By Abdullahi A. Nor

Somalia is approaching one of the most consequential moments in its modern political history. What began as a dispute over elections and constitutional reform has evolved into a deeper crisis over the very structure, legitimacy and future of the Federal Republic.

The danger is no longer simply that Somalia may fail to hold an election on time. The greater danger is that the country could enter a prolonged period in which competing authorities claim political legitimacy, federal states increasingly operate independently of Mogadishu, armed forces become instruments of political competition, and external powers exploit the resulting vacuum.

At the centre of this crisis stands President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and a federal government whose constitutional and electoral agenda has been rejected by significant sections of the political opposition and several federal member states. Parliament’s mandate expired in April 2026, while the president’s constitutional term expired in May, according to recent analyses of the crisis. Yet there is still no broadly accepted political settlement governing the country’s transition to the next elections.  That alone should be alarming.

A constitutional dispute has become a struggle for the state

The fundamental question confronting Somalia is no longer simply when will elections be held? It is who has the authority to determine the rules under which Somalia will be governed?

The federal government’s constitutional and electoral reforms have been portrayed by its opponents as an attempt to centralize power in Mogadishu. Puntland has rejected the federal government’s approach, while Jubaland has also remained outside the government’s political framework. The opposition coalition has similarly challenged the legitimacy of the government’s electoral and constitutional process.

Puntland’s confrontation with Mogadishu has already moved beyond political statements. In June and July, tensions escalated over federal military appointments and the movement of forces, culminating in clashes involving Puntland forces and units associated with the federal government.

This is precisely where constitutional disputes become dangerous: once political disagreements begin to determine where troops move, who controls weapons and which administration commands security forces, the constitutional crisis ceases to be merely political. It becomes a question of state survival.

The federal compact is under unprecedented pressure

Somalia’s federal system was designed to prevent precisely this kind of concentration of power. Yet today, Somaliland remains outside the federal system and continues to pursue its claim to independence. Puntland has effectively suspended cooperation with Mogadishu over the constitutional and electoral dispute.

Jubaland remains deeply opposed to the federal government’s approach. And South West State has become the scene of an increasingly bitter confrontation between the federal government and forces and communities opposed to its intervention.

The result is a country in which the political map increasingly looks different from the constitutional map. This is the paradox Somalia now faces: the federal government may control the capital and possess international recognition, but political legitimacy cannot be manufactured through administrative appointments, constitutional amendments or the deployment of security forces. Legitimacy must be negotiated.

The crisis in South West State is particularly dangerous because it brings together nearly every unresolved problem in Somalia: federalism, elections, security, constitutional authority and local legitimacy.

Critics of the federal government’s intervention argue that Mogadishu has used military force and political engineering to reshape the leadership of South West State. The appointment of Speaker Adan Mohamed Nur—better known as Adan Madoobe—as the political figurehead of the state has been strongly contested by opponents who argue that he lacks sufficient popular legitimacy.

Whether one accepts that characterization or not, the underlying political problem is impossible to ignore. A federal government cannot create sustainable political legitimacy in a federal member state simply by controlling its administrative capital.

If large sections of the local population regard an administration as imposed rather than elected, the government may possess the buildings, security forces and official titles—but it will struggle to possess genuine authority.

That is the lesson Mogadishu should learn before the South West crisis becomes another prolonged Somali conflict.

Somalia is not operating in a geopolitical vacuum

What makes today’s crisis considerably more dangerous than previous political disputes is Somalia’s geography. Somalia occupies one of the most strategically important positions in Africa. Its coastline stretches along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, adjacent to the Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most important maritime gateways.

The country sits between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, near Yemen and the Red Sea, while Ethiopia—one of Africa’s most populous countries—remains landlocked and increasingly interested in reliable access to the sea.

The strategic importance of this geography has increased dramatically since the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran conflict.

The war has disrupted energy markets, shipping routes and security calculations across the Middle East. The Strait of Hormuz has become a major geopolitical pressure point, while the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have simultaneously become more contested.  For Somalia, this is both an opportunity and a danger.

A stable, united Somalia could become one of the most strategically valuable states in the region. A fragmented Somalia could become the opposite: a battlefield of competing regional and global interests.

The Iran war has changed the strategic equation

The consequences of the Iran war extend well beyond the Persian Gulf. The conflict has demonstrated how quickly maritime chokepoints can become instruments of geopolitical pressure. Shipping companies are already reassessing routes, insurance costs and port infrastructure. Gulf states are investing in alternative transportation corridors as they seek to reduce their vulnerability to disruptions around Hormuz.

At the same time, the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have become increasingly important to competing security and economic strategies. That puts Somalia directly in the middle of the emerging geopolitical contest.

Recent piracy incidents off Yemen and Somalia have further illustrated the vulnerability of the maritime corridor. The resurgence of piracy in 2026 has included multiple vessel hijackings across the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean.

The message for Somalia should be unmistakable:

Geography is becoming Somalia’s greatest strategic asset—and potentially its greatest security liability.

When a strategically located country is politically fragmented, other countries rarely remain passive. They seek ports. They seek military access. They seek intelligence partnerships. They seek commercial concessions. They seek political allies. And they seek influence over whoever controls strategic territory.

This is already visible throughout the Horn of Africa, where Gulf states, Turkey, Ethiopia, Egypt, the United States, China, Israel and other actors have competing security, commercial and strategic interests. The Iran war has accelerated this competition rather than reducing it.

Somalia therefore cannot afford to behave as though its internal political crisis exists in isolation from the international system. Every constitutional dispute in Mogadishu is being watched by actors outside Somalia. Every confrontation between federal and state forces is being assessed through a geopolitical lens. Every port, airport, military base and coastline has strategic value,and every political vacuum creates an opportunity for someone else.

The greatest threat may not be Al-Shabaab

For years, Somalia’s political establishment has rightly identified Al-Shabaab as the country’s principal security threat. But there is another danger that deserves equal attention: state fragmentation.

A weakened central government fighting with federal states is less capable of defeating Al-Shabaab. A federal member state fighting with Mogadishu cannot concentrate fully on economic development. Security forces divided by political loyalties cannot build a professional national army, and a government consumed by electoral survival cannot devote sufficient attention to state reconstruction.

This is the vicious circle Somalia risks entering. Political conflict weakens institutions, and weak institutions produce insecurity.

Insecurity encourages external intervention. External intervention deepens political competition. Political competition further weakens the state, and the cycle continues.

The federal government still has a choice

None of this means the Federal Republic is doomed. Somalia’s future remains negotiable. But the window for political compromise is narrowing. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud still has an opportunity to transform the current crisis from a confrontation over political survival into a national settlement over the future of the republic. That would require something more difficult than another political conference. It would require compromise.

The government would need to negotiate seriously with Puntland, Jubaland, the opposition and other political actors over the constitutional framework and electoral system. It would need to reduce the use of security forces as instruments of political pressure. And it would need to accept that an election whose rules are rejected by a substantial portion of the country cannot produce the legitimacy Somalia desperately needs.

The opposition, for its part, must also recognize that rejecting every federal initiative without presenting a workable national alternative will not resolve the crisis.

Somalia needs a political settlement—not merely a political victory for one side. If the current trajectory continues, Somalia could enter a period of prolonged institutional ambiguity.

One administration could claim constitutional authority. Federal states could insist that Mogadishu has exceeded its mandate. Opposition leaders could reject the electoral process. Security forces could become increasingly divided. Local administrations could seek greater autonomy. and external powers could deepen their involvement. Such a scenario would not necessarily produce the dramatic collapse of the Somali state overnight. It could be much more dangerous than that.

Somalia could gradually become a country that exists as one state on international maps but operates as several competing political and security spaces on the ground.

That would be a dream scenario for those seeking strategic influence over Somalia’s coastline and a nightmare for the Somali people.

The choice before Somalia

Somalia’s strategic geography cannot be changed. Its location beside the Gulf of Aden cannot be moved. Its proximity to Yemen, Ethiopia, the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula cannot be negotiated away.

But Somalia can decide whether its geography becomes a source of prosperity or a magnet for foreign competition. That decision begins with political unity. Not uniformity. Not centralization. Not the elimination of federal states.

It means accepting that constitutional legitimacy cannot be imposed by force, that elections cannot be credible without broad political consent, and that federalism cannot survive if the centre treats member states as subordinate administrative districts. The coming months may therefore determine far more than who governs Somalia next. They may determine whether Somalia’s federal experiment survives at all.

The country stands at a crossroads: a negotiated political settlement that preserves the Federal Republic—or a prolonged constitutional crisis that gradually transforms political fragmentation into territorial and institutional fragmentation. And while Somali politicians argue over elections, constitutional clauses and political appointments, the world around them is changing rapidly. The Red Sea is becoming more contested. The Gulf of Aden is becoming more strategic.

The consequences of the Iran war are reshaping regional calculations. Foreign powers are reassessing military and commercial access, and Somalia’s coastline is becoming more valuable by the day. The tragedy would be for Somalia to discover too late that while its leaders were fighting over who controls the state, others were preparing for a world in which controlling Somalia’s strategic geography may matter even more than controlling its government.

The Federal Republic still has a future—but only if its political leaders choose to save the republic before the geopolitical forces gathering around it decide its future for them.

Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com