By Ayan Abdirashid Ali

The recent resurgence of confederalism in Somali political discourse, particularly as championed by Abdul Ahmed III in his article, Confederalismo: Addressing the Structural Barriers to Political Progress in the Somali Peninsula, is both timely and provocative. The article purports to offer a realistic institutional remedy to the endemic dysfunction that plagues Somalia’s governance, casting confederalism as a rational evolution rather than a rupture. It is an argument that brims with intellectual confidence, but upon scrutiny, it collapses under the weight of its own assumptions.

Far from being a principled response to systemic malaise, the confederal turn advocated by Ahmed is better understood as a retreat into fragmentation. It offers the illusion of political and legal coherence while undermining the very conditions necessary for viable, equitable governance. This article contends that confederalism is not a cure, but a misdiagnosis. Somalia does not need a structural reset; it needs a reinvigorated and honest commitment to the unfinished work of constitutional federalism. This conceptual error leads to a second, equally critical flaw: the assumption that formalising autonomy guarantees stability.

The Foundational Fallacy: Confederation Without Sovereigns

Part of Ahmed III’s proposal is the belief that Somalia’s federal member states, particularly Puntland, are sufficiently autonomous to enter a horizontal legal arrangement akin to a confederation. This is a conceptual misstep. Confederations, by definition, are composed of sovereign entities that delegate limited powers to a central coordinating body. Examples from history such as the Swiss Confederacy or the pre-constitutional United States demonstrate that confederations presume the pre-existence of functioning, (and or in some instances) internationally recognised states.

Puntland, despite its early institutional development and relative political coherence, remains fixed within Somalia’s constitutional architecture. It does not possess an international legal personality, nor does it maintain the full sovereign powers of a state like defence, diplomacy, currency, and citizenship. To elevate it and other Federal Member States to confederal partners is to retrofit sovereignty onto entities that have never (historically) held it. This is not structural realism; it is historical revisionism.

Formalising Autonomy Is Not the Same as Structuring Stability

Ahmed argues that confederalism merely codifies existing political realities (i.e.,) the de facto autonomy exercised by regions like Puntland since the collapse of the central government in 1991. But the transformation of informal practice into formal structure is not neutral; it has serious consequences for institutional coherence. What is being proposed is not a framework for cooperation, but a reconstitution of Somalia into a collection of semi-sovereign actors.

This structural disaggregation is problematic in a fragile state context. Post-conflict political settlements, as scholars like Joel Migdal and Theda Skocpol have shown, depend on layered authority, negotiated interdependence, and institutional constraint. Confederalism in Somalia, rather than solving the problem of mutual distrust, would institutionalise it. It would convert coordination into bargaining, governance into ad hocism, and national solidarity into regional self-interest.

The Limits of Structural Fixes in the Absence of Legal Culture

Ahmed’s critique partially rests on the assumption that Somalia’s crisis is structural rather than behavioural. He critiques analysts such as Abdelkarim A. Haji Hassan for allegedly overemphasising elite misconduct while underplaying institutional incentives. But this is a false dichotomy. Structure and agency are not opposed; they are dialectically interrelated (see Giddens’ structuration theory where he argues how social systems emerge and persist through the dynamic interplay between structures and agents, rejecting artificial prioritisation of one over the other). Somalia’s governance crisis stems precisely from the absence of institutions capable of constraining elite behaviour.

Political agency arguably operates within and is shaped by the institutional environment. When that environment is characterised by impunity, opacity, and personalised rule, it rewards opportunism and punishes cooperation. Thus, elites do not act destructively because they are inherently predisposed to do so, but because no credible institutional checks make alternative conduct rational. To blame structure alone is to absolve the actors who have deliberately circumvented reform; to blame behaviour alone is to ignore the vacuum that enables such conduct. What is required is a dual approach: institution-building that embeds constraints and a political culture that gradually normalises compliance.

The Provisional Constitution of 2012 remains unratified. There is no functional constitutional court. Dispute resolution mechanisms between the Federal Government and Federal Member States are either dormant or politically compromised. Ahmed is right to criticise this fragility, but wrong to conclude that confederalism addresses it. In fact, confederalism assumes what Somalia lacks: a culture of constitutionalism, a respect for intergovernmental norms, and institutional parity among actors.

Rather than dispersing power horizontally, what Somalia needs is the vertical integration of legal norms, a robust judiciary (that extends constitutionally), clear fiscal federalism arrangements, and political accountability mechanisms. Confederalism offers none of these. It disaggregates responsibility without solving the trust deficit that plagues Somali governance. Even if one disregards these theoretical shortcomings, confederalism fails the test of practical feasibility.

Model Without Global Precedent or Feasibility

Ahmed asserts that Puntland’s model is “plausible.” Yet plausibility must be corroborated by precedent and practicality. Confederalism is an obsolete and largely discredited model in contemporary statecraft. There are no modern, fully and technically functioning states that operate under a durable, stable confederal constitution. Historical experiments in confederalism have either collapsed or evolved into federations. The few historical attempts, Senegambia, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia either collapsed or evolved into federations. Proponents might cite the European Union as a confederal success, but this ignores both the EU’s unique supranational context and Somalia’s lack of comparable institutional foundations.

The confederal experiment Ahmed envisions would require elaborate mechanisms of inter-regional coordination, multiple layers of duplicated bureaucracy, and legal arbitration structures to manage conflicts between regions and the centre. Somalia, a nation heavily reliant on international support and a nation lacking resilient state infrastructure, cannot afford such a model. Far from reducing central domination, confederalism would increase transaction costs, institutionalise gridlock, and entrench elite fiefdoms.

Institutionalising Fragmentation Under the Guise of Realism

Ahmed appeals to political realism, arguing that Somalia’s statehood is already a fiction maintained by donor subsidies and international diplomacy. But realism, properly understood, is not cynicism. It is a commitment to governing with the tools available and not surrendering to dysfunction. Confederalism may mirror the fragmented political geography of the Somali Peninsula, but it does not offer a mechanism for transforming that geography into a just political order.

Rather than realism, Ahmed’s proposal enshrines a dangerous relativism: if national integration is difficult, abandon it; if federal institutions are weak, dissolve them; if regional autonomy is de facto, make it de jure. This is not structural reform, it is institutional abdication. Confederalism, even if theoretically conceivable, is not a legitimate basis for serious political dialogue in Somalia’s current circumstances. If one were to soberly assess the costs and benefits of such a transition, the result would be an unambiguous loss for the Somali state project, for national unity, and for regional stability. No responsible policy framework should entertain a proposition that diminishes national cohesion without offering functional gains in return.

Confederalism promises the illusion of control and mutual respect among regional entities, but in practice, it would exacerbate inequality, fuel inter-regional competition, and weaken Somalia’s capacity to project a unified voice in international fora. The fragmentation of national sovereignty would not empower ordinary Somalis, it would entrench elite capture and deepen the disconnect between citizens and the state. Any political model that multiplies bureaucratic layers while diluting accountability is a regression, not an innovation. Confederalism is not a transitional mechanism, it is an exit strategy dressed in constitutional language. The cost of institutionalising such a framework would be paid in lost legitimacy, weakened statehood, and diminished prospects for peace.

A sober political calculus reveals no strategic benefit to Somalia from adopting a confederal system. It would formalise fragmentation, strain national resources, and permanently weaken the centre’s capacity to coordinate critical sectors such as security, foreign affairs, and infrastructure. No successful contemporary state uses confederalism as its operating model. To propose it for Somalia, arguably one of the most fragile states in the world is not a pragmatic alternative but a risky leap into untested governance terrain. Any reasonable person, after weighing Somalia’s history, political geography, institutional fragility, and security challenges, would conclude that confederalism is not just undesirable, but dangerously imprudent.

Legal Constraints on Confederalism

From a legal standpoint, the proposal to establish a confederal structure in Somalia is incompatible with both domestic constitutional law and established norms of international law. Confederalism, as a form of governance, presupposes the existence of sovereign entities that can voluntarily enter into treaty-based arrangements with limited and clearly defined shared functions. Somalia’s Federal Member States, however, are not sovereign under either the Somali Provisional Constitution or international law. They are constitutionally subordinate entities whose authority and legitimacy derive from the federal framework established by the national charter.

The Provisional Constitution does not contain an exit clause, or any provision allowing a Federal Member State to secede or unilaterally redefine its constitutional relationship with the central government. Instead, it enshrines a vertical structure in which sovereignty is indivisible and resides with the Federal Republic of Somalia as a single legal personality. Any attempt to elevate an FMS to the status of a confederal partner would therefore not only exceed the constitutional bounds but effectively dissolve the existing legal order. Such an act would constitute a constitutional rupture rather than a reform.

International legal principles reinforce this position. The principle of territorial integrity, as enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, prohibits member states from engaging in actions that compromise the territorial unity of other sovereign states. The African Union similarly upholds this doctrine under Article 4(b) of its Constitutive Act, emphasising the inviolability of borders inherited at independence. Somalia’s internal boundaries, and the structure of its union, fall under this protective umbrella. No Federal Member State enjoys separate recognition under international law or qualifies as a sovereign actor capable of entering into external legal relations on its own behalf.

Moreover, the principle of uti possidetis juris, which protects postcolonial boundaries against unilateral alteration, is well established in African legal jurisprudence. It reinforces the notion that any reconfiguration of Somalia’s internal governance must remain within the bounds of its inherited statehood structure. A shift to confederalism that effectively dissolves the Somali state into co-equal sovereign units would not only violate this principle but also destabilise the African regional order, which strongly discourages any precedent of fragmentation.

Finally, under international legal doctrine, particularly the non-recognition of entities created through unconstitutional means, any such confederal restructuring would be unlikely to gain legal recognition from the international community. Somalia’s ability to speak and act coherently on the global stage would be compromised, undermining its standing in diplomatic negotiations, multilateral cooperation, and treaty implementation.

In this regard, confederalism lacks legal standing in Somali constitutional law and is incompatible with binding international legal principles. It is unsupported by any treaty, violates regional and international norms, and contradicts Somalia’s Provisional Constitution. Any move in this direction would not only be ultra vires (beyond legal authority), it would invite instability, isolation, and legal incoherence. It is not a legally viable alternative; it is an extraconstitutional aspiration without legal footing.

The Real Path Forward: Completing Federalism, Not Replacing It

What Somalia requires is not another systemic reinvention, but the completion of its existing federal project. In this regard it entails (among other items):

1) Completing the Constitution to provide a definitive legal framework.
2) Establishing a Constitutional Court to adjudicate disputes between levels of government.
3) Implementing fiscal federalism with transparent revenue-sharing agreements.
4) Investing in civic education and institutional culture so that law, not loyalty, governs political conduct.

Federalism is not inherently flawed, it has simply been incomplete for far too long. Its promise has been betrayed by all sides, by Mogadishu’s centralising impulses and by regional leaders who rule as autocrats. But this failure of practice does not justify structural abandonment. To borrow from political theorist Stephen Holmes, constitutionalism is less about perfection than about persistence, staying the course until institutional habits take root.

Unity Through Reform, Not Retreat

Ahmed’s call for confederalism is, at bottom, a well-articulated expression of disillusionment. But disillusionment is not a strategy. His proposal certainly speaks to real grievances, the erosion of trust, the central government’s overreach, and the betrayal of federal principles. Yet confederalism does not redress these grievances, it merely reframes them.

The structural question for Somalia is not whether to federate or confederate, but whether it has the political maturity to invest in the slow, often frustrating work of federal reform. That work demands patience, legal innovation, and a shared commitment to building something larger than the sum of its regions. Confederalism, by contrast, is a politics of shrinking ambition. While confederalist sentiments may reflect legitimate grievances about marginalisation and overcentralisation, they should be channelled into reforming rather than abandoning the federal project.

Let us not confuse structural pessimism with institutional wisdom. Somalia’s future lies not in horizontal retreat, but in vertical reconstruction. It is through completing federalism, not abandoning it, that Somalia may yet emerge as a just, sovereign, and unified republic.

Ayan Abdirashid Ali
Email: abdirashidaliayan@gmail.com
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Ayan is a Lawyer and Legal Researcher
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