By Bashir M. Sheikh Ali, J.D., Ph.D.

What began as a scheduled parliamentary session on the proposed amendments to Chapters 5 through 9 of the Provisional Constitution deteriorated into open disorder, with reports of shouting, papers torn, and even punches exchanged between executive officials and members of Parliament. The scenes reflected the gravity of what was before the Parliament rather than confusion about it. Among the chapters included in the amendment package, Chapter 9—judicial authority—carries particular institutional significance, because it determines how federal justice is exercised, where federal cases are heard, and which courts ultimately interpret federal law. Unlike provisions that regulate political offices or legislative procedure, Chapter 9 fixes the judicial architecture of the federal system itself.

The amended Chapter 9 addresses a structural problem that has existed since Somalia adopted federalism: how federal judicial power can operate nationwide in a country that lacks the capacity to sustain parallel federal and state court systems. The amendment responds by embedding an integrated court system into the constitutional framework.

Under the integrated structure created by Chapter 9, state courts perform dual functions across different levels of adjudication. State courts of first instance exercise both state and federal jurisdiction, hearing federal cases at trial alongside state matters. State supreme or high courts act as appellate courts for federal cases originating in those trial courts. State courts of appeal remain limited to non-federal matters. Federal cases proceed upward through this structure and reach the Federal Supreme Court only after federal appellate review at the state supreme court level.

The Federal Supreme Court functions strictly as an apex court for federal law. It does not adjudicate state constitutional questions. Where a state constitution or state law is alleged to violate the Federal Constitution, the dispute is referred to the Constitutional Court, which exercises constitutional review. This separation preserves constitutional supremacy while keeping ordinary federal adjudication distinct from constitutional litigation.

This integrated architecture reflects the logic articulated in the 2018 Jowhar Agreement, which framed judicial integration as a response to Somalia’s institutional constraints rather than as a redesign of federalism. The agreement recognized that state courts already operate nationwide and possess the geographic reach necessary to deliver federal justice in practice. Integration was therefore conceived as a method of assigning federal jurisdiction to existing state judicial institutions, rather than constructing a separate federal judiciary from the ground up.

As set out in 2025 analysis published by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies,[1] the integrated model rests on the assignment of federal jurisdiction to state trial courts, federal appellate review at the state supreme court level, an apex federal role for the Federal Supreme Court, and constitutional supremacy vested in the Constitutional Court. With the exception of Somaliland, Somalia’s existing Federal Member States (as represented by their respective ministries of justice) accepted in 2018 the principle of integration reflected in this framework, acknowledging that federal justice must function nationwide and that state courts are the only institutions capable of delivering that reach in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 9 translates this integrated structure into constitutional text. It does not create federal trial courts or federal courts of appeal. Instead, it assigns federal jurisdiction to state courts, defines the appellate pathway for federal cases through state supreme courts to the Federal Supreme Court, and separates constitutional review into the Constitutional Court. Federal justice is thus delivered through an integrated system rather than through a parallel federal court hierarchy.

Judicial integration requires corresponding judicial governance. The amended provisions therefore establish an integrated Judicial Service Council (JSC) whose composition mirrors the structure of the courts themselves. The JSC includes leadership from the Federal Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, State High Courts, federal and state prosecution services, the Capital, and the legal profession. This composition reflects the fact that state courts exercise federal jurisdiction and that judges across the system apply both state and federal law.

Under the amended Chapter 9, the chair of the JSC is not elected. The chairmanship attaches ex officio to the Chief Justice of the Federal Supreme Court, with the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court serving as deputy. The Council’s mandate extends across judicial appointments, discipline, administration, and regulatory oversight for all courts operating within the integrated framework. Anchoring the chairmanship in the Federal Supreme Court aligns governance with federal appellate coherence, while the breadth of membership reflects the integrated nature of the judiciary.

Read together with the allocation of jurisdiction and appellate pathways, the JSC completes the constitutional architecture of integration. Court structure determines where federal cases are heard. Appellate design determines how federal cases move upward. Judicial governance determines how judges are appointed, supervised, and disciplined across jurisdictions. These elements operate as a single system.

Taken as a whole, the amendments to Chapters 9 embed an integrated federal judiciary in both adjudication and governance. They define where federal cases are heard, how they are appealed, which courts exercise final authority over different categories of disputes, and how judges across the system are governed. Whatever view one takes of constitutionalizing this model, what the text creates is clear: a single, integrated architecture through which federal justice operates nationwide without constructing a separate federal court system that Somalia cannot sustain.

Seen in this light, the events in Parliament are best understood as the collision between permanent constitutional design and the environment in which it was debated. The parliamentary flashpoint was not caused by judicial architecture in isolation, but by placing a high-stakes, permanent institutional design question into a political environment no longer capable of rational constitutional debate.

Bashir M. Sheikh Ali, J.D., Ph.D.
Email: bsali@yahoo.com
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Notes and References

[1] The author is a Somali American lawyer based in Nairobi. The views expressed in this analysis are his own and do not reflect those of any organization with which he may be affiliated.
2] Rule-of-Law-and-Independent-Judiciary-in-Somalia.pdf