By Abdullahi A. Nor
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has called on Somalia to move beyond personality-driven politics and establish stronger institutions capable of clearly defining who makes national decisions, how those decisions are reached, and which institutions are accountable for implementing them. It is a message that sounds difficult to dispute.
Yet coming from a presidency facing persistent accusations of constitutional overreach, political engineering and the concentration of power, it also raises an uncomfortable question: is the President describing the Somalia he wants—or the Somalia his critics say his government is helping to create?
Speaking at an event focused on education, national institution-building and the development of Somalia’s human capital, Hassan Sheikh argued that the country cannot achieve sustainable progress while political decision-making remains dominated by individuals and political groups. He urged Somalis to “wake up” and build a political system capable of replacing personality-based politics with institutions governed by clearly defined rules.
The President’s argument is that Somalia’s economic and social progress—from expanding commerce to improvements in education and public services—will remain limited unless the country’s political system becomes stable, predictable and institutionally grounded. The argument lands in a deeply polarized political environment.
The president’s remarks are seen as nothing more than a performative political rhetoric and empty lip service—an approach to governance that the President has increasingly become accustomed to.
The Contradiction at the Center of Somalia’s Crisis
Opposition leaders have spent months making almost the opposite argument: that the central problem is not the absence of institutions, but the use of state institutions by the presidency to advance a political agenda.
They accuse Hassan Sheikh’s administration of attempting to shape the electoral environment in its own favor, influencing the political leadership of Federal Member States, and pursuing constitutional and electoral changes without the broad consensus they believe Somalia’s federal system requires.
These remain political realities, and the government rejects such characterizations. Nevertheless, they expose a striking contradiction at the heart of Somalia’s current crisis. The President says Somalia needs institutions strong enough to prevent individuals from determining the country’s political destiny.
His opponents respond that the presidency itself has become too powerful, corrupt and that political institutions are increasingly being used to serve the interests of the incumbent administration.
That dispute is particularly significant because Somalia’s political negotiations have remained stalled despite months of engagement between the Federal Government and opposition groups, with international actors attempting to broker an agreement over elections, constitutional arrangements and the country’s political future.
While those negotiations continue, political developments in several Federal Member States, SWS, Galmudug, Hirshabeele, have proceeded rapidly, intensifying opposition suspicions that the government is attempting to reshape the political landscape before a national agreement is reached.
An Election Designed by Those in Power?
One of the most contentious accusations facing the administration concerns the electoral process. Opposition leaders argue that the Federal Government’s preferred model risks allowing the incumbent political establishment to influence the rules, institutions and conditions under which the next election will take place.
They have repeatedly called for an electoral framework negotiated among the Federal Government, opposition, Federal Member States and other stakeholders rather than one effectively designed by the government itself.
The administration maintains that direct elections and stronger political institutions are essential to ending Somalia’s long dependence on indirect, clan-based political arrangements. The disagreement is therefore not simply about whether Somalia should hold elections.
It is about who writes the rules, who controls the institutions administering the process, and whether the political playing field can be considered genuinely neutral. That is the question that continues to haunt Somalia’s political transition.
Public Land and the Politics of Accountability
The debate also extends beyond elections. Opposition figures and civil society activists have accused this administration in Mogadishu of failing to adequately protect public land and have raised allegations concerning the transfer or sale of valuable government property to politically connected individuals and businesses.
Some activists have made particularly disturbing claims involving the encroachment or redevelopment of burial grounds.
Such fact requires no investigation or documentary evidence because the eviction of poor people and sale produced nearly living witnesses of 750,000 IDPs, is an established fact. But their persistence reflects a much broader concern over public assets, transparency and accountability in a country where state institutions remain fragile.
For critics, the issue is straightforward: a government cannot credibly preach institutional accountability while citizens remain uncertain about how public assets are being allocated and who benefits from them.
The specter of kleptocracy, nepotism and the president’s legacy
The administration has also faced accusations of nepotism and patronage, with opponents arguing that political appointments and access to state resources have at all times favored individuals with close political, familial or clan connections.
Again, the government rejects such accusations. But the broader principle raised by these allegations is important. Strong institutions are not measured by how frequently leaders speak about them. They are measured by whether public appointments, procurement, public land administration, financial management and political decision-making can withstand independent scrutiny.
That is where Somalia’s institutional transformation remains unfinished. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud occupies a unique place in Somalia’s political history: he is the first Somali president to return to the presidency after previously serving as head of state.
That alone will form an important part of his historical legacy. But history will judge more than the fact that he became the first president elected to two non-consecutive terms. It will also judge what happened to Somalia’s institutions during his tenure.
Was the presidency used to strengthen federal institutions or to consolidate political influence?
Did constitutional reform produce broader national consensus or deepen political division?
Did electoral reform create genuine democratic competition or merely change the mechanism through which political power is distributed? And perhaps most importantly, did Somalia emerge from his presidency with stronger institutions than those he inherited?
Those questions are enough to make him the worst president ever in Somalia’s political history.
Security, Education and the State
Hassan Sheikh also linked political stability to national security and education. Using the metaphor of a farmer preparing the soil before planting, he described security as the foundation upon which education, economic development, dignity and national prosperity must be built.
He argued that Somalia’s greatest resource is not oil, minerals, buildings or military hardware but its people and the knowledge they possess. His reference to Japan was intended to illustrate the transformative power of investment in education, research and human capital.
That message is difficult to challenge. Somalia desperately needs better schools, universities, skilled professionals, productive businesses and institutions capable of turning knowledge into economic opportunity. But education and security cannot flourish independently of political legitimacy.
A university requires predictable institutions. Businesses require enforceable laws. Investors require confidence that contracts and property rights will be respected. Citizens require confidence that government power is constrained by law.
President Hassan sold the grounds of the Somali National University including the labs, nursing school among other faculties the medical faculty grounds. In other words, the institutional system the President says Somalia needs is precisely the system his critics argue must first be protected from political interference.
A Presidency at a Crossroads
The most consequential question facing Hassan Sheikh may therefore be whether his government can reconcile its rhetoric about institutional governance with the political reality confronting the country.
Somalia does need to move beyond personality politics. It does need stronger institutions. It does need a predictable constitutional order. It does need transparent elections, accountable government, secure public assets and an independent judiciary. But those principles cannot apply only to political opponents.
They must apply equally to the government in power. If Hassan Sheikh succeeds in leaving behind stronger institutions, a credible constitutional settlement and an electoral system trusted by competing political forces, his second presidency could ultimately be remembered as a period of institutional transformation.
If, however, political polarization deepens, constitutional disputes remain unresolved, federal relations deteriorate and patronage, corruption and political manipulation continue to dominate public discourse, history may record a very different legacy.
The President says Somalia must become a country governed by institutions rather than individuals. That is precisely the standard by which his own presidency should now be measured.
The ultimate test is not what the President says about the rule of law. It is whether Somalia’s institutions are strong enough to constrain the President himself.
Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com