State Capture in Plain Sight: Inside President Hassan Sheikh”s Web of Nepotism, Privatization, and Power

State Capture in Plain Sight: Inside President Hassan Sheikh”s Web of Nepotism, Privatization, and Power

By Abdiqani Haji Abdi

In functioning states, corruption hides in the shadows; in Somalia today, it no longer bothers to conceal it. While the Somali government cannot pay its membership dues to international organizations such as AU, IGAD and EAC, as WardheerNews wrote in its editorial, reports indicate that under the directive of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud—millions have been mobilized to push through a unilateral constitutional change.

This stark contrast underscores a troubling set of priorities, where essential international obligations are neglected even as significant public funds are directed toward contested political objectives, raising serious questions about fiscal responsibility and the broader direction of governance.

What is unfolding under the administration of Hassan Sheikh is not a series of isolated incidents or controversies—it is a pattern. A governing style increasingly defined by nepotism, opaque privatization, and the steady transfer of public assets into private hands tied to the political elite.

At its core lies a simple question: where does the state end—and where does the presidency’s inner circle begin?

Family Rule Disguised as Governance

President Hassan’s conduct is not incidental, but part of a broader culture of impunity that has taken root within his administration. Dayib Ahmed has recently published an extensive and detailed study examining what he characterizes as the President’s family’s runaway corruption, describing a pattern in which public assets are systematically treated as a private enterprise, with little distinction between state resources and personal gain.

No issue better illustrates the blurring of lines than the president’s extensive reliance on family members in key state functions.

His daughter, Jihan Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has emerged as one of the most influential figures in Somalia’s foreign policy apparatus. Officially appointed as a Special Adviser on Foreign Affairs in 2023. She is widely described by critics as functioning as a de facto foreign minister—despite her youth and lack of formal diplomatic experience. Seasoned diplomats, sources say, have found themselves sidelined.

Her sister, Zubeida Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, followed a similar path, securing a diplomatic advisory role in 2025 without prior experience in government or international institutions.

Inside Somalia, the pattern continues. The president’s son, Abdifatah Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was elevated to commander of the Presidential Special Guard shortly after joining the military—leapfrogging officers with years of battlefield experience.

Another son, Abdiqani Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has been linked by critics to controversial land seizures, while his spouse was appointed Director General of the Somali Bureau of Standards—raising concerns about conflicts of interest and institutional capture.

The web extends further. The president’s son-in-law, Adam Roble, was officially appointed on March 7, 2024 as the Director General of the Development and Reconstruction Bank, effectively controlling key financial flows tied to national development. His appointment was approved by the council of Ministers during their weekly meeting. At the same time, Hodan Osman was appointed as the Banks Chairperson.

To add an insult to injury and to the surprise of everybody, sources close to the Presidency are saying that the same Adam Roble, who is married to Jihan Hassan Sheikh and has absolutely no military experience—not even having held the rank of a soldier—was appointed by the President as the head of the Logistics Command of the Somali National Army although Villa Somalia has yet to formally announce. This position had previously been held, and was vacated, by the now Commander of the Armed Forces, Major General Ibrahim Mohamed Mahmoud.

Even access to the presidency itself is said to be tightly managed by relatives such as Hinda Culusow, whose role as Director of Protocol has reportedly drawn complaints from diplomats over exclusion and gatekeeping.

Defending these appointments, President Mohamud has argued that his relatives are “citizens like everyone else,” entitled to employment. But critics counter that this is not about employment—it is about control.

Privatization or Patronage?

Parallel to this consolidation of power is an aggressive wave of privatization—one that critics describe as reckless, opaque, and in some cases, unlawful.

At the center of the controversy is a little-known entity widely referred to as Empire Company, reportedly linked to Villa Somalia. The company is said to control vast segments of Somalia’s travel and immigration revenue streams, taking significant shares of passport fees, visa processing, and even penalties—leaving the government with reduced portions of its own sovereign income.

This model has extended across key sectors. Foreign firms such as Favori LLC and Albayrak Group continue to manage Mogadishu’s airport and seaport under revenue-sharing agreements. While these partnerships predate the current administration, oversight bodies have repeatedly flagged concerns about transparency and accountability.

Domestically, tax collection itself has been outsourced. Contracts initially granted to MGS Soft Inc.—later terminated amid corruption allegations—were reportedly reassigned to Waayeel Consulting, a firm said to be linked to the same family web.  

Meanwhile, everyday citizens face the consequences. Waste management services operated by Ifi Waste Management require households to pay monthly fees—on top of existing taxes—creating what many describe as a system of double taxation.

What emerges is not merely privatization, but a pattern critics call “elite capture”: public services outsourced, revenues fragmented, and accountability diluted.

The Disappearance of Public Wealth

If nepotism defines who controls the system, and privatization defines how it operates, corruption allegations define its scale.

Critics and watchdog reports point to the sale of hundreds of public properties—land, buildings, and strategic assets—valued at between $800 million and $1 billion. Much of this, they allege, has bypassed the national treasury entirely.

Diplomatic properties have not been spared. Somalia’s embassy compound in Dar es Salaam is alleged to have been sold under questionable circumstances, while prime public lands in Mogadishu—from markets to military sites—have reportedly been auctioned off.

The human cost is equally stark. In areas such as Sinai, thousands have reportedly been displaced by land seizures linked to politically connected individuals. In Mogadishu, families have been evicted from markets and public spaces to make way for private developments. Even burial grounds have not been immune, with reports of exhumations ordered to clear land for commercial projects.

At the same time, allegations persist of diverted state revenues, including tens of millions of dollars in airspace fees and the resale of military supplies intended for elite units.

A System Under Strain

Taken together, these developments point to deeper systemic failures.

Financial transparency has eroded, with private intermediaries handling state revenue streams through opaque systems. Oversight institutions meant to verify collections or enforce accountability are themselves recruited from the family web. Citizens, meanwhile, bear increasing financial burdens without corresponding improvements in services.

And yet, the administration maintains that its policies are lawful and necessary, dismissing criticism as politically motivated.

From Power to Powerless

And then comes the moment that captures the scale of the shift.

Hussein Arab Iise—a former Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister, and Member of Parliament—now finds himself publicly appealing for justice as his own land is reportedly seized.

A man once at the center of power, now reduced to seeking help online. It is a scene few would have imagined. The Arab Iise family is not an obscure name. It is deeply rooted in Mogadishu’s history, particularly in the eastern districts of Banaadir. Yet even that legacy appears to offer no protection.

Those who once stood beside him are gone. And what remains is a question that extends far beyond one man: If power cannot protect its own, what protection exists at all?

A Defining Moment

Somalia now stands at a critical juncture. With constitutional tensions rising, elections uncertain, and public trust under strain, the concentration of power and resources within a narrow circle risk pushing the country toward deeper instability.

History offers a clear warning: when state institutions become extensions of personal networks, governance weakens—and recovery becomes far more difficult.

The question is no longer whether these patterns exist. It is whether they will continue—and what remains of the state if they do.

Abdiqani Haji Abdi
Email: Hajiabdi0128@gmail.com