By Abdikarim H. Abdi Buh

The killing of Abdulghani al-Kikli, widely known as Ghaniwa, a powerful militia commander in Tripoli, has plunged Libya’s capital into violent unrest and raised serious questions about the future of the country’s fragile political order. Eyewitnesses and local sources confirm that armed clashes erupted late Monday in several parts of Tripoli following reports of his assassination, which remain unconfirmed by the Government of National Unity (GNU).

Gunfire and explosions were heard across Abu Salim and other districts, prompting fears of a renewed militia war in the capital. The United Nations has urged calm and called for immediate de-escalation to prevent a broader conflict.

But behind the gunfire lies a deeper power struggle—one that could redefine who controls western Libya.

From Revolutionary Fighter to Power Broker: Who Was Ghaniwa?

Abdulghani al-Kikli, or Ghaniwa, was more than a militia leader—he was a pillar of Tripoli’s post-Gaddafi militia power structure. A native of the working-class Abu Salim district, he emerged in 2011 as a revolutionary fighter and quickly rose through the ranks of local armed groups.

He founded the Abu Salim Central Security Force, which later evolved into the Support Force Apparatus (SSA)—one of the capital’s most formidable militias. Known for a blend of pragmatism and ruthlessness, al-Kikli maintained a firm grip over his stronghold and was both feared and relied upon to maintain a semblance of order in a capital fractured by competing loyalties.

Though his group operated under the Presidential Council of the GNU, it functioned with relative autonomy, overseeing security, detentions, and intelligence gathering far beyond the scope of government oversight.

“He was the law in Abu Salim,” said a resident who asked not to be named. “Everyone knew not to cross him—but if you stayed in line, there was stability.”

Al-Kikli was also accused by human rights groups of overseeing arbitrary arrests, secret detentions, and torture—a legacy that contributed to both his influence and infamy.

Timeline: How Tripoli Reached the Boiling Point

To understand the gravity of al-Kikli’s killing, one must trace the chain of events that made him indispensable—and increasingly vulnerable:

• 2011 – The Fall of Gaddafi: Libya collapses into factionalism after the revolution. Armed brigades take over major cities.
• 2012–2015 – Militia Rule in Tripoli: Ghaniwa emerges as a powerful commander. His forces control much of Abu Salim.
• 2016–2018 – Consolidation of Power: SSA expands its territory and influence. Ghaniwa becomes a key figure in Tripoli’s security cartel.
• 2020 – UN-Brokered Ceasefire: A roadmap for peace is introduced, setting the stage for a new transitional government.
• March 2021 – GNU Formed: Abdul Hamid Dbeibah is appointed Prime Minister. SSA is integrated under the Presidential Council but retains its autonomy.
• 2022–2023 – Factional Tensions Escalate: Clashes erupt between SSA and rival militias, especially groups linked to Misrata.
• Late 2023 – Violence Intensifies: Intermittent skirmishes in Tripoli signal growing instability as rival groups seek to challenge Ghaniwa’s dominance.
• May 2025 – Al-Kikli Reportedly Killed: Gunfire and shelling spread in response to reports of his death. No official statement is issued, but Tripoli descends into chaos.

A Vacuum of Power—and a Race to Fill It

The implications of al-Kikli’s death are both immediate and long-term. SSA loyalists have already mobilized in retaliation, reportedly clashing with rival factions in Abu Salim, Salah al-Din, and along the Airport Road. Yet the broader concern is who—or what—will replace Ghaniwa’s authority in a city historically ruled by militias, not institutions.

Observers note that rival factions from Misrata, many with strong links to the GNU’s Interior Ministry, may attempt to fill the void. Misrata’s militias are disciplined, well-funded, and have long eyed greater influence in the capital.

“This is a dangerous moment,” said a regional analyst. “The removal of a powerful figure like Ghaniwa could unleash new turf wars unless there’s quick and coordinated political action.”

A Test for the GNU—and for the UN

The Dbeibah-led GNU, which was already losing legitimacy due to delayed elections and reliance on armed groups, now faces a defining challenge. Can it reassert control, or will Tripoli descend into militia-led fragmentation once again?

The United Nations, which backed the formation of the GNU under the 2020 ceasefire roadmap, is calling for calm—but critics argue its strategy of political appeasement toward militias like SSA has backfired.

Al-Kikli’s death might provide a narrow window of opportunity to reform the security sector and assert civilian control over armed groups. But doing so will require extraordinary coordination and political will—both of which have been in short supply.

 A Capital at the Crossroads

As the smoke clears in Tripoli, one thing is clear: Abdulghani al-Kikli’s death marks the end of an era. Whether it becomes a turning point toward reform or the beginning of another bloody chapter in Libya’s long crisis will depend on what leaders in Tripoli—and their backers abroad—do next.

For now, the people of Tripoli are bracing for more nights of uncertainty.

Abdikarim Haji Abdi Buh 
Email: abdikarimbuh@yahoo.com