By Djama Mahamoud Ali

Introduction

More than three decades after the collapse of the Somali state that plunged the nation into a devastating civil war, the spectre of 1991 has returned to haunt the country. The recent events in Baidoa, combined with the actions of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the troubling rhetoric of his supporters, have produced a political climate alarmingly reminiscent of the days preceding the state’s total disintegration. Those dark days, which Somalis had hoped were consigned to history and gradually forgotten, now appear to have returned with renewed ferocity.

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose term of office has expired and who now rules the country through constitutional amendments passed unilaterally for his own benefit, is leading Somalia into further chaos and destruction. The Baidoa crisis, the deterioration of Somali foreign policy, the president’s unprecedented solo conduct of international affairs, and the emerging military confrontation in Galmudug, reveals that Somalia is reliving the very patterns of political collapse that produced the 1991 catastrophe.

The Echoes of 1991 in Baidoa

The year 1991 remains a defining and tragic chapter in Somali history, marked by chaos, violence, and profound suffering that claimed countless lives and displaced millions. The predatory centralism of the military regime years concentrated state power in Mogadishu and produced the collapse of 1991, followed by a decade of catastrophe that permanently scarred the national consciousness. Federalism was subsequently adopted as the answer to that history, a mechanism to give regions enough autonomy so that joining the national framework would not mean surrendering themselves to a Mogadishu that had already demonstrated what it could do with unchecked authority.

The events unfolding in Baidoa today is reminiscent of what happened in 1991, and directly threatens this foundational compromise of Federalism. In April 2026, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Baidoa alongside a high-level delegation after he forcibly ousted the South West State president Abdiaziz Laftagareen. Federal forces assumed control of Baidoa’s administrative center, and the Federal Government appointed a transitional regional leadership, an act against the State and Federal Constitutions.  Both the politicians in the opposition and state leaders immediately condemned as an intervention that undermines Somalia’s federal system. Critics argue that the mistrust born of the civil war, which morphed into a patronage state, has been sharpened in Baidoa into something more concrete, less reversible, and unlikely to yield to dialogue or any reassurance based on constitutional language.

This is not merely a localized political dispute. Baidoa crisis risks reproducing precisely the conditions of 1991, with reports of troop mobilization toward the city suggesting an imminent confrontation that could divert significant federal resources away from ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. The federal government’s reliance on military force rather than political consensus to resolve regional disputes mirrors the very centralizing impulses that triggered the original collapse of the country 1991.

Compounding this crisis is the troubling rhetoric emanating from the president’s inner circle and supporters. Their language bears an ominous resemblance to the divisive, exclusionary discourse of the early 1990s, which framed political opponents not as legitimate stakeholders but as existential threats to be neutralized. This rhetorical escalation, combined with federal military deployments into regional capitals, creates a political tinderbox where dialogue is replaced by coercion and federalism becomes a hollow shell.

A Government of One Man: The Personalization of Somali Leadership

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has transformed Somalia’s governance into “one-man show.” The president alone participates in nearly every international meeting, including workshops where presidential attendance is neither necessary nor appropriate. He has spent more time outside the country than inside it, jetting between capitals around the world for engagements both official and unofficial.

Official records reveal an extensive and arguably excessive pattern of international travel. While strategic international engagement is necessary for any head of state, this pattern of prolonged and frequent absences raises legitimate concerns about executive attention being diverted from urgent domestic governance challenges.

More significantly, the president has been accused of sidelining institutional processes entirely. Opposition leader Abdirahman Abdishakur has asserted that “the country is not being governed by the rule of law, but by the will of one man,” adding that “the president is running state affairs single-handedly, sidelining his own cabinet and undermining institutional processes”. The Somali Salvation Forum, a coalition of opposition groups led by former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, has accused President Mohamud of undermining national unity and the agreed-upon state-building process, describing his actions as indicators of increasing political isolation and alleged attempts to consolidate power.

This personalized approach to governance replicates the centralizing pathologies that characterized the Siad Barre era, a time when state power was concentrated in Mogadishu and used against those outside the ruling circle’s orbit. The lesson of 1991, painfully learned after a decade of catastrophic violence, was that such centralization inevitably leads to fragmentation and collapse. Yet President Mohamud appears determined to ignore this lesson.

The Collapse of Somali Foreign Policy

Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Somali foreign policy has reached its lowest point in decades. The most dramatic manifestation of this failure came in late 2025, when Israel officially announced its recognition of Somaliland, the self-declared independent region in northern Somalia that has asserted its sovereignty since 1991 but remained largely unrecognized by the international community. This marks the first time that any Somali region has received formal recognition from a foreign country, a devastating diplomatic blow to Somalia’s territorial integrity.

While a coalition of 21 Arab, Islamic, and African states subsequently condemned Israel’s move, the damage to Somalia’s diplomatic standing is undeniable. The recognition occurred despite the president’s extensive international travels and personal engagement with foreign leaders. If anything, the president’s constant presence on the global stage should have strengthened Somalia’s ability to deter such moves, that it manifestly failed to do so constitutes a profound indictment of his foreign policy approach.

The crisis extends beyond Somaliland recognition. president of Somalia enters the same agreement with politically opposing countries, a move that undermines the credibility of the country’s foreign policy. When Mogadishu signs deal with states that hold conflicting interests and opposing geopolitical alignments, it creates the impression that Somalia’s positions are transactional rather than principled. Foreign partners begin to question which commitments are reliable, and whether agreements signed today will still hold tomorrow if a different ally offers better terms. This inconsistency makes diplomatic engagement harder because trust is built on predictable, consistent policy. Instead, Somalia risks being seen as a state that can be courted by any side without regard for long-term strategy.

The practical effect is that Somalia loses leverage in negotiations and weakens its voice on issues that matter directly to its security and economy. Countries watching the president balance competing deals are less likely to invest in large infrastructure, defense cooperation, or debt relief programs, since they cannot be sure Somalia will honor its side of the bargain when pressured by the other party. Domestically, it also erodes public confidence in the government’s ability to defend national interests. A foreign policy that shifts between opposing blocs without a clear doctrine ends up serving short-term gains while damaging the country’s long-term credibility and ability to build lasting alliances.

Analysts have noted troubling shifts in international attitudes toward the Somali question, with increasing interest in Somaliland at the expense of Somalia. President Mohamud’s government has sensed these changes but appears unable to reverse them. The contrast with Somalia’s previous foreign policy achievements, including successful advocacy against unilateral recognition of Somaliland for over three decades, could not be starker.

Constitutional Manipulation and Term Expiry

Perhaps the most direct threat to Somalia’s fragile political order is President Mohamud’s manipulation of the constitutional process to extend his stay in power. In March 2026, the President masterminded constitutional changes that could extend his term in office by a year and push back planned election. These developments contradict the president’s earlier public assurances. In September 2025, in an interview with the BBC Somali Service, Mohamud explicitly ruled out extending his term, stating: “No individual politician has veto power” and “I accept only what the law allows”. Yet within six months, his parliament had passed amendments enabling precisely what he had publicly disavowed.

The constitutional reforms were rushed and not inclusive. Puntland and Jubaland, two crucial federal member states, insisted that the process did not follow the proper path. The rushed passage of constitutional amendments in March 2024, widely perceived as a move to concentrate power in the presidency, was enacted without national consensus and swiftly rejected by the Federal Member States and all opposition members. Puntland responded with an unprecedented declaration of administrative independence, a seismic moment that fractured the foundation of Somalia’s federal system.

The Somali Salvation Forum has announced plans to sue the president’s administration in Somali courts and international jurisdictions, accusing Mohamud of corruption, human rights abuses, and unconstitutional amendments that expanded presidential powers. The Forum warned that Somalia faces a “sensitive political and constitutional crisis” that threatens state-building and the fight against al-Shabab.

One opposition member of parliament captured the gravity of the situation succinctly: “President Mohamud made changes to a constitution that was built on national consensus. He did so without agreement, and ironically, even failed to adhere to the new provisions he introduced”. This pattern of unilateral constitutional revision, combined with expired term limits and the absence of a credible electoral framework, places Somalia squarely on the path toward authoritarian centralism, the same path that led to the catastrophe of 1991.

The Galmudud Confrontation: A Crisis Replicated

What has been witnessed in Baidoa is now being replicated in Galmudug. Reports indicate that the federal government is mobilizing military forces toward Galmudug in a bid to oust President Ahmed Qoorqoor, mirroring the manner in which Laftagareen was deposed in South West State. Armed conflict is on the brink in Galmudug, with tensions escalating daily.

The Somali Salvation Forum of the opposition has previously highlighted concerns about the expired mandates of Galmudug, Hirshabelle, and South West state administrations, warning that extensions and alignment with the president’s party could destabilize the already fragile federal structure. Their concerns are well-founded. President Mohamud’s ambitious drive to centralize authority has collided with the entrenched realities of Somalia’s decentralized political landscape, forcing a retreat to foreign-mediated dialogue, a public acknowledgment that unilateral governance has failed across the board.

The consequences of this confrontation extend beyond the immediate political crisis. When federal and regional forces become preoccupied with fighting each other, counterinsurgency pressure against al-Shabaab diminishes. Intelligence-sharing breaks down, operational coordination falters, and local communities caught between competing authorities may accommodate insurgent actors as a survival strategy. At a time when Somalia can least afford a diversion of resources from the fight against terrorism, political infighting threatens to undo the hard-won gains of recent years.

The International Community’s Responsibility

The trajectory of Somalia’s current political crisis demands urgent international intervention. The international community, which has invested billions of dollars and decades of diplomatic capital in Somalia’s state-building project, cannot afford to stand idly by as the country slides toward renewed civil conflict.

The theory underpinning international support for Somali federalism was explicit: the federal government would use “rule by law” as its instrument to build order rather than entrench personal power. President Mohamud has violated this core requirement. His unilateral constitutional amendments, his personalization of governance, his military interventions in regional states, and his refusal to accept term limits have all undermined the very conditions upon which international support was premised.

The international community possesses significant leverage that it has, to date, been reluctant to exercise. This leverage includes financial aid, security cooperation, diplomatic recognition, and the influence of multilateral institutions such as the African Union and the United Nations. It is imperative that the international community use this power to oblige President Mohamud to return to the negotiating table and bring about a solution acceptable to all stakeholders, principally the opposition and the federal member states.

The kind of election the president seeks to conduct is a tailored one, where the winner is already chosen, precisely the kind of election he conducted in Baidoa. The international community must reject any electoral framework that does not include genuine participation of all federal member states, independent oversight, and transparent processes. Moreover, it must make clear that acceptance of constitutional term limits and respect for federal autonomy are non-negotiable prerequisites for continued support.

Conclusion

Somalia has been slowly recovering from the worst civil war in its modern history. Under the current regime of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, whose term of office has expired and who now rules the country using a constitution he has unilaterally amended to his favor, that recovery is being reversed. The dark days of 1991, which Somalis had hoped were consigned to history, have returned in the form of federal military interventions in regional capitals, constitutional manipulation, personalized governance, and the collapse of foreign policy.

The events in Baidoa represent more than just another crisis that the federal project can absorb, they may well be the blow that finishes it. Unless the international community intervenes urgently and decisively, using its power and leverage to compel the president to return to dialogue and produce a solution acceptable to the opposition and federal member states, Somalia risks descending once again into the chaos and destruction from which it has spent three decades trying to emerge. The lessons of 1991 are clear: centralizing power in Mogadishu without regional consensus leads inevitably to collapse. It is a lesson that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the international community can no longer afford to ignore.

Djama Mahamoud Ali
Email: djama_m@yahoo.om