By Djama Mahamoud Ali

For months, Somalia’s political crisis has been the subject of intensive international mediation. Yet the gap between the parties remains as wide as ever, and there is growing evidence that one side is using the process not to reach agreement but to buy time for unilateral actions. The Federal Government of Somalia, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, continues to press ahead with the implementation of the unilaterally altered constitution and regional elections that critics describe as pre-determined, while participating in mediation that appears designed to create the illusion of dialogue.

The latest round of high-stakes political talks opened in Mogadishu in early July 2026, bringing together the Federal Government and the opposition Somali Future Council. Unlike previous rounds, the negotiations are being facilitated with the direct involvement of Turkey, ambassadors representing several Western nations, the European Union, and the United Nations. A decisive session is set to take place on July 20, 2026.

However, expectations are not merely cautious, they are pessimistic. Previous mediation efforts have repeatedly ended with optimistic communiqués but little tangible progress. More troubling, there is a growing recognition that the federal government is participating in these talks not to find common ground but to create diplomatic cover for its unilateral political agenda. As one analysis notes, the mediation “is not a neutral peace process. It is a geopolitical gambit, designed to freeze the clock while Villa Somalia consolidates power under the cover of ‘inclusive dialogue’.”

The Current Political Landscape: A Government Negotiating in Bad Faith

The Constitutional Crisis

At the heart of the current crisis are the constitutional amendments passed on March 4, 2026, when Somalia’s bicameral Federal Parliament approved amendments to chapters five to fifteen of the provisional constitution. These amendments shifted Somalia from a parliamentary system toward a presidential model while extending the presidential term from four years to five. Critically, the extension applies to incumbent office holders, thereby extending the mandates of the Federal Parliament and President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud by one year beyond their previously scheduled expiry dates.

The vote was contested, with opposition actors arguing that the amendments may have been passed without the required parliamentary quorum. Former Presidents Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo have criticized the amendments, citing a lack of political consensus and warned that they risk further deepening political polarization.

Yet despite these objections and despite ongoing mediation, the government has shown no willingness to reconsider. Its position remains fixed: the amendments are lawful and necessary for constitutional governance. This intransigence is the first indication that the government is not approaching negotiations in good faith.

Pre-Determined Elections in Galmudug and Beyond

The controversy has been particularly acute in South West State, where federal forces reshaped the political landscape, culminating in the installation of a new regional administration following an election that opposition figures argue lacked broad political consensus. Turkish drones reportedly backed the operation that forced President Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen to resign.

The pattern has now shifted to Galmudug, where the National Electoral Commission has scheduled a presidential election for July 20, 2026, the same day as the internationally mediated talks are set to take place. Critics argue that the outcome has effectively been determined before voting has concluded. Galmudug Parliament Speaker Cali Gacal reportedly stated that the regional administration had virtually no role in managing the election, claiming instead that the process was being directed by the Federal Government only.

As one analysis puts it, “Galmudug’s ‘Election’ Is About to Begin, Too Bad the Winner Has Already Been Chosen.” This is not a democratic process; it is a predetermined outcome designed to install a government chosen person.

The federal government’s use of “sticks and carrots” in these regional elections mirrors tactics used in Baydhabo. By rewarding allies and punishing opponents, the government has systematically reshaped Federal Member State leadership in its favor, while participating in mediation that ostensibly seeks national consensus.

The Negotiations as a Tactic to Buy Time

The most troubling aspect of the current situation is the growing evidence that the federal government is using the mediation process not to reach agreement but to buy time for its unilateral consolidation of power. While international mediators facilitate dialogue, the government continues to press ahead with the implementation of the amended constitution, regional elections, and political appointments that reshape Somalia’s federal landscape.

 Despite of the ongoing negotiations, the President, whose constitutional mandate expired on May 15, 2026, continues to exercise the full powers of office rather than functioning in a caretaker capacity pending a political settlement. In virtually every successful peace process, confidence-building measures come first. Parties are expected to refrain from unilateral actions that could prejudice negotiations or alter political realities before agreements are reached. Somalia’s mediation has so far failed to produce that confidence.

The government’s participation in talks serves multiple tactical purposes:

· It creates the appearance of a commitment to dialogue
· It placates international donors who demand political consensus
· It divides the opposition by engaging some factions while excluding others
· It provides cover for unilateral actions that would otherwise draw international condemnation
· It stalls for time while the government consolidates power in Federal Member States

Opposition Divisions

The opposition is not united on the way forward. While the Somali Future Council, which brings together Puntland, Jubaland, and the National Salvation Forum, which represents a significant political force, its members are not all participating in the same processes. Puntland and Jubaland have declined to join meetings hosted by Turkish intelligence officials, questioning Ankara’s neutrality.

This fragmentation allows the federal government to divide and rule, engaging with some opposition factions while ignoring others. The opposition has not presented a unified alternative vision, and there is no consensus on the sequencing of political transitions, the status of the constitutional amendments, or the role of international actors.

The Turkish Mediation Controversy

Turkey’s role as mediator has emerged as a major point of contention. Turkish intelligence officials held preliminary talks in early July with representatives of Somalia’s federal government and opposition leaders, but delegates from Puntland and Jubaland boycotted the gathering, insisting Ankara is not a neutral actor.

These suspicions are well-founded. Turkey has played a prominent role in Somalia’s affairs in recent years, providing security assistance, development support, and diplomatic engagement with the federal government. Critics point to the alleged use of Turkish-supplied military equipment and elite Somali forces trained by Turkey against opposition-aligned groups.

Turkey’s foreign policy in Somalia has been fiercely pragmatic: it backs whoever sits in the presidential palace of Villa Somalia.” This unwritten rule has made Ankara a perennial target for the opposition. The irony is striking: just six years ago, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, now the incumbent, stood in the opposition and fiercely accused Turkey of arming the National Army to prop up President Farmaajo.

The absence of Puntland and Jubaland from Turkey-led talks demonstrates the limits of Turkish mediation. A mediator perceived as having a vested interest in one party’s survival cannot effectively pressure that party to make concessions.

Historical Precedents: The Pattern of International Intervention

The Farmaajo Government (2017-2022)

The international community’s approach to Somalia during President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo’s tenure offers important lessons. In 2021, Farmaajo’s constitutional mandate expired, but he remained in office. The Lower House of Parliament passed a motion to delay elections by two years, effectively extending Farmaajo’s term.

The international community responded with coercive measures. The UN Security Council rejected Farmaajo’s term extension and endorsed efforts by the African Union to help parties resolve the electoral impasse. More significantly, the World Bank, the European Union, and the United States threatened to pull the plug on funding. Washington threatened sanctions while the European Union delayed payment of installments of its three-year €100 million budget-support package.

The threat of cutting the flow of cash to a government so reliant on donor support had traction with Farmaajo. The lesson is clear: when faced with credible threats to funding and sanctions, Somali governments have made concessions they would not otherwise make.

Why the Current Approach Is Failing, The Absence of Coercive Leverage

The fundamental problem with the current mediation effort is the absence of meaningful coercive leverage. Unlike during the Farmaajo era, when the international community threatened to cut funding and impose sanctions, the current approach appears to rely primarily on facilitation and encouragement.

For the current Federal Government of Somalia, Turkey is the ultimate diplomatic safe haven. Unlike the UN, EU, UK, and US, who during a similar political standoff in 2022 threatened Mogadishu with crippling sanctions to force a specific political roadmap, Ankara has never adopted such measures.The result is a mediation process that provides cover for unilateral actions rather than constraining them. The government can attend talks, make vague commitments, and then continue its consolidation of power without consequence.

Bad-Faith Negotiation

The government’s use of negotiations to buy time fundamentally undermines the mediation process. When one party is not genuinely seeking agreement, no amount of facilitation will produce results. The international community must recognize this reality and respond accordingly.

The telltale signs of bad-faith negotiation are all present:

· The government continues unilateral actions during the mediation process
· It refuses to freeze the status quo while talks proceed
· It engages selectively with opposition factions to divide them
· It makes vague commitments without concrete implementation mechanisms
· It participates in talks while fundamentally unwilling to compromise on core issues

Opposition Fragmentation

The opposition’s lack of unity further complicates the situation. While the Somali Future Council represents a significant political force, its members are not all participating in the same processes. Puntland and Jubaland have boycotted Turkey-led talks while participating in broader international engagements.

This fragmentation allows the federal government to divide and rule. The government can claim it is engaging with the opposition while avoiding meaningful negotiations with the most critical actors, Puntland and Jubaland.

Recommendations for the International Community

Given this complex situation, the international community must fundamentally rethink its approach. I would like to offer the following recommendations for the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, the United Nations, and other international actors involved in the Somali mediation process.

1. Recognize Bad-Faith Negotiation and Respond Accordingly

The international community must publicly acknowledge that the federal government is using negotiations as a tactic to buy time. This recognition should inform all subsequent engagement. Rather than continuing to facilitate dialogue as if both parties were negotiating in good faith, international actors should call out bad-faith behavior and impose consequences.

This means conditioning continued mediation on a freeze of unilateral actions. The government should be given a clear choice: suspend the implementation of the unilaterally amended constitution and regional elections, or face consequences. This is not an unreasonable demand; it is standard practice in peace processes worldwide.

2. Restore Coercive Leverage

The international community must be willing to impose costs on parties that reject a negotiated settlement. For the federal government, this means credible threats to:

· Withhold budgetary support
· Impose sanctions on individuals undermining the political process
· Suspend security cooperation
· Freeze development assistance

Somalia remains heavily dependent on international financial support; the threat of cutting off this flow of cash remains the most powerful tool available. As the Farmaajo precedent demonstrates, such threats have traction.

For the opposition, leverage includes the threat of withdrawing political recognition, withholding support for alternative political structures, and conditioning future engagement on participation in good faith negotiations.

3. Abandon the Facilitative Model and Impose a Proposed Solution

The international community cannot continue to simply facilitate dialogue while hoping the parties will find common ground. Historical experience demonstrates that Somali political actors do not make concessions voluntarily. The international community must propose a concrete political settlement and use its leverage to secure acceptance.

This proposed solution should address the core issues:

· The status of the constitutional amendments
· The electoral calendar and sequencing
· The transition of power
· The role of Federal Member States in national decision-making

The solution should be developed in consultation with all stakeholders but ultimately presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal backed by consequences for rejection.

4. Demand a Freeze on Unilateral Actions

Any meaningful mediation process must include a freeze on unilateral political actions. The international community should demand that the federal government:

· Suspend all electoral processes in Federal Member States until a national consensus is reached
· Halt the implementation of unitarily amended constitution pending negotiation
· Cease political interference in Federal Member State affairs
Similarly, the opposition should be required to refrain from establishing parallel political structures.

The international community must be willing to enforce this freeze through the leverage described above.

5. Insist on Genuine, Inclusive Participation

The mediation process must include all major stakeholders, including Puntland, Jubaland, and all opposition factions. The exclusion of key actors, whether through their own boycott or through deliberate exclusion, undermines the legitimacy of any agreement.

The international community should make clear that it will not recognize or support any political arrangement that excludes major stakeholders. This applies equally to federal government unilateral actions and to opposition parallel processes.

6. Establish Implementation Guarantees with Consequences

Previous mediation efforts have repeatedly ended with optimistic communiqués but little tangible progress. Any agreement reached must be backed by meaningful guarantees for implementation.

This should include:

· International monitoring mechanisms with teeth
· Benchmarks with clear timelines
· Consequences for non-compliance, including sanctions and funding cuts.

7. Publicly Name and Shame Bad-Faith Behavior

The international community should be willing to publicly name and shame actions that undermine the mediation process. When the government conducts pre-determined elections during negotiations, this should be called out. When it uses constitutional amendments to extend its mandate unilaterally, this should be condemned.

Conclusion

Somalia stands at a critical juncture. The July 20, 2026, talks represent another opportunity to resolve the country’s deepening political crisis. However, if the international community approaches these talks with the same facilitative mindset that has characterized previous efforts, the outcome is likely to be worse than failure, it will provide cover for continued unilateral consolidation of power.

The historical record is clear. During the Farmaajo government, the international community imposed a solution by coercion and leverage and it worked.  The current situation is more difficult because one party is not negotiating in good faith. The government is using mediation as a tactic to buy time while it reshapes Somalia’s federal landscape through unilateral actions. The opposition is divided. One of the mediators is perceived as biased.

In these circumstances, the international community cannot simply facilitate. It must recognize bad-faith behavior, restore coercive leverage, impose a proposed solution, and demand a freeze on unilateral actions. If the international community does not use sticks and carrots and does not propose a solution, the government and opposition have no appetite to make concessions and reach agreement.

The July 20 talks risk becoming another exercise in diplomatic theater, another performance in which the audience already knows the final scene before the first act begins. The international community must choose: continue the mediation trap of endless facilitation without results, or adopt a more assertive strategy that combines coercive leverage with a concrete proposed settlement.

For many Somalis, patience is wearing thin. The country is demanding results. The international community must rise to the occasion, not with more facilitation, but with the courage to impose consequences on those who undermine the peace process.