By Djama Mahamoud Ali

Introduction

As the Federal Government of Somalia’s executive term approaches its expiration, a profound political crisis has emerged, driven primarily by the president’s pursuit of constitutional amendments and reelection. The political landscape of the Federal Republic of Somalia is once again at a precipice. The final months of the current presidential term have not been dedicated to stabilizing a nation still recovering from decades of civil war and confronting an ongoing insurgency. Instead, the administration has been consumed by a self-referential campaign to extend its tenure through constitutional changes. This singular focus has created a governance vacuum with cascading negative effects. By prioritizing personal political survival, the executive branch has alienated federal member states, abdicated its role in coherent foreign policy, and set the stage for a constitutional crisis as the term limit approaches.

This paper will analyze the ramifications of this strategic miscalculation and project the likely trajectories for Somalia’s immediate future.

The Erosion of the Federal Compact: Defections and Distrust

The cornerstone of Somalia’s post-conflict reconstruction was the federal model, a delicate balance of power between the central government in Mogadishu and its Federal Member States (FMS). The president’s campaign to amend unilaterally the constitution, widely perceived as a move to centralize power and extend his tenure, has shattered this fragile trust. The defection of key member states is not merely a political disagreement; it represents a functional disintegration of the federal union.

Jubaland, long at odds with Mogadishu over electoral processes and security control, has effectively ceased to operate as a collaborative partner. More significantly, Puntland, which has historically positioned itself as a pioneer of federalism, withdrew its recognition of the federal government’s authority, citing the unconstitutional extension of the president’s mandate. The recent federal government takeover of South West State underscores President Hassan’s intent to extend his mandate beyond its legitimacy, revealing a calculated strategy to position himself for a term extension. Nevertheless, with Parliament’s term set to expire in less than a week and just over a month remaining in President Hassan’s mandate, the only sensible course is to exercise restraint and agree on a credible path forward.

The Foreign Policy Vacuum and the Rise of External Actors

The administration’s inward focus has created a dangerous void in Somalia’s foreign policy. Effective diplomacy requires consistent strategy, long-term vision, and the authority to speak for the entire nation. With the president consumed by domestic political survival, Puntland and Jubaland federal member states refusing to recognize his mandate, Somalia’s ability to present a cohesive foreign policy has collapsed. This vacuum has provided the breakaway region of Somaliland with its most significant strategic opportunity in decades.

While the reality on the ground in Somaliland is completely different, it presents itself as a stable, democratic alternative to the chaos in Mogadishu, Somaliland has actively courted international recognition. The most striking example of this dynamic is the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Historically a partner to the Somali federal government, the UAE has capitalized on Mogadishu’s diplomatic disarray. The reported Emirati facilitation of Israel’s consideration of recognition for Somaliland exemplifies a broader trend: external powers are now bypassing the legitimate federal government to deal directly with its separatist region. This not only undermines Somalia’s territorial integrity but also reconfigures the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa without Mogadishu’s consent.

Contradictory Engagements: A Foreign Policy Adrift

Compounding the problem of a vacuum is the erratic behavior that emerges when a government attempts to fill it without a coherent strategy. In a desperate bid to secure external support and legitimize its domestic agenda, the presidency has entered into conflicting agreements with rival international powers. The absence of a coordinated foreign policy has led to a situation where Somalia has simultaneously entertained strategic partnerships with nations whose regional interests are fundamentally opposed.

Agreements made with one party have undercut relationships with others, leaving Somalia with no reliable strategic ally. Furthermore, contradictions have emerged in security policy, where partnerships with some nations in the fight against Al-Shabaab have been complicated by agreements with others that introduce new, destabilizing military presences into the region. Such inconsistency signals to the international community that the Somali government is not a reliable partner, further isolating it diplomatically at the very moment it needs support to navigate its internal crisis.

The Approaching Precipice: The Fate of the Country

With the president’s term expiring in under two months and no clear political path forward, the country faces a set of stark and potentially violent scenarios. The constitution, which the president sought to amend, now offers no clear guidance on succession, as the political factions cannot agree on whether the current mandate is valid. The “fate of the country” will likely be determined by one of three trajectories:

1. Constitutional Fracture and Fragmentation: The most probable outcome is a de facto partition of the federal state. With Puntland and Jubaland States governing independently, and Somaliland pursuing external recognition, Somalia could revert to a pre-2012 model of competing autonomous administrations. The federal government would become a rump state, controlling only Mogadishu and parts of the surrounding area, with its authority unrecognized by a majority of its constituent members.

2. A Managed Transition to a Hollow State: A last-minute, internationally brokered compromise could produce a transitional administration. However, given the depth of the distrust, such an administration would be paralyzed. It would exist nominally to manage the remnants of the federal project and coordinate counter-terrorism efforts but would lack the legitimacy or capacity to reconstitute the federal compact. In this scenario, the “state” survives in name only, a hollow entity incapable of exercising sovereignty over its claimed territory.

3. Escalation to Internal Conflict: The least desirable but entirely plausible outcome is an escalation to open conflict. If the president refuses to vacate office upon term expiration or attempts to forcibly reassert control over the dissenting federal member states, the current political stalemate could turn violent. Such a conflict would not be a simple civil war between two sides but a multi-layered conflict involving rival FMS forces, clan militias, and potentially external proxies, all while Al-Shabaab continues to expand its influence. This scenario would undo the fragile gains of the last decade and plunge the country back into a level of chaos not seen since the early 2000s.

 Conclusion

The current crisis in Somalia is a self-inflicted wound. By prioritizing a campaign for personal political longevity over the responsibilities of governance, the president has triggered a chain reaction that has undone the federal compact, paralyzed foreign policy, and created an opening for separatist ambitions and external exploitation. The administration’s contradictory international engagements have further isolated the nation. As the term expiration looms with no agreed-upon path forward, Somalia stands on the brink.

The nation’s fate now hinges on whether domestic and international actors can avert a complete collapse, but the damage done to the federal structure and the credibility of its institutions will take years, if not decades, to repair. The central lesson of this period is a cautionary tale for fragile states: when executive ambition is placed above institutional stability, the very existence of the state is put at risk.

Djama Mahamoud Ali
Email: djama_m@yahoo.com