By Mohamed A Yasin

Somalia’s political crisis has reached a point where an invitation to dialogue is no longer enough. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud may be reopening the door to negotiations, but for many of his opponents, the damage has already been done. Federal member states have broken with Mogadishu, opposition leaders have challenged the legitimacy of the constitutional changes underpinning his continued presidency, and political disputes have spilled into armed confrontation.

The question confronting Somalia is not whether dialogue is desirable. It is why a serious, inclusive political settlement was not secured before the country reached this point. The president’s latest offer comes too late to be treated as a fresh beginning, it should have come before the expiry of his original four-year mandate in May 2026, prior to the disputed constitutional changes  that deepened the national divide, and before the struggle over political authority in South West State turned into a military confrontation.

Instead, Somalia is being asked to negotiate after years of mistrust have hardened into competing claims of legitimacy.

A crisis that did not emerge overnight

The confrontation is rooted in a fundamental disagreement over Somalia’s constitutional order, the length of the federal leadership’s mandate and the framework for future elections.

President Hassan Sheikh’s government maintains that constitutional amendments adopted by parliament extended the presidential and parliamentary terms from four to five years, allowing the president to remain in office until May 2027. The opposition, including the Somali Future Council and the administrations of Puntland and Jubaland, rejects that interpretation and argues that the changes were adopted without the political consensus required for such a consequential national decision.

The disagreement is documented in the. It is not a minor procedural dispute. It concerns who has the authority to govern, how that authority is legitimized and whether Somalia’s federal system can survive when the principal political actors no longer agree on the rules.

The opposition has argued that an electoral arrangement imposed by one side cannot produce the national consensus required to stabilize the country. The federal government, by contrast, presents its constitutional reforms and direct-voting agenda as necessary steps towards a more democratic system.

Both sides have invoked democratic principles, but their disagreement over the process has become more consequential than their shared stated objective of moving Somalia towards direct elections.

For critics of Hassan Sheikh, the president’s mistake was to press ahead with constitutional and electoral changes before securing an agreement with the federal member states and major opposition figures. They contend that an earlier offer of genuine negotiations might have prevented the dispute from becoming a national crisis.

South West State: The cost of political confrontation

The events in South West State have given this argument a particularly serious dimension. On March 30, federal forces took control of Baidoa, the state’s administrative capital, amid escalating tensions with the regional administration. Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen resigned shortly after being re-elected to a five-year term, and residents fled as fears of further fighting grew.

The confrontation demonstrated how a political dispute over constitutional amendments and electoral arrangements could escalate into a struggle involving federal troops, regional loyalties and the displacement of civilians. The crisis did not end with the change in control of Baidoa. Subsequent fighting involving federal forces and fighters loyal to Laftagareen underscored the continuing security risks. has documented the violence and its civilian consequences.

For those who believe the federal government’s approach has contributed to the crisis, South West State has become a warning of what can happen when political disputes are handled through force rather than an agreed settlement.

A late invitation to negotiate cannot, by itself, reverse the consequences of displacement, restore confidence between political institutions or resolve questions about the legitimacy of regional leadership. Those tasks require more than an announcement from the presidential palace.

Hirshabelle and Galmudug face their own tests

The danger is that the same pattern of mistrust will deepen elsewhere. Hirshabelle’s electoral process has faced opposition from political figures, traditional leaders and residents who object to what they regard as a one-sided contest. Protests in Beledweyne in September reflected concerns that the process lacked sufficient agreement among the political and community stakeholders concerned. describes the disputes surrounding the regional electoral processes.

The controversy is particularly sensitive because Hirshabelle encompasses Hiiraan and Middle Shabelle, where disagreements over political representation and the distribution of power have long complicated the state’s cohesion. Proceeding with an election while significant stakeholders reject the arrangements risks deepening those divisions, even if the vote formally produces a winner.

Galmudug faces its own electoral and political disagreements. Although its leadership has generally maintained closer relations with Mogadishu than Puntland and Jubaland have, that alignment should not be mistaken for proof that all political disputes have been resolved or that the administration is immune to internal pressures.

It would be premature to declare that either state is inevitably heading towards war. But the experience of South West State shows why disputed electoral processes deserve urgent political attention before disagreements become violent. The federal government’s challenge is therefore not simply to hold votes. It is to establish arrangements that communities and political stakeholders consider credible enough to accept.

The shrinking space for federal consensus

Somalia’s federal system was intended to distribute authority and accommodate a country emerging from prolonged conflict. Its survival depends on cooperation between Mogadishu and the regional administrations, even when their leaders disagree over policy or political strategy.

That cooperation has deteriorated sharply. Puntland and Jubaland have opposed the federal government’s constitutional and electoral approach, while the South West crisis has further exposed the consequences of a breakdown in federal relations. The wider political fragmentation is examined in.

Hassan Sheikh has pursued a strategy that prioritizes consolidating federal authority over building agreement among the country’s political stakeholders. The government rejects the opposition’s interpretation of its constitutional legitimacy and maintains that its reforms are intended to strengthen democratic institutions.

The important question is whether the current approach can deliver an electoral settlement that the principal parties accept. A government may possess the administrative capacity to organize a vote, but the ability to hold an election is not the same as securing broad political legitimacy.

Nor can the support of selected regional leaders substitute for a national agreement when other major stakeholders reject the process.

If the president’s latest invitation is intended to resolve the crisis, negotiations must address the underlying disagreements rather than merely seek opposition participation in a timetable already announced by the government.

The Banadir vote and the problem of legitimacy

The dispute also extends to Mogadishu and the Banadir region, where the federal government has promoted direct voting as evidence of progress towards a more participatory political system.

Direct elections are an important democratic objective. But the legitimacy of an electoral process depends not only on the method of voting; it also depends on public confidence, transparent administration, fair competition and the political circumstances in which the vote takes place.

Critics of the federal government have raised concerns about displacement, demolitions and land allocation in Mogadishu, arguing that residents affected by these practices have legitimate questions about their ability to participate in political decisions that shape the city’s future. Allegations that land has been transferred or sold to private interests must be examined through evidence and transparent legal procedures.

These grievances should not be conflated with independently established findings about the electoral process. Nevertheless, they raise a broader question: how can the government demonstrate that political participation is meaningful if citizens believe their housing, property rights and livelihoods have not been adequately protected?

The government’s claims about voter registration and participation must be assessed against verifiable electoral records, including who was eligible to vote, how registration was conducted and whether the process met transparent standards.

A vote should not be treated as proof of political consensus simply because the authorities have organized it. Equally, allegations of irregularities require evidence rather than assumption. Credibility depends on transparent procedures and independent scrutiny.

Dialogue must address power, not merely personalities

The central weakness of a late invitation to negotiate is that it risks treating a structural crisis as a disagreement between individuals. Somalia’s dispute is about constitutional authority, the electoral timetable, the relationship between federal and regional governments, the administration of elections and the safeguards needed to prevent political competition from producing armed conflict.

A credible dialogue would therefore need to address several essential questions: what constitutional framework will govern the next election; how the parties will agree on an implementable timetable; what role federal member states will play; how electoral administration will be made credible; and what commitments will prevent the use of state institutions or security forces to settle political disputes.

It would also need to establish a practical process for resolving disagreements, with clear commitments from all parties and credible support from the international partners assisting Somalia.

The opposition, too, has a responsibility to engage seriously if negotiations offer a genuine opportunity to resolve the crisis. Refusing dialogue regardless of its terms would not help the public. But participation should not be confused with accepting arrangements that remain fundamentally disputed.

The federal government must demonstrate that it is prepared to negotiate the substance of the crisis, not simply invite its opponents to endorse decisions already made.

Somalia cannot afford another missed opportunity

The president’s renewed appeal for dialogue arrives at a moment when the cost of political fragmentation is already visible. South West State has experienced armed confrontation, Hirshabelle’s electoral process has generated public protests, and the dispute over the federal constitutional framework remains unresolved.

For Somalia’s citizens, the consequences extend far beyond political offices. Instability threatens public services, economic activity, humanitarian operations and the coordination required to confront Al-Shabaab. Every new confrontation between federal and regional actors risks diverting attention and resources from the country’s most pressing security and development needs.

The president’s offer should therefore be judged not by its wording but by what follows. Will the government suspend unilateral steps that deepen mistrust? Will it negotiate the electoral framework and constitutional questions in good faith? Will the opposition and federal member states be treated as partners in a national settlement rather than obstacles to a predetermined plan? These are the questions that matter.

Hassan Sheikh’s government maintains that its mandate continues under the revised constitution. His opponents dispute that position. Until the disagreement is resolved through an accepted constitutional and political process, competing claims of authority will continue to undermine confidence in federal institutions.

Somalia needed an inclusive political settlement before the crisis escalated into violence. It now needs one more urgently, at a much higher cost. A late offer of dialogue may still create an opening, but only if it marks a genuine change of approach—one that places negotiated agreement above unilateral decisions and national stability above the pursuit of political advantage.

The country cannot undo the months of confrontation. It can, however, decide whether the next chapter will be defined by compromise and constitutional clarity or by another round of political escalation. That decision will require more than an invitation to talk. It will require the political will to resolve the disputes that made the invitation necessary in the first place.

Mohamed A Yasin
Email: moyasin680@gmail.com