By Abdullahi A. Nor

Somalia’s latest electoral controversy is beginning to expose something far more dangerous than a disagreement over dates, ballots or electoral procedures. It is raising a fundamental question about the future of federalism itself: is Somalia building a democratic federal system—or is Mogadishu gradually converting the Federal Member States into political extensions of Villa Somalia?

The question has become impossible to ignore. The National Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, despite its name, lacks genuine independence and is operating under the political influence of Villa Somalia. The Commission has now announced a new timetable for repeat elections in Galmudug and preparations for elections in Hirshabelle, citing a Supreme Court ruling issued on August 24, 2026.

But there is a striking contradiction at the center of the process. The same electoral system whose Galmudug results were annulled by the Supreme Court is now being asked to conduct another electoral exercise. That should not be treated as a technical footnote. It goes directly to the credibility of the entire process.

If the court found that the previous Galmudug elections violated Somalia’s constitutional and electoral framework, the obvious question is whether the underlying political problems have actually been fixed—or whether Mogadishu is simply pressing the reset button and preparing to repeat the same experiment.

Opposition politicians and critics of the Federal Government have repeatedly alleged that the Galmudug process was designed to produce a predetermined political outcome rather than provide a genuinely competitive contest. Their argument is blunt: if everyone already knows who is going to win before the first ballot is cast, what exactly is the purpose of the ballot?

That allegation cannot simply be dismissed as political rhetoric, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision to annul the previous electoral results. The deeper concern is that elections are increasingly being used not to resolve political disputes, but to institutionalize them.

A government can organize polling stations. It can print ballots. It can announce winners. It can install officials. But none of those actions automatically creates legitimacy. Legitimacy comes from political consent. And that is precisely what Somalia appears to be running out of.

The speed with which the political crisis has moved from elections to institutional confrontation should worry every Somali. Galmudug was already politically fragile. Now, after the Supreme Court annulled the disputed electoral process, the country is watching a new chapter unfold under the same broader electoral framework.

That creates the possibility of a dangerous cycle: contested election → disputed legitimacy → political confrontation → competing security forces → armed conflict.

Somalia has experienced variations of this pattern before. The South West crisis demonstrated how quickly a dispute over political legitimacy can become a confrontation involving armed forces, rival administrations and competing claims to authority. What begins as an argument over who won an election can eventually become a struggle over who controls a city.

There is no guarantee Galmudug will follow precisely the same path. But the ingredients for instability are already visible.

Federal Member States in Name Only?

Perhaps the most serious issue is the gradual erosion of the meaning of federalism. Somalia’s federal system was designed to distribute political authority between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States. In theory, regional governments should possess meaningful political legitimacy derived from their populations.

But critics increasingly argue that Villa Somalia has pursued a different model: supporting regional administrations that are politically dependent on the Federal Government and marginalizing leaders who challenge Mogadishu.

If that accusation is correct, then Somalia is not witnessing the strengthening of federalism. It is witnessing its hollowing out. A state can still have a president, parliament, cabinet and flag while lacking genuine political autonomy. That is the danger of federalism in name but centralization in practice.

The situation in Hirshabelle is particularly sensitive. The state already faces deep political and geographical fragmentation, with competing political centers of gravity around Jowhar, Middle Shabelle and Hiiraan.

If an electoral process is perceived as being imposed from Mogadishu rather than negotiated with local political stakeholders, the result may not be political stability. It could instead produce another disputed administration with insufficient popular legitimacy.

And once legitimacy collapses, governments increasingly turn to the only instrument they can still control: security forces. That is when an electoral dispute becomes a security crisis. Somalia has too many weapons and too few trusted institutions to gamble with such a scenario.

The Supreme Court Has Raised the Red Flag

The Supreme Court’s intervention in the Galmudug election should have triggered a national political conversation about electoral credibility. Instead, the immediate response appears to be another timetable. That risks reducing a constitutional crisis to an administrative exercise.

The fundamental question is not whether the commission can schedule another election. It is whether Somalia’s political class has agreed on the rules of the game. The country has not.

The Federal Government and opposition forces remain divided over the electoral system, the electoral commission and constitutional amendments. If those fundamental disagreements remain unresolved, pushing ahead with unilateral regional elections risks deepening rather than resolving the national crisis.

What Happens If the Ballot Produces Another Unpopular Government?

This is where the situation becomes particularly dangerous. Suppose an election is held. Suppose a winner is announced. Suppose the opposition rejects the result. Suppose significant sections of the population refuse to recognize the new administration. And suppose the Federal Government backs that administration with security forces.

At that point, the election has ceased to be a mechanism for peaceful political competition. It becomes the justification for competing claims of authority. That is the road to another Baidoa. And Somalia simply cannot afford another armed confrontation between forces claiming to defend competing versions of constitutional legitimacy.

The Federal Government should therefore resist the temptation to interpret administrative control as political legitimacy.

Mogadishu can appoint officials.
It can deploy security personnel.
It can recognize regional administrations.
But it cannot manufacture popular consent.
Nor can an electoral commission manufacture it with a ballot box.
The only durable solution is political agreement.

The ongoing negotiations between Villa Somalia and the opposition should produce a comprehensive national settlement covering the electoral system, the electoral commission, constitutional amendments and the relationship between the Federal Government and Federal Member States.

Only then should disputed regional elections proceed. If necessary, elections already conducted under a framework rejected by the principal political stakeholders should be reviewed and replaced by elections conducted under the new national agreement.

Somalia Is Running Out of Political Oxygen

The greatest mistake Somalia’s leaders could make now is to believe that another election automatically means another step toward democracy. It does not. A flawed election can be more destabilizing than no election at all. A credible election transfers power peacefully. A manipulated or widely disputed election can transfer nothing except resentment.

Somalia is already fighting Al-Shabaab, struggling to rebuild its security institutions and confronting an increasingly fragmented political landscape. It cannot simultaneously afford to manufacture new battlefields in Dhuusamareeb and Jowhar.

The country needs institutions that command respect—not institutions that merely possess legal titles. It needs Federal Member States that represent their people—not administrations whose survival depends upon the political favor of Mogadishu.

And it needs elections in which the outcome is determined by voters—not political negotiations conducted before voters ever enter the polling station. The Supreme Court has already delivered its warning on Galmudug.

The question now is whether Somalia’s political leadership will listen. Because if Villa Somalia continues to treat electoral disagreements as problems to be defeated rather than political differences to be negotiated, the next election may not determine who governs. It may determine where the next conflict begins.

Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com