By Abdullahi A. Nor
In many countries, constitutional amendments are routine political exercises. In fragile states, they can be existential gambles. The current debate in Somalia over constitutional change—particularly proposals that could shift the system from parliamentary to presidential rule—has begun to draw comparisons with developments in Zimbabwe, where the government is advancing amendments that could extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s time in power.
The comparison is not exact. But it is revealing. Because while Zimbabwe is grappling with the risks of democratic backsliding, Somalia is confronting the far more dangerous possibility of state fracture.
Zimbabwe: Power Consolidation in a Functioning State
In Zimbabwe, proposed constitutional amendments would extend presidential terms from five to seven years, potentially allowing President Mnangagwa to remain in office until 2030. Additional proposals would allow the president to be elected by parliament rather than through a direct popular vote, and would expand presidential appointments to the Senate, further strengthening executive influence over the political system.
The government presents these changes as necessary to ensure stability and continuity of development programs. Opposition leaders argue they are designed to entrench power and weaken democratic accountability.
Zimbabwe’s political landscape is contentious, but it remains a functioning centralized state. The government controls its borders, commands a national army capable of maintaining territorial authority, and finances most of its operations domestically. Its institutions, while contested, operate within a sovereign framework that is not dependent on foreign troops or external financing to the same degree as Somalia.
This distinction is critical.
Somalia: A State Still Struggling to Stand
Somalia’s political reality is far more precarious. Large parts of the hinterland remain under the influence or control of Al-Shabaab insurgents. The federal government’s effective authority is limited, and even routine movement of senior officials outside major urban centers often requires extensive security arrangements.
In many areas, the writ of the federal government simply does not run.
Security in Somalia continues to depend heavily on international support. The African Union stabilization mission and American air support remain central pillars of the country’s counter-insurgency strategy. Without these external forces, many observers believe the security balance could deteriorate rapidly.
Financial realities are equally stark. Between 70 and 80 percent of the federal government’s budget is financed by the international community. Salaries, military logistics, and even basic administrative functions rely heavily on donor funding. This level of dependence is unusual even among fragile states and reflects the extraordinary circumstances Somalia continues to face.
Somalia also remains under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, a designation applied in situations where international peace and security are considered at risk. This status underscores the reality that Somalia’s sovereignty, while formally restored, is still supported by international mandates, sanctions regimes, and externally backed security arrangements.
In effect, Somalia is not merely reforming a constitution; it is still completing the construction of the state itself.
The Mandate That Was Given
When Somalia adopted its Provisional Federal Constitution, it was understood to be an interim framework. Eleven key articles—dealing with fundamental issues such as power sharing, resource distribution, judicial authority, and the structure of government—were left to be finalized through broad political consensus.
The responsibility of successive administrations, including the current one, was to shepherd this completion process through negotiation and dialogue among all Somali stakeholders. The intention was to strengthen federalism, build legitimacy, and produce a permanent constitution accepted by the Federal Government, Federal Member States, and the Somali public.
However, proposals or discussions that could transform Somalia from a parliamentary to a presidential system have raised alarm among Federal Member States and opposition groups. For many of them, such a shift would fundamentally alter the political settlement that allowed Somalia’s federal order to emerge after years of conflict.
To them, the issue is not merely legal—it is existential.
Federal Tensions and the Risk of Fragmentation
Somalia’s federal system was born out of compromise and necessity. Regional administrations emerged in part because centralized authority had collapsed, and rebuilding trust between the center and the periphery has been a slow and fragile process. Any perception that the federal government is attempting to concentrate power risks undoing that progress.
Unlike Zimbabwe, where political conflict unfolds largely within a single national framework, Somalia’s disputes often carry territorial and institutional consequences. Federal Member States possess their own security forces, political mandates, and local legitimacy. If trust erodes, disagreements can quickly escalate beyond parliamentary debate into deeper political crises.
This is why constitutional disputes in Somalia are uniquely dangerous: they do not merely affect who governs—they can affect whether the country remains politically cohesive at all.
The International Stake
Few countries in the world have received as much sustained international support as Somalia over the past three decades. Billions of dollars have been spent to rebuild institutions, train security forces, maintain humanitarian operations, and prevent the collapse of the Somali state.
This investment was not made only for Somalia’s sake. Stability in Somalia is tied to regional security, maritime trade routes, and global counterterrorism efforts.
For many Somalis, this history raises an important question: should constitutional changes with far-reaching consequences be undertaken without broad national consensus in a country whose stability has required such extraordinary international support?
Increasingly, voices within Somali society argue that international partners have a responsibility to encourage constitutional processes that are inclusive, transparent, and consensual, rather than unilateral.
The Question of Legitimacy
Constitutions derive their strength not only from legal authority but from public trust. When citizens begin to believe that rules are being rewritten to serve those already in power, confidence in institutions declines.
In Somalia, where governance has long struggled with issues of corruption, political polarization, and weak institutional oversight, this crisis of confidence can spread rapidly. Public perception, whether entirely fair or not, plays a decisive role in shaping political stability.
And in fragile states, legitimacy is often the most important currency of all.
Lessons from History
Zimbabwe’s constitutional debate may ultimately determine the future of one presidency. Somalia’s constitutional debate may determine the future of the state itself.
History shows that leaders often justify extending power in the name of stability. Yet stability built on contested legitimacy rarely endures. Systems may appear strong for a time, but beneath the surface, trust erodes, institutions weaken, and divisions deepen.
When that breaking point comes, it rarely announces itself in advance.
A Turning Point
Somalia stands at a crossroads. The country is still rebuilding from decades of conflict. Its security remains fragile. Its economy depends heavily on external support. Its federal system is still evolving.
At such a moment, constitutional change is not merely a technical exercise. It is a decision that will shape the country’s political future for generations.
A constitution can unite a fragile nation—or, if mishandled, it can accelerate its unraveling. And for Somalia, the margin for error is extraordinarily small.
Abdullahi A. Nor
Email: abdulahinor231@gmail.com