Somalia’s Foreign Policy — A Spectacle of Incompetence

Somalia’s Foreign Policy — A Spectacle of Incompetence

By Dayib Sh. Ahmed

When the Somali people have struggled to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national authority—particularly in the face of the direct threat posed by Israel’s grave violations—the underlying challenge has often been the absence of a cohesive and clearly articulated foreign policy. A nation’s ability to protect its borders and assert independence is inseparable from the strength, consistency, and strategic direction of its diplomacy. Without a unified approach grounded in long-term national interests, responses to external pressures risk appearing fragmented, thereby weakening both credibility and influence on the international stage.

A compelling example of the power of strategic diplomacy can be found in history. Skillful diplomats have long demonstrated that stability in international relations is rarely accidental, it is the product of foresight, negotiation, and disciplined statecraft. As one historian of foreign affairs observed, “Prince Klemens von Metternich, the Austrian Empire’s foreign minister who dominated European politics after the defeat of Napoleon, crafted agreements such as the Concert of Europe and the Congress of Vienna, adroitly preserving continental stability until the revolutions of 1848.” Metternich understood that durable peace relies on preparation, strategic balance, and an unwavering commitment to national interest—lessons that remain highly relevant for countries navigating today’s complex geopolitical landscape. Somalia, like other nations, stands to gain immensely from investing in coherent, forward-looking diplomacy as a means to safeguard sovereignty and respond effectively to external challenges.

Yet such standards appear far removed from the current holders of Somalia’s foreign affairs leadership. Diplomacy is often a shadowy and deceptive practice; by its very nature, it involves calculated maneuvering. Still, effective diplomacy demands an understanding of different cultures and traditions, as well as the ability to anticipate the intentions of both allies and adversaries. Critics argue that these essential qualities have not consistently guided Somalia’s foreign engagements.                                                  

In states where governance begins to resemble a closed circle of political sycophants, diplomats risk being reduced to mere messengers rather than strategic actors. History offers cautionary parallels. Hitler’s Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop—whose experience in foreign affairs before 1933 was limited to selling counterfeit German champagne in Britain—appointed party loyalists from the SA, or Brownshirts, to ambassadorial roles. Similarly, Benito Mussolini selected his son-in-law, Galeazzo Ciano, as foreign minister, only to later execute him for disloyalty. Such examples underscore how patronage can erode professionalism and weaken a nation’s international standing.

Somalia today faces a comparable crisis. Hassan’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ali Mohamed Omer, (AKA) Balcad. who has no diplomatic experience, his only prior employment being seasonal assembly line worker at IBM—and who also lacks even basic English proficiency, has nonetheless been absurdly dispatched on diplomatic missions. This decision starkly exposes the administration’s complete disregard for competence, professionalism, or the serious demands or representing Somalia on the international stage. Even more outrageous, the current foreign minister, Abdisalam Abdi Ali, who’s only claimed expertise is owning a small home care business in the US, reportedly has no knowledge of foreign policy whatsoever. These appointments reduce Somalia’s diplomacy to a humiliating spectacle, where nepotism, cronyism, and personal loyalty matter far more than skill, judgment, or strategy. The result is a state completely unprepared to defend its interests, projecting weakness and inviting ridicule on the international stage.

Somalia’s foreign affairs have been reduced to a farcical display of incompetence, leaving the country dangerously exposed and undermining its credibility with the world. Meanwhile, Hassan has surrounded himself with Patronage beneficiaries and incompetent, who enrich themselves at the expense of the nation. Meanwhile, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud travels abroad at least twice a month, and many of these trips appear to produce no tangible results for the nation. At times, he attends meetings or gatherings intended for ambassadors, directors, or officials below the presidential level—an approach that arguably diminishes the weight and dignity of the office he holds. A head of state is expected to concentrate on major strategic decisions; therefore, participation in events inconsistent with the stature of the presidency raises legitimate questions about priorities.

Moreover, these frequent journeys require substantial public funds, including expenses for aircraft, accommodation, security, and accompanying delegations—resources the country urgently needs amid mounting economic challenges and social demands. Instead of financing trips with no clearly visible benefit, such funds could be directed toward strengthening security, improving essential services, or supporting economic development initiatives. According to a minister close to the president’s office who declined to be named, concerns are growing regarding the purpose of these travels. The minister alleged that some trips are used for corruption, money laundering, and personal enrichment. Although such claims require transparent investigation and credible accountability to be confirmed or refuted, they nonetheless reinforce the perception that stronger oversight and financial transparency are necessary.

Ultimately, when the nation’s highest leadership is perceived as traveling frequently without measurable outcomes, public trust and institutional credibility inevitably suffer. Consequently, official travel must be guided by clear national objectives, strategic planning, and strict accountability to ensure that public resources are managed responsibly and in the best interest of the Somali people.

Comparable concerns have also emerged in relation to Somalia’s diplomatic appointments, further reinforcing broader questions about governance and institutional integrity. In addition to executive restructuring at home, critics argue that the country’s foreign representation reflects a similar pattern in which political loyalty appears to outweigh professional qualification. Nearly all ambassadors appointed under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud are described by observers as relatives or close political associates, many of whom allegedly lack formal training or experience in foreign policy and diplomacy. This includes representatives to major global and regional powers such as United States, Russia, China, Türkiye, Kenya, Ethiopia, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Algeria, and Tanzania. When appointments to such strategically significant posts are perceived as politically motivated rather than merit-based, observers warn that the credibility and effectiveness of Somalia’s foreign policy inevitably suffer Indeed, representation on the global stage is not merely ceremonial; rather, it serves as a critical instrument for advancing national interests, attracting investment, and strengthening alliances.

Nevertheless, without clarity of purpose, disciplined messaging, and capable leadership, repeated engagements may appear directionless instead of strategic—thereby diminishing Somalia’s influence at a time when durable partnerships are essential for both security and economic recovery. Furthermore, One Somali diplomatic expert, speaking on condition of anonymity to avoid professional repercussions, offered a blunt assessment in an email response to my inquiry. According to this expert, many of the leaders President Hassan meets allegedly view him as corrupt and display limited respect once meetings conclude; similarly, a comparable lack of regard is often perceived from those he visits. The expert further recounted an incident involving Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who reportedly received President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud while dressed casually in a shirt and jeans and sandal.

When asked about his informal appearance, Museveni was said to have remarked “His visits have become too frequent, seem to have no real agenda, and lack a clear plan. He keeps coming back without achieving much, leaving people confused about what he is actually trying to accomplish.” If such perceptions persist, they risk signaling diplomatic inconsistency and, in turn, eroding Somalia’s standing among regional partners.  Conversely, although diplomatic engagement remains necessary, its impact is significantly weakened when it appears detached from urgent domestic realities. At present, Somalia’s internal affairs stand at a critical juncture, with political instability intensifying and public confidence increasingly strained. Given these circumstances, many argue that the President’s foremost priority should be confronting mounting challenges at home. Otherwise, without decisive leadership focused on stabilization, the fragile gains achieved in recent years could gradually erode, potentially placing the Somali state at renewed risk.

Governance, Power, and Institutional Fragility

The connection between government and governance is clearly illustrated in Federalist No. 51. James Madison wrote some of the most famous words of the American founding “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”

This poses the ancient question: Who will watch the watchers?

Madison’s subsequent point was equally crucial. “A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” Yet in the Hassan era, these auxiliary precautions have utterly failed. They have been so weakened that their intended effect has been reversed. Rather than restraining the rise of authoritarianism, Somalia’s governance appears premised on the notion that those in power are angelic figures whose actions require no oversight—a dangerous and unrealistic assumption.

Somalia’s history offers sobering reminders of the consequences of political inflexibility. At pivotal moments, opportunities for compromise were missed, and the cost was national fragmentation. Sustainable progress requires leaders willing to negotiate, share power responsibly, and place collective survival above individual ambition. International partners often emphasize that durable peace cannot be imported. External assistance may support reconstruction, but it cannot substitute for genuine political consensus among Somali stakeholders. The path forward ultimately depends on whether leaders can rise above factional interests and commit to inclusive governance grounded in mutual trust.

Foreign Policy: Framework, Failures, and Missed Opportunities

Foreign policy constitutes the legally recognized and strategically directed framework by which a sovereign state regulates its interactions, engagements, and agreements with other states, international organizations, and non-state actors, in order to advance national interests, protect sovereignty, and ensure territorial integrity. It encompasses the negotiation, conclusion, and implementation of treaties, memoranda of understanding, and other binding instruments, guided by principles of state responsibility, legality, and prudence under both domestic and international law. In Somalia, the Federal Government’s execution of over eighteen defense and military cooperation agreements during Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s four-year tenure, including the recent one in Riyadh with Saudi Arabia, represents an exercise of foreign policy prerogatives. However, these agreements can be characterized as legally and strategically deficient. with the notable exception of Saudi Arabia—Many were reactive, pursued in response to external developments such as the 2024 Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, rather than as part of a coherent, forward-looking national security strategy.

The catalogue of foreign partners—including the UAE (with which Somalia formally terminated agreements in January 2026), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Türkiye, the United States, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Serbia, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Djibouti, Pakistan, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—while extensive, has failed to translate into substantive improvements in Somalia’s security situation. Al-Shabab continues to exercise significant territorial control and expand operations, demonstrating that these agreements, despite their legal formalization, have been irresponsible, ineffective, and strategically flawed. Legally, while these agreements may bind Somalia under international law, a foreign policy that prioritizes reactive diplomacy over comprehensive, security-centered strategy constitutes a failure of state responsibility, undermining both citizen protection and Somalia’s sovereign interests.

Leadership, Merit, and the Future of the Somali State

Questions about governance are also reflected in the organization of the executive branch, where structural changes appear driven more by political calculation than institutional necessity. In this context, the creation or reshaping of senior posts without clear legislative grounding has fueled debate about whether such decisions genuinely strengthen governance or merely accommodate shifting alliances. Moreover, concentrating authority within a narrow circle limits collaborative leadership at precisely the moment coordinated national action is most needed. At the same time, administrative reshuffling has raised concerns about consistency and accountability. When oversight responsibilities frequently shift between offices, maintaining strategic direction becomes increasingly difficult. As a result, effective governance depends not only on policy ambition but also on continuity, transparency, and institutional discipline—qualities that are difficult to cultivate amid constant reorganization.

These structural concerns become more concrete when viewed alongside firsthand accounts from within government. A senior politician, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly, served on the Somali task force appointed by President Hassan Sheikh in 2024 following the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland. However, according to this official, he had no knowledge of the agreement and stated that most task force members were similarly unaware of it. Furthermore, he explained that neither he nor the task force had any involvement in the reported discussions between Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Abiy Ahmed in Türkiye, nor were they consulted in preparation for the meeting. In fact, he claimed that the task force never formally convened, no consultations were conducted, and no input was requested from its members. Taken together, these claims suggest a troubling disconnect between formal institutional structures and actual decision-making processes.

Consequently, critics argue that such patterns reinforce the perception that key decisions are driven primarily by political considerations rather than by inclusive national strategy. If accurate, this approach undermines institutional credibility and weakens collective ownership of policy outcomes. Beyond procedural concerns, the most troubling cost of prolonged uncertainty has been borne by Somalia’s greatest resource: its people. At a time when skilled professionals and experienced administrators are urgently needed, many capable individuals have reportedly been sidelined from positions where they could contribute meaningfully. Thus, critics contend that when political loyalty outweighs professional competence, public institutions are weakened and public trust erodes. Ultimately, sustainable governance requires not only authority, but also transparency, consultation, and merit-based leadership—without which long-term stability becomes increasingly difficult to secure.

The Road Ahead

Latin American scholar Paloma Griffero Pedemonte once warned against systems that seek to “keep the people ignorant and obedient.” Indeed, this caution is especially relevant in contexts where public awareness is limited and many citizens remain uninformed about the decisions shaping their nation’s future. When people lack access to reliable information, meaningful participation in governance becomes difficult, and accountability weakens. Consequently, a critical question emerges: Who will watch the watchers? As Somalia approaches its next political chapter, the central question remains whether the country can defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, protect national institutions, and foster a political culture in which authority is balanced by responsibility rather than concentrated for personal gain. More importantly, the test is whether leadership can unite to safeguard the Somali nation—preserving unity, strengthening its foundations, and ensuring that the sacrifices of its people lead toward a stable, secure, and self-reliant future.

Furthermore, Somalia’s predicament should no longer be viewed as a temporary phase awaiting resolution. Rather, it reflects deeper structural weaknesses, particularly the failure to consistently cultivate capable leadership, promote civic awareness, and uphold the rule of law. Therefore, reversing this trajectory demands more than declarations of reform; it requires accountability, transparency, public education, and competence at every level of government. At this pivotal moment, the country stands at a decisive crossroads. Somalia must choose between governance anchored in national priorities and the continuation of a personalized system of power—one that echoes the mindset once bluntly summarized by former Peruvian dictator Óscar R. Benavides: “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.” Under Hassan’s leadership, critics argue that sycophants are rewarded with ambassadorial posts and senior positions, while independent voices are marginalized. As a result, public office appears driven more by personal allegiance than merit.

If laws are applied impartially and merit is recognized regardless of affiliation, Somalia can gradually move beyond recurring cycles of fragility. However, if leadership continues to operate through favoritism, exclusion, and political self-preservation, the promise of recovery will remain elusive. Ultimately, without meaningful transformation—and without an informed citizenry capable of holding leaders to account—the narrative of transition will continue to repeat itself, failing to deliver the stability and dignity that citizens have long awaited.

Dayib Sh. Ahmed
Email: Dayib0658@gmail.com
——
Dayib is a writer, political analyst and WardheerNews contributor