are immediately followed by governance, justice, public services, and lasting stabilization.

Somalia continues to struggle with precisely that transition. Meanwhile, national political attention has become increasingly consumed by constitutional disputes, electoral calculations, and competition for institutional control. This imbalance creates precisely the environment in which insurgent movements thrive.

Al-Shabaab does not need to control every district or every town. It merely requires enough political dysfunction to convince local communities that government authority is temporary while its own presence appears permanent.

Political fragmentation has become one of its greatest strategic assets. The deeper Somalia’s internal divisions become, the easier it becomes for militant groups to portray themselves as enduring actors, even where their authority is maintained through intimidation and violence. Perhaps the greatest contradiction confronting Somalia today is the geographic overlap between political consolidation and insurgent influence.

The very Federal Member States expected to provide the parliamentary foundation for future political power remain among those where state authority is most fragile. Political control on paper cannot substitute for effective governance on the ground.

History has repeatedly demonstrated that elections alone do not secure territory. Only functioning institutions, public confidence, security, justice, and accountable administration can achieve that objective. At the same time, Somalia’s federal compact itself is under unprecedented strain.

Puntland has effectively severed political relations with the Federal Government and increasingly functions with the institutions, fiscal administration, and security structures of a self-governing state. Jubaland has likewise suspended political cooperation with Mogadishu following prolonged disputes with the Federal Government and has successfully resisted attempts by the center to impose its authority.

Somaliland, meanwhile, has operated for more than three decades with its own government, elections, judiciary, armed forces, currency, and administrative institutions while continuing to pursue international recognition as an independent state. These are no longer isolated political disagreements. They represent three distinct political realities existing alongside the Federal Government.

Against this backdrop, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appears increasingly focused on consolidating influence within the remaining allied Federal Member States—South West State, Galmudug, and potentially Hirshabelle. Should these administrations remain politically aligned with Villa Somalia, they would collectively produce a substantial parliamentary bloc capable of shaping future federal elections.

Such a strategy may succeed in securing political dominance within the institutions that continue to recognize Mogadishu’s authority. Yet it raises a far more profound constitutional question.

Can any president realistically claim to govern a united Somalia when Puntland no longer cooperates politically with the Federal Government, Jubaland has likewise severed relations, and Somaliland continues to operate entirely outside Mogadishu’s authority?

That question transcends electoral mathematics. It goes to the very definition of the Somali Republic. More troubling still is the reality that the Federal Member States upon which Mogadishu increasingly depends remain among those where Al-Shabaab retains its strongest foothold.

Should Somalia’s political fragmentation deepen while governance continues to weaken in these regions, the country risks creating a dangerous paradox: political authority divided among competing administrations while large parts of the countryside remain vulnerable to insurgent expansion.  In such circumstances, Al-Shabaab would require little additional effort.  Political fragmentation would accomplish much of its strategic objective.

Somalia therefore risks evolving into a country defined by multiple political centers of gravity: Somaliland continuing its long-standing pursuit of international recognition; Puntland functioning as an increasingly autonomous state; Jubaland charting its own political course; and the Federal Government exercising effective authority largely within the remaining allied Federal Member States.

Whether this trajectory ultimately leads to formal constitutional separation cannot be predicted with certainty. That outcome will depend on future political decisions by Somali leaders, Federal Member States, and the wider Somali public. Yet the longer the current political impasse continues without an inclusive national settlement, the greater the danger that today’s political fragmentation becomes tomorrow’s constitutional reality.

History offers a consistent warning. Insurgencies rarely defeat states solely through military superiority. More often, states weaken themselves through political division, institutional erosion, and the loss of national consensus. Somalia cannot afford to repeat that lesson once again.

The country’s future will not ultimately be decided by parliamentary numbers or electoral engineering. It will be determined by whether its political leaders can restore constitutional legitimacy, rebuild trust between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States, and create a state that citizens regard as more credible, more permanent, and more legitimate than the armed movements seeking to replace it.

Until that happens, military victories will remain temporary, political gains will remain fragile, and Somalia’s greatest unfinished battle will continue to be fought not on the battlefield, but in the realm of politics.

Mohamed A Yasin
Email: moyasin680@gmail.com