By Ayanle Warsame
This article focuses on a group that has received little attention so far: the younger politicians who won seats under the Justice and Solidarity Party banner in this year’s elections. Most of them were born after 1991. They have never lived under a state that worked the way the Supreme Court’s ruling assumes a state works. So what do they make of a President who removed a Chief Justice with a Facebook post?
Nobody has asked them in any systematic way, or if someone has, I couldn’t find it. What follows is inference, built from what is known about who they are, how they got their seats and what has been said and published over the last week. I have tried to give the arguments on each side their proper weight.
Who the cadre is
First, a point of scale. The JSP members elected this year sit on district councils and in state assemblies, not in the federal Parliament. Banadir held local council elections in late December 2025. Southwest voted on 10 May, Galmudug on 30 July, and Hirshabelle after that. The party took 51 of 95 assembly seats in Southwest, 67 of 89 in the Galmudug re-run and 78 of 99 in Hirshabelle.
The candidate pools were young. In Banadir, 69 per cent of the 1,604 council candidates were between 20 and 35, according to figures reported before the vote, and local coverage called it a first. That describes candidates, not winners. I haven’t found a published age breakdown of those elected, and the party’s ranks include plenty of older figures. Still, roughly 70 per cent of Somalis are under 30, so a younger political class was always going to arrive at some point. These elections are where it began to.
How suspect were the elections?
“Suspect” is the opposition’s word, and the record is more mixed than that. It matters, because it shapes how the cadre sees its own mandate.
The concerns are real. The main opposition parties boycotted or were excluded from the Galmudug and Hirshabelle votes. The Supreme Court annulled the July vote in Galmudug on 24 August, finding irregularities that had affected the integrity and outcome of the result. The re-run then went ahead without Towfiiq, the party that had brought the successful challenge, and the JSP’s share went up. In Banadir, parties complained that the commission published party totals without saying who had won which seat. In January an EU-funded UN tender for an independent assessment of the Banadir vote cited limited oversight, uneven participation and transparency problems. Critics also argue that ballots decide the assemblies while the party decides who becomes state president.
There is another side. The Court ratified the Banadir results because no complaints were filed in the legal window, and it found the Southwest elections strictly lawful. It later approved the Galmudug re-run, on 13 October, and the Hirshabelle results, on 19 October. The presidency says 1.8 million people registered and that no armed incident occurred at any polling station. These were the first one-person, one-vote contests in decades. A young councillor who campaigned, queued and counted may reasonably feel the result is theirs, whatever the opposition says.
Nothing I found shows the results were fabricated, and the one judicial finding of irregularity was followed by a re-run. But an election that the main opposition did not contest, in a system where parties control the seats, produces a mandate that is real and also thin. The people who hold it are likely to know that better than anyone.
A generation that never saw the law work
Someone born after 1991 has lived through transitional governments, indirect clan-based elections, and a provisional constitution adopted in 2012 and revised this year. The courts they grew up around were, by the common complaint in Somali civic research, slow, open to clan influence or open to payment. I haven’t seen polling on how this particular cohort sees them, but I would expect many to share that view. Power was settled by negotiation among elders, by money and sometimes by force. For someone raised in that system, a judgment is a document that may or may not be obeyed, and the first question is always who will enforce it.
Two opposite inferences follow, and both are plausible. One is that the Court’s ruling feels remote. It looks like another round in a contest between older men who have traded the presidency among themselves for years, and the cadre’s own prospects depend on the party, not the Court. The other is that people with no inheritance of working institutions may value them more, because they have seen what life costs without them. The August annulment in Galmudug may well have been the first time many in this cohort watched a court overturn an election result. That the same Court then ruled against the President makes things awkward for anyone who benefited from the re-run.
How they might read the dismissal
The case for staying with the government is stronger than outsiders tend to allow. The presidency says it acted on complaints from judges and legal professionals about the justice system, and it has promised wider reform. The Attorney General’s office has objected that the Court ruled without a public hearing, left questions of jurisdiction and standing unresolved, and that the panel was improperly composed. Some legal commentators reject the point about the Chief Justice not presiding, noting that the law lets the deputy do so, but the other objections are arguable. The new Chief Justice, Ibrahim Idle Suleiman, has been Chief Justice before, and Somali outlets describe him as a member of the ruling party and a former adviser to the President.
There is also the matter of what the cadre is committed to. The government’s project is the first nationwide one-person, one-vote election since 1969, planned for April and May 2027. A young politician can sincerely think the priority is to reach that vote, and that a 90-day order from a court under dispute threatens it. Their seats came from that project, so undermining it undermines them. Add the ordinary pull of salaries, positions and a party that holds the lists, and a new member with no independent base has every reason to stay in line. The foreign-plot narrative, which I come to below, offers a further way to do that without feeling lawless: defending the state against outsiders is easier to say than defending the President against a court.
The case against runs as follows. This cohort entered politics under a party called Justice and Solidarity, in an election season sold as reform. The method of the dismissal matters to them as much as the substance. The announcement came on the presidency’s Facebook page, and did not say whether the Judicial Service Commission had recommended it or whether Parliament had approved it, which the Constitution requires. A generation that lives online will notice that. And there is a sharper, more self-interested point. The Court certified their elections. A court that can be reorganised overnight cannot certify anything durably, and if a different court later reviews those results, doubt about them returns. The same tool can also be used on them. An executive that can remove a judge by announcement can, in principle, remove other officials the same way.
Public opinion is not uniform either. When AFP asked Mogadishu residents after the ruling, some said the Court was right and the rule of law must be respected, while others said it was wrong because the Court was already functioning when the new constitution was approved. The cadre’s own friends, relatives and clan elders will be split in the same way.
The conspiracy theories
Conspiracy thinking is going to be part of this, because trust is thin and verified information is scarce. Here is what has been published, with what is known about each claim.
On the government side, the main theory is a foreign plot. On Friday 6 November the Defence Minister, Ahmed Moallim Fiqi, posted that the ruling was an agenda “arrived at in the Abu Dhabi meeting”, carried out by “mercenaries” inside the judiciary, and that the Chief Justice had fled to the compound of former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. It builds on earlier claims. In October the head of the National Intelligence and Security Agency said opposition figures had met in the UAE to plan an armed rebellion, and Fiqi accused politicians meeting in Abu Dhabi of learning from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. Published reporting says no documents, dates or names of any RSF figure were provided. There is real tension in the background: Mogadishu cancelled its agreements with the UAE in January, and the President accused Abu Dhabi of dealing with Somalia through multiple channels. But the specific claim that judges were hired or directed from abroad is unsupported by anything I found. The judges’ ruling is documented. Whether anyone paid or instructed them is not.
The opposition has theories of its own. One is that the dismissal was timed to stop the ruling. This began with local media citing unnamed sources before the judgment, and the Court itself said the dismissal was meant to obstruct the case. The presidency has not accepted that, and Hiiraan Online noted that no independent evidence establishes the motive. The timing is a fact. The motive is an inference. A second is that troops were sent to arrest the Chief Justice. Opposition candidate Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame and former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire made the allegation, and there were unconfirmed reports of an arrest. Baashe himself says his guards were withdrawn and he is under surveillance, and he spoke to reporters on Saturday, so he does not appear to have been detained. A third is that this is a coup against the Court, which is how the Somali Future Council describes it. That is a characterisation, not a secret plot.
The widest theory is that the whole sequence is a managed route to holding power through 2027 and beyond: the term-extension amendments, the new party, the local and state elections, and now the Court. Writers such as those at WardheerNews argue that the elections are appointments by another name and that the road to 2027 needs a court that will not stand in the way. It rests on documented ingredients, but intent cannot be proved from outside, and the government’s stated aim is to reach the 2027 vote.
There is also a regional version. Many see the crisis as a proxy contest, with Turkey behind the government and the UAE behind the opposition-aligned states. Puntland has condemned airstrikes, and FTL Somalia reports that Turkey denies involvement. Each camp’s foreign-hand story mirrors the other’s.
The information environment makes all of this easier. The dismissal was announced by Facebook post. After the ruling, a senior judge told BBC Somali that the Court’s own Facebook page had been taken offline, which has not been independently verified. In September 2025 police arrested several young people accused of insulting the President and warned social media users against doing so. Where the authorities and the Court are both short of trusted channels and each claim comes from an interested party, speculation fills the space. For the cadre, theories offer cover in both directions: a loyalist can believe the foreign-plot account, and a doubter can believe the opposition’s without evidence. The danger is that positions harden before facts arrive.
What can reasonably be inferred
None of this is proven, but some deductions are better supported than others.
Most of the cadre will stay publicly loyal in the near term, for ordinary reasons: they are new, they have no independent base and their accountability runs to the party and not to voters. Dissent, if it comes, will probably look like silence, absence or careful language about dialogue and constitutional process. Open breaks would be a significant signal.
Their stake in the Court is larger than they may yet realise. If the President wins this contest by capturing the institution that certified their elections, the gain is short-term, because the certification loses its value with the Court’s independence.
If fractures appear, they are most likely at state level. Galmudug and Hirshabelle will choose presidents soon, the JSP has backed particular candidates, and a disputed selection would test party discipline among legislators who have local clan and constituency pressures of their own.
This is not a bloc. A councillor in Banadir, an assembly member in Baidoa and a legislator in Galmudug have different clans, different local rivals and different exposure to Turkish or Emirati influence. Treating the post-1991 generation as one mind would be a mistake.
Finally, a negotiated settlement with a neutral court and a firm election timetable would probably serve this cohort better than either side winning outright. It would protect the legitimacy of their seats and spare them a choice they would rather not make. That is an inference, but a sound one.
What to watch
- Any JSP legislator or councillor, especially younger ones, speaking about the Court or calling for dialogue.
- Whether state assemblies in Southwest, Galmudug or Hirshabelle recognise the new Chief Justice.
- The Galmudug and Hirshabelle presidential selections, and any dispute over them.
- Whether the planned mid-November consultations include any of the younger cohort.
The people who will live longest with the outcome are the ones who joined politics last. How they respond will say a good deal about whether this crisis ends in a settlement or hardens into something worse.
Ayanle Warsame
Email:ayanlewarsame321@gmail.com

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