By Abdirashid Hashi
I read and reread Dr. Abdifatah Tahir’s piece titled “Is Somali Unity Possible Without Political Seriousness? My Reflections.”
For one, I am glad he wrote it. As a disillusioned unionist, his intervention is useful because it allows political actors and academics in the south to hear directly where many lifelong unionists from “Somaliland” now stand. It also provides written material that helps unpack what exactly the secessionists and their sympathizers, which the good doctor now appears to have become one of — may expect as the price of unity.
My reflections here are offered in the same spirit: to contribute to an honest discussion. Before doing so, however, it is useful to summarize Dr. Tahir’s core argument.
The former federal MP, Dr. Abdifatah Tahir, suggests that Somali unity is only possible if the south becomes “serious” and offers meaningful concessions to Somaliland. In practical terms, this seriousness would require relocating the capital from Mogadishu to the north, guaranteeing that the presidency comes from the north for thirty-three years, and establishing roughly equal political representation between north and south — including parity in cabinet and senior government positions.
These are sweeping demands. But before discussing them, one important conceptual issue must be addressed. Throughout the article, Dr. Tahir uses terms such as northern Somalia, Somaliland, the Isaaq clan, and the secessionist movement almost interchangeably. Yet these are not identical categories.
Not all communities in northern Somalia supported secession. Nor did all experience the same historical grievances. Furthermore, the territory of the former British Somaliland protectorate is no longer politically or geographically intact. The eastern regions — including communities in Sanaag and the newly established Northeast State — are no longer part of the Somaliland political project as it exists today.
This distinction is not academic; it is essential. When Dr. Tahir argues that the “north” should hold the presidency for thirty-three years, it is not clear whether he means all communities from the former Somaliland territory or specifically the Isaaq political camp that leads the secessionist project. However, when he writes that he will follow “the course pursued by the community to which I belong” if his demands are not met, the ambiguity disappears. He is clearly referring to the secessionist Isaaq political camp whose grievances he outlines in the opening sections of his article.
The Southern Counter-Argument
Dr. Tahir also argues that enthusiasm for unity in the south has been weak and that southern elites are invested in preserving existing power arrangements rather than opening space for Somaliland’s participation. According to him, his experience in Mogadishu as a member of parliament led him to that conclusion and ultimately shaped the litmus-test conditions he now proposes. What the article fails to present, however, is the southern counter-argument.
And here is one. Between 2010 and 2024, successive Somali presidents actively pursued dialogue with Somaliland leaders and offered significant concessions in pursuit of unity. Presidents Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (2009–2012), Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012–2017), Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo (2017–2022), and again Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2022–2023) all pursued negotiations and explored major concessions — including discussions around the presidency, relocation of the capital, apologies, and compensation.
In February 2020, President Farmaajo was widely reported to have prepared to travel to Hargeisa to offer what many described as a blank cheque to Muse Bihi if he would accept unity. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, then fresh from receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, was reportedly prepared to accompany him in that effort. President Sharif in 2010 and President Hassan Sheikh in 2015 and again in 2022–2023 made similar overtures to Somaliland leaders such as the late Ahmed Silanyo and later Muse Bihi.
None of these efforts produced an agreement. But the failure did not occur because the south refused to accommodate. It occurred because Somaliland’s leadership repeatedly declined offers that many observers considered extraordinarily genuine.
To claim, therefore, that the south has not been interested in unity is simply not supported by the contemporary record.
Responsibility Is Not One-Sided
By placing the entire burden of failure on southern elites, Dr. Tahir conveniently sidesteps the responsibility of northern unionists — including himself. Yet the historical record shows that politicians from the north have been central players in Somalia’s politics for the past twenty-five years. In fact, they often held decisive swing votes in presidential elections and were instrumental in determining who governed the country. Put plainly, his cohort’s political behavior has not been fundamentally different — or better — than that of politicians from other regions.
One could even argue that northern unionist politicians in Mogadishu failed to galvanize their southern counterparts around a coherent strategy for restoring unity. At the same time, they failed to use whatever influence and local credibility they may have had (for they said they “represent” the north) to moderate the increasingly radical posture of the secessionist leadership.
Instead, the political culture that emerged among many northern politicians was what Somalis call hal lug ku taagni — standing with one foot in each camp. Neither fully unionist nor openly separatist, many operated in Mogadishu as fervent nationalists (MP Dubbe and Dr. Beyle are classic examples) and then joined the secessionist camp once their time in national office ended. The flip-flopping became as normal as another Tuesday at the office. Failure to bring about national unity, to say the least, is widely shared.
The Question of International Recognition
Dr. Tahir also suggests that Somaliland’s prospects for international recognition are increasing and that this trend should push the south to make greater concessions. The empirical evidence does not support that claim.
Of the 194 United Nations member states, not one — aside from Israel — recognizes Somaliland. The African Union, the European Union, the Arab League, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation have all reaffirmed Somalia’s territorial integrity and rejected Israel’s unilateral gesture.
Somalia currently holds seats on both the United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, strengthening its diplomatic ability to defend its sovereignty.
Ironically, Israeli involvement has likely made Somaliland’s quest for recognition more difficult rather than easier. The Gaza war and the Somaliland leadership’s embrace of Netanyahu have generated greater sympathy for Somalia internationally and have pushed some previously neutral countries to distance themselves from the secessionist project.
Even within Somaliland itself, many elders, businessmen, ulema, and intellectuals now view the flirtation with Israel as reckless and a betrayal of Somali values, including support for the inalienable rights of Palestinians to their land.
Unity Cannot Be Built on Ultimatums
No Somali would object if an Isaaq leader — a statesman in the tradition of Timacadde, Hadrawi, or General Ahmed Jama — were to lead Somalia for the next thirty-three years, or even the next ninety-nine years.
In fact, in 2000 I advocated for the late Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal to lead the newly reconstituted Somalia. In 2004 I advocated for the late Hadrawi to be president. In 2017 I argued that Mohamed Jirde Hussein should be drafted as a presidential candidate. In 2020 I was in Hargeisa sounding out credible intellectuals and businessmen about running for national office. I remember telling them that the Darod and Hawiye candidates who rotate in power every four years together control each about sixty-one MPs — roughly what you also have — and that with thirty or so progressive MPs a serious northern candidate could cross the finish line.
And just last Sunday, unbeknownst to Dr. Tahir’s upcoming article, I paid a courtesy visit to a deputy prime minister and told him that in the coming election the Isaaq unionists should field a candidate.
The point is simple: any Somali who wants the presidency — with determination and coalition-building — can get it. Think of Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and others who lost several times yet continued seeking the office. Somalis care far more about patriotism and leadership than about clan origin. And even Abdifatah, with his intellectual prowess and political acumen, could be a good candidate — if he keeps his legs in one place and at the center.
“I am out unless my demands are met” is for the average Faarax, not for one Dr. Abdifatah Tahir.
Abdirashid Hashi
Email: rashid2025@abdikarimbuh
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The author is a Somalia analyst and researcher. He is the co-founder and former director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, a Mogadishu-based think tank, and a former cabinet minister. He also tweets at @AnalystSomalia.