By Abdullahi A. Nor

Somalia’s Federal Government appears to have perfected a peculiar style of governance: make decisions first, confront the consequences later, and then accuse those who object of obstructing national progress. Its latest attempt to establish the National Revenue Authority without first securing an agreement with the Federal Member States is another example of a government that operates on political impulses rather than constitutional planning.

The controversy is not about the professional qualifications of Faysal Mohamed Hashi, whom the Federal Cabinet appointed Director-General of the National Revenue Authority. His experience in revenue administration may be substantial. The real question is why Mogadishu believes it can establish a national fiscal institution and appoint its leadership before agreeing with the Federal Member States on the very fiscal responsibilities the institution is expected to administer.

Jubaland has rightly challenged this approach, declaring that it was neither consulted nor involved in the process. Its Ministry of Finance and Economic Development has rejected the appointment, questioned the legality of the institutional arrangements and announced the suspension of financial cooperation with the Federal Government until an agreement is reached.

The dispute, reported by Somali media exposes a fundamental weakness in Mogadishu’s approach to federal governance: the persistent assumption that announcing a federal decision is equivalent to securing national agreement. It is not.

The Constitution Is Not a Government Recommendation

Somalia’s Provisional Federal Constitution is explicit about the principles governing the relationship between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. It does not give Mogadishu unlimited authority to determine the distribution of powers and resources simply because it occupies the federal capital.

Article 54 – Allocation of Powers – states that the allocation of powers and resources shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the Federal Government and the Federal Member States.

This provision is central to the present dispute. The Constitution identifies four areas reserved to the Federal Government: foreign affairs, national defence, citizenship and immigration, and monetary policy. Fiscal federalism is not among those exclusively reserved responsibilities.

The constitutional implication is clear: the allocation of fiscal responsibilities and resources must be negotiated rather than unilaterally determined. Even more directly, Article 122 – Principles of Public Finance – provides that public-finance principles shall be discussed between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States in accordance with the Constitution. This is not an optional political courtesy. It is a constitutional requirement. Read Articles 54 and 122 of Somalia’s Provisional Federal Constitution.

Mogadishu cannot reasonably claim to be strengthening national financial institutions while bypassing the constitutional process intended to establish agreement over their underlying responsibilities. The problem is not necessarily the creation of a National Revenue Authority. Somalia needs stronger revenue administration, better tax compliance and more effective public financial management. The problem is attempting to build the institution before resolving the federal financial arrangements within which it must operate. That is precisely what putting the cart before the horse means.

Article 50: Mogadishu Does Not Own Every Revenue Stream

Article 50 of the Constitution establishes the principles of federalism, including cooperation, equitable distribution of resources and the assignment of revenue-raising responsibilities to the level of government best placed to exercise them effectively. This principle directly challenges the assumption that all revenue administration should automatically be concentrated in Mogadishu.

A genuine federal system recognizes that different levels of government have constitutionally protected responsibilities. The objective should be to coordinate those responsibilities, eliminate duplication and establish predictable arrangements for sharing national resources.

A National Revenue Authority cannot legitimately become a vehicle for absorbing the fiscal responsibilities of the member states without an agreed constitutional and legislative framework. The Federal Government must explain which revenues fall under federal administration, which remain within the responsibilities of the member states, how overlapping revenue sources will be managed and how the resulting proceeds will be distributed.

These are fundamental questions. They should have been resolved before the appointment of the institution’s leadership. Read Article 50 – Principles of Federalism.

Article 51: Consultation Is Not Something Mogadishu Can Ignore

The Federal Government’s approach also raises questions under Article 51, which governs collaborative relationships between different levels of government. The provision requires governments to cooperate, respect one another’s constitutional responsibilities and share information about policies and activities affecting the authority of other levels of government.

It also provides for an annual conference of the executive heads of the Federal Government and Federal Member States to discuss and agree on national economic development, the promotion of national wealth and information-sharing.

What is the point of having such constitutional mechanisms if the Federal Government proceeds with major national financial arrangements without first establishing agreement with the governments expected to participate?

Mogadishu cannot invoke federalism when seeking political recognition and disregard it when negotiating the distribution of financial authority. Read Article 51 – Collaborative Relationships.

A Qualified Appointee Cannot Rescue a Flawed Process

The Federal Government may argue that Hashi is an experienced public-finance professional who has played an important role in modernising revenue administration. That may well be true. But professional competence and institutional legitimacy are two different things.

An individual can be exceptionally qualified and still be appointed through a politically flawed process. The quality of an appointment does not resolve the constitutional questions surrounding the institution itself.

The government appears to have concentrated on identifying who should lead the authority before determining what authority the institution should exercise, how it should relate to existing state revenue administrations and what agreements should govern its operations. This is administrative improvisation disguised as institutional reform.

A properly planned process would have begun with a meeting of federal and state finance ministers. They would have negotiated revenue assignments, collection responsibilities, administrative arrangements, revenue-sharing mechanisms and accountability safeguards. Once those matters were agreed, the necessary legislation and institutional appointments could have followed. Instead, the Federal Government appears to have chosen the reverse sequence.

Mogadishu Is Undermining Years of Fiscal Reform

The consequences extend beyond the immediate confrontation with Jubaland. Somalia’s fiscal federalism reforms have involved years of negotiations, technical work and financial support from international development partners, particularly the World Bank.

The World Bank’s Financial Governance Report on Somalia identifies the allocation of fiscal responsibilities and agreement between the federal and state governments as important elements of financial governance reform. The UN Capital Development Fund’s study of intergovernmental fiscal relations similarly highlights the importance of clarifying revenue assignments and establishing workable arrangements between the different levels of government.

These are not technical details that can be settled after an institution has been established. They are the foundation upon which the institution must operate. International partners cannot continue investing money, expertise and time in financial reforms only to see political leaders undermine the process through unilateral decisions.

The government should be explaining how its actions advance the agreed reform agenda, not why the member states should accept decisions made without them.

A Government That Reacts Instead of Governing

The National Revenue Authority controversy is part of a wider pattern of governance in which political announcements frequently precede consultation, institutional decisions precede legal consensus and confrontation follows almost inevitably.

A responsible federal government anticipates political and constitutional consequences before acting. It identifies stakeholders, negotiates competing interests and develops an implementation strategy that commands sufficient political support. Mogadishu too often appears to do the opposite.

It makes a decision, waits for objections and then attempts to defend its position through assertions of federal authority. When the member states resist, the disagreement becomes another political crisis. This is not how a federation is supposed to function.

The Federal Government must understand that federal authority is not synonymous with unlimited central authority. The member states are not provincial offices of the Ministry of Finance. They are constitutionally recognised components of the federal system, with responsibilities that cannot simply be absorbed through Cabinet resolutions.

If the administration genuinely believes in federalism, it must demonstrate that belief through consultation and respect for constitutional boundaries.

Jubaland’s Response Is a Warning, Not a Solution

Jubaland’s rejection of the appointment and suspension of financial cooperation represent a serious escalation. A prolonged breakdown in financial coordination could undermine revenue reforms, disrupt development programmes and further fragment an already fragile national financial system.

Jubaland must also recognise that suspending cooperation indefinitely is not a substitute for negotiating a national settlement. It should remain engaged in the process and press for a transparent agreement that protects the legitimate financial responsibilities of all member states.

But Mogadishu bears particular responsibility for initiating a constructive resolution. It should suspend any attempt to impose disputed operational arrangements, convene the federal and state finance ministers and negotiate a comprehensive fiscal framework.

The dispute should not be reduced to a contest between the political leadership in Mogadishu and the administration in Kismaayo. It concerns the constitutional future of every Federal Member State.

The Cart Cannot Lead the Horse

Somalia needs a National Revenue Authority capable of improving domestic revenue mobilisation, strengthening tax administration and reducing dependence on external assistance. But national institutions cannot be built by bypassing the constitutional agreements that give them legitimacy.

The Federal Government must stop confusing the power to make an appointment with the authority to determine the entire fiscal architecture of the federation. First agree on the fiscal responsibilities. Then agree on the institutional mandate. Then establish the authority and appoint its leadership. That is the logical, constitutional and professionally responsible sequence.

The present controversy demonstrates what happens when a government reverses that order. Instead of strengthening national institutions, it creates another confrontation with the member states and undermines confidence in the federal project.

Somalia has suffered enough from governments that announce ambitious reforms without doing the political and institutional groundwork necessary to implement them. The country does not need more unilateral announcements, Cabinet resolutions or politically convenient appointments. It needs a government capable of planning, negotiating and respecting the Constitution.

A federal government that cannot agree with its member states on who collects the country’s revenue, who controls it and how it is shared has no business pretending that it has established a functioning national fiscal system. Until Mogadishu learns that constitutional government begins with agreement rather than imposition, it will continue putting the cart before the horse — and calling the resulting confusion national reform.

Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com