By Omar Abdi Shire

Introduction

Somalia remains one of the world’s fragile states. More than three decades after the collapse of the central government in 1991, the country continues to struggle with institutional weakness, dependence on external actors, social fragmentation, and a profound deficit of political trust. Yet after thirty years of state-building efforts, an unavoidable question emerges: What has changed? What must change? What should be maintained because it has produced positive outcomes?.

To answer these questions, it is necessary to revisit the origins of state collapse and critically examine the political trajectory that followed.

Legacy of 1991: From state collapse to political anarchy.

Although the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted from multiple political, economic, and social factors, there is broad agreement that one of the most consequential causes was the manner in which armed opposition movements confronted the central govt.

Rather than pursuing a negotiated political transition, competing armed factions relied primarily on military force. The destruction of state institutions, security, structures, and administrative authority eliminated the mechanism that maintains order and control. The aftermath somalia entred what political theorists would describe as an anarchic environment, where power became increasingly determined by armed capability rather than. Institutional legitimacy.

The result was the emergence of a “law of jungle” political order in which individuals and groups relied upon clan militias, personal influence, and militia strength rather than established legal systemic frameworks. Every attempt to establish authority, wether its based on religion, traditional reconciliation, or political agreement, was challenged by competing actors possessing their own armed forces.

This dynamic generated a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence that became self-reinforcing. Political disputes repeatedly transformed into military confrontations, while military victories rarely produced a sustainable political settlement.

Arta process and the foundations of the contemporary state

  The 2000 Arta peace conference marked a turning point in Somalia’s political reconstruction. Through the efforts of Somali peace advocates and significant international support, a new framework for governance emerged. While imperfect, the institutions created during and after Arta laid the foundation for the political order that exists today.

It is important to acknowledge that every subsequent federal administration, regardless of its shortcomings, has operated within the institutional architecture that originated from this process. Yet the persistence of institutions alone has not resolved Somalia’s fundamental challenges: the relationship between political competition and organized violence.

Elections, political elites, and the normalization of armed opposition.

The presidential elections of 2009, 2012, 2017, 2022 and even the current political environment leading toward new future expected elections have all been accompanied by severe political crises. While governments have often contributed to these crises through delayed elections, constitutional disputes, or attempts to extend mandates, an equally troubling phenomenon has become normalized. The use of armed force by opposition actors as a legitimate political instrument.

At the conclusion of nearly every electoral cycle, Somalia approaches a dangerous threshold where political disagreement risks escalating into military confrontation. Opposition groups frequently mobilize armed forces, establish parallel security structures, and challenge the authority of the state through coercive means. The pattern reflects what may be described as a form of political atavism, the re-emergence of deeply rooted pre-institutional methods of resolving disputes through force rather than law.

Consequently, each crisis tends to produce the same outcome: one period of instability is merely replaced by another. Political actors who condemn the use of force while oppositions often adopt similar practices once they acquire power. The cycle reproduces itself because the underlying incentives are unchanged.

The 2021-22 crisis and politics of armed mobilization

Perhaps the most illustrative example accured during the constitutional and electoral crisis surrounding the extensions of President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s term. Following the parliamentary approval of an extension, opposition groups launched what became known as the “National Salvation”  movement. Armed forces loyal to various political and clan-based actors entered Mogadishu, established fortified positions, and challenged the authority of the federal government. In the some araes, armed opposition units effectively operated parallel to the security structure within the capital itself.

The crisis demonstrated the extent to which military mobilization had become integrated into Somalia’s political culture. Rather than relying exclusively on constitutional mechanisms, major political disputes once again became interwined with armed coercion. 

Ironically, the same pattern later confronted Famaajo’s successor. Following constitutional disputes and controversies surrounding governance reforms, armed opposition elements once again mobilized forces within Mogadishu. The result was renewed insecurity, destruction of property, civilian displacement, and the persistent threat of wider clan-based conflict. 

The lesson is not that one side was uniquely responsible. Rather, the lesson is that Somalia’s political system repeatedly incentivizes viewing military capability as an effective tool of political bargaining.

The central Question: Can a state survive with multiple armed centers of power?

The fundamental question is, can a state maintain stability when both the government and opposition possess independent military capabilities capable of challenging one another through force?

In consolidated democracies, political disputes are resolved through courts, constitutional bodies, and electoral institutions because these institutions possess recognized authority. Political actors accept unfavorable outcomes because they trust the system more than they trust violence.

Somalia, however, continues to struggle with weak institutional legitimacy and limited public confidence in the conflict-resolution mechanism. Consequently, political actors frequently view armed mobilization as a rational strategy. Under such circumstances, the existence of multiple competing centers of coercive power creates permanent uncertainty. Every electoral cycle becomes a potential security crisis.

Structural realities and the need for a monopoly of force

From a structural-functionalist perspective, institutions can only perform their intended functions when authority is clearly defined and widely recognised. Historically, the Somali political organization has oscillated between periods of strong centralized authority and periods of fragmentation. Democratic traditions have existed, but they have often been constrained by clan dynamics, security concerns, and weak institutional development.

For this reason, Somalia’s state-building process cannot be evaluated solely through models borrowed from stable Western democracies. The country’s unique historical and social realities require a more nuanced approach. One principle, however, remains universally relevant: the state must possess a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Political legitimacy should be contested through elections, legal challenges, public debate, and constitutional mechanisms, not through competing armed formations. A political system in which opposition groups can independently mobilize military forces against the state institutions creates what may be described as an “anarchic-adjacent competition” for power. Such a system perpetually risks returning to the dynamics that contributed to state collapse in the first place.

Peace beyond the absence of voilence

“peace is not merely the absence of violence; it is the absence of conditions that make violence likely.

A society cannot be considered genuinely stable simply because violence is temporarily absent. Stability requires institutional arrangements that prevent political actors from transforming disagreements into armed confrontation.

As long as parallel military structures remain available as instruments of political competition, the potential for violence remains embedded within the system itself.

Conclusion

The central lesson of Somalia’s post-1991 experience is not that governments are always right or that opposition movements are always wrong. Rather, it is that the normalization of armed political competition has repeatedly undermined state-building efforts regardless of who occupies power. Thirty years of political experience suggest that Somalia’s future stability depends less on the identities of individual leaders and more on the establishment of a political order in which force is monopolized by legitimate state institutions.

Governments must be held accountable through constitutional and democratic means. Opposition movements must retain the right to challenge authority. Yet neither objective can coexist sustainably with the routine militarization of political disputes. If Somalia is to escape the cycle that has defined much of its modern history, political competition must be divorced from armed coercion. The state cannot be simultaneously rebuilding institutions while tolerating multiple centers of organized force.

The ultimate challenge facing Somalia is therefore not simply achieving democracy, but constructing a political system in which all actors accept that power changes through institutions rather than through the threat or use of force of voilence

Omar Abdi Shire
Email: omarabdishire890@gmail.com
Mersin university
————
Refrence  
SOMALIA:Parliamentry and presidential elections 2022 (Estrella Chocron)
SOMALIA: Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 2022, Peace,positive and negative. (Johan Galtung)
Somalia national peace confrence https://unterm.un.org/unterm2/es/view/UNHQ/41F77AF97EF9171285256AEA0065185C

A brief  backround constitutional history
https://constitutionnet.org/country/somalia