By Abdisaid M. Ali

The declaration issued in Kismayo was neither defiance nor a tactical feint. It was the predictable outcome of a political order in which Fthe channels of consent have been steadily stripped of meaning. Somalia’s federal system was conceived as a negotiated political settlement among political equals emerging from collapse. It is now treated as a procedural hurdle to be managed by executive will, rather than the constitutional basis of the state. When institutions can no longer mediate power, politics migrates outside them because there is no other arena left that can compel attention.

That contraction has accelerated under the second term of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The federal center has placed control ahead of consent and speed ahead of legitimacy. Decision making has been pulled inward through pressure, performance, and selective inclusion, rather than sustained political negotiations. Bodies intended to balance federal partners increasingly serve to endorse decisions already set in Mogadishu. Constitutional change has moved in fragments without the breadth of agreement a fragile republic requires. Electoral rules and timelines have shifted through leverage rather than consent. Personal authority has grown faster than the restraints that should discipline it.

Kismayo should be read through this lens. It was not a provocation but a warning from the edges of the federal system. Federalism remains intact in language while being emptied in practice. The National Consultative Council was meant to anchor politics in bargaining among equals. When it becomes a tool of compliance, its purpose is inverted. Declarations replace deliberation because deliberation no longer changes outcomes. As the center in Mogadishu disregards the agreed foundations of the federal bargain, Puntland has been pushed into a decisive moment, and the national framework itself is exposed to further fracture.

Centralization has brought Puntland to a decisive crossroads. For more than two decades it has governed with uncommon coherence in Somalia, sustaining security, administration, port commerce, and revenue. It has built practical authority and relative stability, but without firm constitutional protection. As power concentrates at the center without a settled constitutional balance, the space for such autonomous governance narrows. What was once managed through political negotiation now risks being overridden by decree, forcing Puntland to confront whether its authority will remain informal and vulnerable or be anchored in a durable political and legal settlement.

It has maintained internal security, administered territory, managed ports and trade, and mobilized revenue. This political authority is not ceremonial. It is exercised daily. Yet it remains constitutionally exposed. Puntland governs without firm assurance that its powers are protected against reversal, reinterpretation, or gradual encroachment by the center.

There is a harder truth that must be stated without euphemism. The current Puntland administration has shown neither the capacity nor the political will to confront the structural challenges now bearing down on Puntland and Somalia. They require serious method, careful sequencing, and institutional discipline.

Instead, governance has been reactive and personalized, driven by improvised fixes and fragmented authority, and oriented toward short term political survival rather than long term design. Serious statecraft begins by bringing power, revenue, security, and legitimacy into a coherent, rule bound system that can outlast any one leader. That work has not been done. The tools have not been built, and those that exist are not being used with consistency or purpose. This incapacity does not negate Puntland’s position. It heightens the risk of drift at precisely the moment when clarity and competence are most needed.

The question, then, is not capacity in the abstract. Puntland has demonstrated over time that it can govern. The question is whether its authority will remain de facto and reversible, dependent on bargaining and the shifting temper of Mogadishu, or whether it can be secured in a durable legal settlement that survives leadership change, external pressure, and regional volatility. The Mogadishu’s current course has sharpened the choice by compressing the space for consent while extending executive reach. The weakness of Puntland’s own leadership compounds it.

Three pathways are now visible, each constrained by Somalia’s latecomer conditions.

The first is to remain within the existing federal status quo. This reduces immediate confrontation and preserves access to external assistance. It allows governance to continue without formal rupture. But it codifies ambiguity. Powers over security, revenue, ports, and resources remain contested in principle even when exercised in fact. Each dispute becomes a transaction rather than the application of settled rules. Over time, institutions degrade not through sudden collapse but through fatigue. Authority that must be renegotiated without end steadily loses bargaining power, especially under weak leadership.

The second is a negotiated refounding of Somalia on confederal lines. Under such an arrangement, Puntland would retain firm control over taxation, customs, ports, security forces, and internal administration, while only a limited set of functions such as currency, treaties, and external representation would be shared. The difference is structural. Autonomy would be protected by constitutional design rather than temporary accommodation. Disputes would be managed through agreed mechanisms rather than political pressure. This path aligns Puntland’s de facto authority with legal recognition while preserving regional and international legitimacy. It is demanding. It requires unity within Puntland, technical seriousness, and disciplined negotiation with Mogadishu. It also requires leadership capable of sustained focus and institutional follow through, qualities currently in short supply.

The third is full secession and the pursuit of sovereign statehood. This promises clarity and total control, including distinct citizenship and foreign policy. It also opens multiple fronts at once. Secession would be resisted by the federal center, sharpen unresolved territorial questions, and meet regional reluctance to set precedent. Recognition would be slow and partial. External assistance would tighten. Internal cohesion would be tested under sustained fiscal and security pressure. Such projects are possible, but they are unforgiving. They demand exceptional unity, real revenue depth, and disciplined leadership once early momentum fades and the costs accumulate.

Measured against authority, legitimacy, durability, and cost, a confederal settlement remains the most viable course. The status quo offers short term room to maneuver, but it slowly bleeds leverage and leaves Puntland negotiating its rights case by case. Secession maximizes autonomy at a price that may exceed Puntland’s current margins of resilience. A serious confederal settlement strengthens control while limiting exposure, which is precisely what is required as centralization accelerates without consent. But it cannot be pursued rhetorically or episodically. It requires leadership able to think beyond the next crisis.

If Puntland is to pursue such a course, the way forward must be disciplined and sequential. Elite consensus must be consolidated so Puntland speaks with one voice across political, security, economic, and traditional institutions. A rigorous constitutional brief on confederal models should set out, with precision, the division of powers, revenue authority, command over security, and credible mechanisms for dispute resolution. A single negotiation team must be appointed and protected, with a clear mandate and the patience to hold the line. Key regional and international partners should be engaged early and quietly so Puntland’s case is understood as a stabilizing, lawful political settlement rather than a step toward rupture. Throughout, security cohesion and fiscal discipline must be protected, because control over force and revenue remains the material foundation of any credible political claim.

The deeper conclusion is this. Somalia’s crisis is not merely a contest of personalities. It is a contest over the terms on which authority is organized. In late forming states, power that outruns consent produces resistance, and resistance that outruns institutions produces fragmentation. Puntland cannot afford to drift between these outcomes. Its strategic task is to convert de facto authority into a rule based settlement that can survive hard seasons, not only friendly ones. That requires restraint, preparation, and leadership disciplined enough to trade momentary advantage for durable position. The choice is not only about Puntland’s status. It is about whether Somalia can still be held together by consent under law, or whether it will be held together by pressure until pressure fails.

Abdisaid M. Ali
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Abdisaid is the chairperson of Lomé Peace and Security Forum, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and Former National Security Advisor, Somalia. X account @4rukun. 
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