By Abdullahi A. Nor

After four years of deafening silence during what many insiders describe as one of the most brazen periods of state asset plunder in Somalia’s recent history, the Office of the Auditor General led by Ahmed Isse Gutale, has abruptly “discovered” its mandate. Its latest move, a narrowly focused probe into land leases inside the heavily fortified Halane (Xalane) compound, has been presented as a breakthrough in accountability.

To critics, however, it looks less like reform and more like a carefully staged performance. Because the real question is not what the Auditor General is investigating today. It is what it chose not to investigate yesterday.

For years, allegations of systematic land grabbing in Mogadishu have circulated openly—hardly whispers in dark corners, but loud, persistent claims repeated by displaced families, civil society actors, and even insiders within government. Entire neighborhoods were reportedly cleared. Public land, once belonging to the state was allegedly parceled off, transferred, and monetized through opaque networks.

And yet, throughout this period, the institution constitutionally mandated to safeguard public assets was nowhere to be seen.

Where was the Auditor General when hundreds of thousands of vulnerable residents were forcibly displaced from their homes?
Where was it when reports emerged of civilians being shot during evictions?
Where was it when allegations surfaced that state land worth hundreds of millions of dollars had been quietly redirected into private hands?

These are not minor oversights. These are foundational failures.

The Office of the Auditor General did not merely fail in its duties, it became, by omission, part of the machinery that enabled the very corruption it now claims to confront.  And yet today, in a sudden display of institutional enthusiasm, the same office has turned its attention to a far narrower target: seven private companies leasing land within Halane, Mogadishu’s most securitized enclave, home to international missions, contractors, and foreign entities.

The optics are impossible to ignore. Instead of addressing the alleged large-scale liquidation of public assets across the capital, the Auditor General has chosen to focus on rental agreements, agreements whose legal basis is not fundamentally disputed, even if their financial management may be questionable.

It is, at best, a selective reading of accountability.At worst, a deliberate distraction.

According to the Office’s own report, a special review was conducted into land lease agreements involving seven private firms operating inside the Halane compound. The investigation examined whether these companies were complying with their contractual obligations, particularly in relation to rent payments owed to the government.

One company, SKA International Group, was singled out. The report claims that SKA operates on approximately 40,000 square meters of government land and owes around $860,000 in unpaid rent.

On paper, this is a legitimate finding. Public revenue matters. Contracts must be honored. But in context, the figure raises more questions than it answers. $860,000. That is the number the Auditor General has chosen to spotlight—after years of alleged losses that critics claim run into the hundreds of millions.

To many observers, the contrast is staggering. “You cannot ignore a forest fire and then declare victory for putting out a candle,” one analyst remarked bluntly.

But the controversy does not end with what is being investigated. It extends to who is doing the investigating.

The head of the Auditor General’s office Ahmed Isse Gutale, has himself come under intense scrutiny. He reportedly holds no formal qualifications in accounting, auditing, or finance, the core disciplines central to the institution he leads. While he possesses an LLB from a local university, he is said to have no relevant professional experience in the field.

Instead, Gutale is widely described as a figure drawn from the media sphere, having been actively involved in supporting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s election campaign. To detractors, this background is not a footnote, it is the story.

An office that demands technical rigor, independence, and professional credibility is now led, they argue, by an individual whose primary qualification appears to be political loyalty rather than financial expertise.

“That is not just a weakness,” said one governance expert. “It is a structural flaw. You cannot enforce accountability if the institution itself is built on patronage.”

The implications are profound

In countries with fragile institutions, the credibility of oversight bodies is often the last line of defense against systemic abuse. When those bodies are perceived as politically aligned—or professionally underqualified, the entire accountability framework begins to erode.  And in Somalia, where public trust is already thin, such perceptions carry real consequences.

The report has been forwarded to the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, with recommendations for corrective action. The language is familiar: strengthen oversight, enforce compliance, protect public assets.

The problem is not the language. The problem is credibility. Because institutions do not build legitimacy through isolated actions. They build it through consistency—and through the competence and independence of those who lead them.

For years, Somalia’s governance structure has been plagued by accusations of elite capture, where state institutions are either weakened, bypassed, or repurposed to serve narrow political and financial interests. In such an environment, watchdog bodies like the Auditor General are not optional—they are essential.

But when those watchdogs appear only after the damage is done, and only in carefully selected areas—and under leadership whose qualifications are openly questioned—their role becomes suspect.

Why Halane, and why now?

Why pursue rental discrepancies in a controlled, internationally monitored zone, while remaining silent on far more politically sensitive issues such as the alleged sale of over 300 public properties without clear accounting of proceeds?

Why investigate private companies, but not the public officials who authorized, facilitated, or benefited from questionable transactions?

These are the questions that define this moment.

What Somalia is witnessing is not a genuine anti-corruption drive, but a form of institutional theater—an attempt to project accountability without confronting its most uncomfortable truths. And in Somalia’s current political climate, perception is everything.

The public is not merely watching what institutions do. They are judging what they choose not to do—and who is entrusted to do it.

The Halane investigation may yet recover unpaid revenues. It may even lead to improved contract management. But it will not, on its own, restore public confidence.

That will require something far more difficult: a willingness to investigate not just minor discrepancies, but systemic abuse. Not just private actors, but public authorities. And crucially, to ensure that those leading such efforts possess both the independence and the professional competence required for the task.

Until then, the Auditor General’s sudden awakening will continue to be viewed not as a turning point—but as a reminder of what happens when institutions arrive late to the scene of the crime, led by figures whose credibility is contested, and attempt to rewrite the story after the damage has already been done.

Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com