Asmara (WDN) — Eritrea has accused the United Arab Emirates of pursuing what it described as “port colonialism” in Africa, warning that Abu Dhabi’s expanding commercial, political and military footprint along the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and East Africa deserves far greater scrutiny.

Eritrea’s Foreign Minister Osman Saleh said the UAE’s growing presence in regional ports should not be viewed simply as a commercial enterprise. He argued that African governments should examine the broader strategic consequences of allowing a foreign power to establish long-term influence over critical maritime infrastructure.

The criticism comes as UAE-linked companies, particularly DP World and AD Ports Group, have expanded their involvement in ports across Africa and the wider Red Sea region. Their interests include Berbera in Somaliland, Bosaso in Puntland, as well as port projects in countries including Egypt and Tanzania.

For Eritrea, the concern is that commercial port investments can eventually create political and military leverage.

From Ports to Power

The UAE’s regional strategy illustrates how ports have become instruments of geopolitical influence. Control, management or long-term investment in strategically located ports can provide far more than commercial revenue. It can create logistical access, political relationships and influence over maritime trade routes that connect the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.

That is why Eritrea has rejected proposals for a permanent UAE military presence on the Dahlak Islands. Abu Dhabi previously maintained a military facility at Assab, which it used during its involvement in the Yemen war.

Asmara now says it does not want Eritrean territory or ports transformed into permanent foreign military platforms. The distinction between commercial investment and strategic influence has consequently become increasingly difficult to ignore.

The UAE’s Troubled Regional Record

The Eritrean warning also opens a much broader debate about the UAE’s role in conflict zones across the region and Africa. Critics of Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy point to its involvement, directly or indirectly, in conflicts and political struggles in Yemen, Libya and Sudan, among other theaters. They argue that UAE-backed actors and military relationships have frequently intensified existing rivalries rather than producing durable political settlements.

The consequences have been particularly devastating in countries already suffering from institutional collapse and armed conflict. In Yemen, the UAE became a major participant in the Saudi-led military intervention and supported local forces pursuing their own political and territorial agendas.

In Libya, Abu Dhabi has been accused of providing military and political backing to forces opposed to the internationally recognized authorities, contributing to the country’s complex fragmentation. In Sudan, the UAE has faced persistent allegations of supporting the Rapid Support Forces, accusations Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied. The devastating war that erupted in 2023 has nevertheless transformed Sudan into one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

These cases do not prove that the UAE alone caused the conflicts. Local political failures, rival regional powers, armed groups and international actors have all played significant roles. But they raise a legitimate question about Abu Dhabi’s model of foreign engagement:

Does the UAE’s pursuit of strategic influence help stabilize fragile states—or does it deepen conflicts by empowering selected local actors?

Eritrea Watches Ethiopia and Somalia

Asmara is particularly concerned about the UAE’s growing relationship with Ethiopia, especially as Addis Ababa seeks reliable access to the sea. Eritrea also views with suspicion the strengthening relationship between Israel and Somaliland.

From Asmara’s perspective, the convergence of UAE, Ethiopian, Israeli and Somaliland interests around ports and maritime access could fundamentally alter the strategic balance along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The concern is not simply who owns or manages a port. It is who ultimately gains strategic influence over the surrounding territory, maritime routes and security arrangements.

The Red Sea and Horn of Africa are rapidly becoming a major arena of international competition. The UAE is only one of several external powers seeking influence. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Israel, the United States, China and European states all have strategic interests in the region.

Ports have consequently become much more than infrastructure projects. They are increasingly linked to military logistics, energy security, trade routes, fisheries, investment and geopolitical influence. This makes Eritrea’s warning particularly significant.

Asmara is effectively arguing that African countries should not judge foreign port investments solely by the promised economic benefits. They should also examine what political and strategic obligations may accompany those investments over the long term.

The Cost of Foreign Intervention

The wider lesson from Sudan, Libya and Yemen is that foreign intervention can produce consequences far beyond the original strategic objective. When external powers support competing local factions, provide weapons or establish security partnerships, they can unintentionally—or deliberately—reshape domestic power balances in ways that make political compromise more difficult.

The result can be prolonged conflict, fragmented authority and weakened national institutions. This is where the strongest criticism of the UAE emerges.

Abu Dhabi has become exceptionally skilled at converting commercial relationships into strategic influence. The question is whether that influence ultimately produces stability—or simply gives the UAE greater leverage over countries already struggling to govern themselves.

Africa Must Ask Harder Questions

Eritrea’s accusation of “port colonialism” should therefore not be dismissed as simply another regional political dispute.

African governments have every right to attract foreign investment and develop their ports. But they also have a responsibility to ensure that strategic infrastructure remains subject to transparent agreements, national oversight and clearly defined security arrangements.

Port investments should not quietly evolve into permanent military footholds. Commercial partnerships should not become mechanisms for political dependency. And foreign security assistance should not empower armed actors at the expense of national institutions and peaceful political settlements.

The UAE’s expanding footprint across the Red Sea and Africa is a reality. Whether it ultimately contributes to stability or deepens regional fragmentation will depend on how Abu Dhabi uses its growing influence—and how firmly African states insist on transparency and accountability.

The real issue is no longer whether the UAE is investing in Africa. It is what Africa is becoming in return: a partner in mutually beneficial development, or a collection of strategic assets in someone else’s geopolitical competition.

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