Put the Courts on the Negotiating Table: What Somalia Must Settle Before the Next Election

Put the Courts on the Negotiating Table: What Somalia Must Settle Before the Next Election

By Bashir M. Sheikh-Ali

Somalia is in a transition year, and as in past transitions, the guns are out. This time they are firing across the country: in Baidoa, in Beledweyne and in the capital itself. Puntland and Jubaland have their own rifts with Mogadishu, but federal forces no longer take the fight to Garowe or Kismayo, because both have shown they can defend themselves. In Gedo, where many local leaders reject Kismayo’s rule, federal and Jubaland forces still face each other. And, as before, the country’s leaders are jockeying over who will host the talks, who will mediate them and what guarantees each side gets, all to settle how the next president and Parliament will be chosen. What none of them proposes to fix is the governance defect that keeps bringing Somalia to fighting and back to the bargaining table: no Somali court has the competence, independence and accepted authority to settle a dispute over federal power and ensure that its judgment is carried out.

Somalia’s transitions of power are also growing progressively more dangerous. In 2012, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud took office amid genuine hope. By 2017, that hope had worn thin, but when he lost, he handed over power peacefully. In 2021, the question changed from who would win Villa Somalia to whether its occupant would leave it, and a term extension sent rival forces into the streets of Mogadishu. In each prior impasse, the leaders eventually settled on who would rule but never on who would judge their future disputes, leaving each new standoff to elite bargaining. Today, the question of whether Villa Somalia’s occupant will leave is back, and Somalis are beginning to doubt that the Villa can change hands peacefully at all.

That trend should alarm every Somali, whatever their clan or politics. In 2021, guns were drawn in one city for a week. This year, they have been fired in several regions for months. If the next five years bring a decline like the last five, the clans may stop caring what the leaders in Mogadishu agree to at all, and no deal signed there will hold anywhere else. Another agreement that decides who rules and leaves no court to settle disputes will bring that day closer.

Yet this year also shows that a Somali court can decide an election dispute and have its decision obeyed, as long as the federal government is not the loser. On 24 August, the Supreme Court annulled Galmudug’s parliamentary and local council elections. The electoral commission accepted the ruling, voters returned to the polls on 30 September, the Court certified the parliamentary results and the commission announced the winners.

On 4 November, while a challenge to federal mandates was pending, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud removed Chief Justice Baashe Yusuf Ahmed. The next day, a five-judge panel held that the 2026 constitutional amendments did not extend the terms of the sitting President and Parliament, limited the government to caretaker business and ordered elections within ninety days. The Court also declared Baashe’s removal void. The government challenged the Court’s jurisdiction and the makeup of the panel, rejected the judgment’s legal effect and swore in a new chief justice. The coming talks must decide how Somalia will build a competent and independent judiciary: courts that can rule against any party, the federal government included, and see their rulings obeyed.

When the Government Obeyed the Courts

In July 1964, the chairman of the Electoral Central Office annulled the election for the whole district of Merca because voting figures had been altered in one polling station. The Supreme Court held that he had exceeded his authority. The law allowed him to subtract the 300 invalid votes and reallocate the seats on the corrected count. Instead, he would have thrown out 20,031 votes whose validity no one disputed. The Court gave him two days to correct the count. He complied.

Earlier that year, the interior minister dissolved Mogadishu’s elected council on the day it first met, citing the record of an earlier council under the same mayor. The Supreme Court held that the law required proof that a council could not perform its functions, and this one had not yet had the chance. The Court annulled the decree, and the minister reinstated the council. The 1962 judiciary law bound the government to comply within any time the Court set and required the Court, at a party’s request, to enforce its own judgment. Merca and Mogadishu remind us that the law was obeyed.

The First Republic guaranteed judicial independence and, as a transitional measure, let foreign jurists serve. Giuseppe Papale and Aldo Peronacci headed the Supreme Court in its early years before Abdurahman Sheikh Ali was appointed its president in 1968. After the 1969 coup, the military suspended the Supreme Court and, in January 1970, created a National Security Court.

The 2004 Transitional Federal Charter restored formal guarantees of independence and gave the Supreme Court authority over disputes under the Charter. The 2012 Provisional Constitution provided for a Judicial Service Commission and a Constitutional Court, and Parliament passed their laws in 2014 and 2016. The Constitutional Court never sat. In 2015, Hassan Sheikh dissolved the commission he had inherited from the transitional government, saying its appointment breached the Provisional Constitution, then failed to get a replacement through Parliament. The commission stood empty until Farmaajo filled seven of its nine places by decree in December 2020, and in 2022 Hassan Sheikh dissolved that one too, citing flaws in how it was established. In July 2026, his cabinet, whose mandate had expired according to the Supreme Court, approved four nominees to a new Supreme Judicial Council, which had yet to be established. His successor will have the same grounds to dissolve it.

Fourteen Years of Deals without Garsoor

Every election deal since 2012 has settled how leaders are chosen and left disputes involving the governments to the leaders themselves, without anything that would make them obey court rulings. When the Supreme Court ordered fresh elections for eight seats in 2017, the House kept the sitting members, citing the political agreement that had elected them. When the House extended the government’s term in 2021, rival forces fought in Mogadishu until it reversed itself a week later. The 2024 elections law gave the Court a role in election disputes, and Galmudug shows that role can work. The 2026 constitution sensibly made the Supreme Court the interim constitutional court, a step the 2012 text should also have taken, given that the Constitutional Court it called for was never built. That a Supreme Court whose chief justice the president has just removed by decree must still fill that gap fourteen years later shows how little federal governments have done.

With guns firing in Baidoa, Beledweyne and Mogadishu and the Supreme Court’s ruling rejected, the talks on offer are about the election and the disputed constitutional text, not about building the courts and the institutions that would make them independent. The President called a conference at Villa Somalia for 14 to 18 November. The Somali Future Council, which includes the leaders of Puntland and Jubaland, refused to attend and asked American, British, European and Turkish mediators to convene the talks instead, with guarantees that any agreement would be honored. When the conference failed to convene, the President offered to meet the Council at a venue of its choosing. Neither side has proposed building the courts that would judge their disputes. The Council invokes the Supreme Court’s ruling to deny that the President still holds office lawfully, but it cannot lean on the Court when the Court rules its way and leave building the courts off the negotiating table.

The opposition should answer a simple question: do its leaders want a Somalia they can rule, or one that thrives under laws that protect everyone, including those out of power? If the latter, they must make an independent judiciary a condition of the next agreement. They have watched a president remove the Chief Justice while a case against his government was pending, and winning the presidency will not protect them from the next president who does the same. Foreign mediators may secure the next agreement, but they will leave. Somalia needs courts that stay and bind whoever holds power. If the talks leave that task for another day, the next disputed result could send the parties back to their guns.

Ordinary Somalis pay for the missing court too. In 2025, more than 63,000 people in Mogadishu were evicted from land the government claims, and protests over evictions in Banadir rose from 8 to 78 in a single year. On 8 November, police enforcing a demolition in Daynile killed three protesters, and armed residents ambushed them in return. A family facing demolition needs a judge who can hear its case before the house comes down. Without that judge, the only way to stop a bulldozer is to stand in front of it. The missing court also keeps al-Shabaab in business. Where the state offers no judge, al-Shabaab offers its own courts. In 2022 the Interior Minister acknowledged that Somalis use them because the state’s judgments are not enforced. Every demolition without a hearing sends another family their way.

The Next Deal Must Build Garsoor

Kenya once faced Somalia’s choice and made the opposite decision. After the violence that followed its 2007 election, Kenya’s leaders did not stop at agreeing how the next vote would be held. Instead, they used the settlement to rebuild the courts. The 2010 Constitution reconstituted the Judicial Service Commission, gave the judiciary its own fund and required every serving judge and magistrate to be vetted. Then the courts faced the test Somalia’s have always failed. In 2017, the Supreme Court annulled a sitting president’s election. The judges came under fierce attack from the president’s camp, and the opposition boycotted the rerun, but the rerun was held. In 2022, Raila Odinga challenged a presidential result again, lost, and said he respected the decision while disagreeing with it. Over two elections, Kenyans learned that a court could rule against the president and be obeyed, and that losing in court cost less than fighting in the street.

South Africa faced the mistrust that paralyzes Somalia, and answered it with a court. As apartheid ended, the outgoing government and the ANC each feared the other would write the final constitution to suit itself. So they agreed on thirty-four principles in the 1993 interim constitution and seated a Constitutional Court to judge whether the final text honored them. When the Court refused to certify the first text, the assembly did not remove the judges or declare the ruling void. It rewrote the constitution. Somalia adopted its 2026 amendments with no Constitutional Court to review them, leaving the status of the Constitution itself in dispute. A challenge to how they were adopted ended on standing, so their validity remains untested. Iraq and Lebanon remind us of the other road: where the rules for appointing judges were left for later, their highest courts were stalled by the very politics they were meant to referee.

Why have Somalia’s leaders never put the courts on the table? In other countries, politicians who may lose office build courts to protect their chance to return. In Somalia, losing office has never meant losing the game. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud lost in 2017 and returned in 2022. Two other former presidents, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, have been invited to the coming talks. A leader who leaves Villa Somalia keeps his patronage, clan backing and connections, and these buy him a seat at the next round. A court that bound whoever held power would make that seat worth less. When Sharif Sheikh Ahmed did turn to a court this October, the government removed the Chief Justice the day before the ruling. If the leaders do not put the courts on the table themselves, those who pay for the courts’ absence must put them there: the families across Mogadishu, from Daynile and Kahda to Hodan and Wabari, whose homes came down without a hearing; the people of Baidoa, Beledweyne and Beled Hawo, whose towns federal forces have fought over; the bar, religious scholars, business and the partners who fund the state. They must keep pressing until leaving the courts out costs the leaders more than putting them in.

What Somalis should demand of the next deal is simple to state: a competent and independent judiciary that can decide disputes involving the federal and state governments, election disputes included, and see its rulings carried out. Independent means that no president can remove a judge by decree, pick the whole bench himself or cut the courts’ money to punish a ruling. It means that when the court rules against the government, the ruling is carried out: the electoral commission holds the rerun, Parliament leaves the disputed seat empty and the security forces protect the vote. Competent means judges who know the law, weigh evidence, give written reasons and decide on time, chosen in the open for their ability rather than by clan quota.

Somali leaders have promised such courts before. To make the judiciary independent, the 2012 Constitution required the Federal Parliament to establish an independent Judicial Service Commission, which was to appoint and discipline judges free of the executive, within 30 days of the formation of the Council of Ministers, and the Constitutional Court, which was to settle constitutional disputes, including those between the federal and state governments, within 60 days. Both deadlines passed during Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s first government, and nothing compelled anyone to act once they had. In 2018, federal and state justice ministers went further in the Jowhar agreement. They declared the judiciary independent of the executive and the legislature in both administration and budget, and agreed on a Constitutional Court and a judicial council to appoint and discipline judges. But they set no deadline and made every step wait until the agreement was written into a reviewed Constitution. Eight years later, the 2026 text captured the essence of the agreement, but much of the country disputes the text itself.

The next deal must thus avoid both mistakes. Unlike the 2012 deadlines, its timetable must not depend on the goodwill of those it binds. Unlike Jowhar, it must not wait on the constitutional dispute. Because the 2012 and 2026 texts provide for different bodies to select judges, the parties must agree on that body themselves rather than wait to learn which text prevails. And unlike both, delay must cost whoever holds power rather than reward him. How to achieve that is for the negotiators to settle, and there is no easy way to force it. Somalia has no authority above its leaders that can make them keep their word; if it had one, this essay would be unnecessary. But a deal that leaves enforcement to the incumbent’s goodwill will fail before it is signed. Until the Constitutional Court sits, every party must commit to obey the Supreme Court in its interim role.

None of this will be easy. Somalia must build these courts while guns are firing, while 4.5 and corruption still shape every appointment, and while the leaders who must agree have every reason not to. But the alternative is not a safer status quo. Each transition since 2012 has been more dangerous than the last, and the next breakdown will come in a country already fighting in several regions. Somalia has seen where that road ends. In 1990, disputes no institution could settle were left to clans and militias, and the state collapsed soon thereafter. Staying on the present course risks taking Somalia back there, or breaking the country apart for good.

In Merca in 1964, the Supreme Court gave an election official two days to correct his count, and he did. In Galmudug this year, the Court annulled the state’s elections, voters returned to the polls and the new result took effect. Both times, the side the Court ruled against complied. The coming talks should make that the rule even when the federal government is the one that loses. Before Somalia’s leaders settle who will host the talks and who will mediate them, they should settle what the talks are for: not only how the next vote will be held, but which court will hear disputes over it, how that court will be built and what each of them must do when it rules against them.

I am confident that many Somalis share the goal of a competent and independent judiciary, even if they would build these courts differently than I would. That is as it should be. What matters is the result: before the end of the next government’s term, Somalia must have courts that can settle disputes over federal power, elections included, and see their rulings obeyed. The leaders can choose the road. They cannot keep choosing no road at all.

Bashir M. Sheikh-Ali
Email:bsali@yahoo.com
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The author is a Somali-American lawyer based in Nairobi. The views expressed in this analysis are his own and do not reflect those of any organization with which he may be affiliated. He can be reached

 

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Sources

  • Haji N. A. Noor Muhammad, “Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the Somali Republic,” Journal of African Law 10(1), 1966, on the Merca case of 9 July 1964; and “The Rule of Law in Somalia,” Journal of the International Commission of Jurists V(2), 1964, on the Mogadishu council case of 7 March 1964.
  • Legislative Decree No. 3 of 12 June 1962, Organisation of the Judiciary, arts. 10(4) and 35, Bollettino Ufficiale della Repubblica Somala, Suppl. No. 6 to No. 6, 30 June 1962.
  • Somali official gazette, appointments to the Supreme Court of 1960, 1965 and 1968; Law No. 3 of 10 January 1970 establishing the National Security Court.
  • Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2012, arts. 109A–109C and 111A, and the timeframes for establishing the Judicial Service Commission and the Constitutional Court in art. 135(2).
  • Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia, 2026 (Law No. 51), arts. 131, 135, 138, 145 and 191.
  • Political Agreement on the Justice and Corrections Model of Somalia, Jowhar, 23–24 January 2018, sections 5, 8(1) and 10.
  • Caasimada Online, “Villa Somalia: Gudiga waxay ahaayeen caqabad,” 21 March 2015, quoting presidential legal adviser Cumar Maxamed Cabdulle on the dissolution of the Judicial Service Commission, https://www.caasimada.net/villa-somalia-guddiga-waxay-ahaayeen-caqabad/.

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