By Djama Mahamoud Ali
On July 2, 2026, the United States terminated critical military funding for Somalia, explicitly citing the federal government’s failure to sustain progress against Al-Shabaab. This decision, far from being arbitrary, is a direct and reasonable response to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s systematic misallocation of internationally financed military assets. Evidence demonstrates that the administration has prioritized military campaigns against federal member states such as Jubaland, Southwest State, Puntland and Oppostions, over counterterrorism operations. Furthermore, the president’s entrenched “Mogadishu-centric” worldview, which equates the capital’s relative safety with national security while disregarding Al-Shabaab’s stranglehold on the surrounding regions, underscores a fundamental breach of trust with international donors. Consequently, the withdrawal of funding is not only justified but serves as an inevitable fiduciary consequence of the Somali government’s diversion of resources for political survival.
For nearly two decades, the international community, led by the United States, has invested billions of dollars in Somalia’s security architecture. The primary objective has been singular: to dismantle Al-Shabaab and restore stability to a nation fractured by civil war. However, the recent U.S. announcement to end payments to the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) signals a definitive rupture in this partnership. Washington’s official letter to the African Union accused the Somali government of failing to sustain progress against al-Shabaab, take ownership of its security functions, or undertake serious security sector reform.
The termination of funds did not emerge from a vacuum. It is the logical culmination of the Somali government’s deliberate prioritization of internal political consolidation over the national counterterrorism mission. By redirecting U.S.-trained and financed troops to fight against its own member states, and by revealing a vision of Somalia that is dangerously confined to the boundaries of Mogadishu, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has rendered the continuation of international military funding both unreasonable and unsustainable.
The core of the funding dispute lies not in a lack of military capacity, but in a deliberate misdirection of that capacity. The Somali National Army (SNA), trained and financed extensively by the United States, Turkey, and other friendly nations, was explicitly built to combat Islamist insurgency. Yet, under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, these forces have been systematically weaponized against Somalia’s federal member states and his opponents
Military deployment to fight against Jubaland, Southwest State, and Puntland instead of deploying troops to reclaim territories held by Al-Shabaab, the federal government has engaged in aggressive military posturing against these States. Troops were moved into Southwest State in March 2026, resulting the ousting of Lafatgreen from the presidency of South West State. Concurrently, leaked military logs revealed federal efforts to destabilize Puntland by organizing proxy militias to instigate armed clashes in urban centers like Garowe and Galkayo. These operations have consumed logistical resources, troop morale, and command attention that should have been directed toward the front lines against the insurgents.
The motivation behind this diversion of the military force is obvious, it is the preservation of personal power. Opposition coalitions, including the Somali Future Council, have explicitly accused the president of using the military as a political instrument to dismantle rivals who reject his unilateral constitutional changes and term extensions. When the army fights Al-Shabaab, it serves the nation; when it fights Jubaland or Puntland, it serves the political ambitions of a single leader. This re-allocation of force for the sole reason to remain in power constitutes a fundamental betrayal of the trust placed in the government by its international allies.
Perhaps the most damning evidence of the government’s strategic failure is the president’s own perception of the conflict. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s vision of Somalia appears to be dangerously confined to the boundaries of Mogadishu, a city that also happens to serve as his primary clan base and political stronghold. When questioned about the progress of the fight against Islamist insurgents, President Mohamud reportedly replied that Mogadishu is safe. While this assertion may hold superficial truth regarding the capital’s fortified perimeters, it reveals a catastrophic blind spot. Al-Shabaab does not need to hold Mogadishu to control Somalia; it exerts dominance over the vast rural and peri-urban regions surrounding the capital. By claiming victory based solely on the security of Mogadishu, the president demonstrates a belief that Somalia is merely Mogadishu.
This worldview has profound operational consequences. If the government perceives the insurgency as a peripheral issue rather than a national existential threat, it naturally deprioritizes offensives in the hinterlands. The regions of Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, and the Juba valleys remain under heavy insurgent influence, yet the federal administration shows little urgency to liberate them. This narrow, clan-centric vision of the state alienates the very federal member states that are bearing the brunt of the insurgency, forcing them to rely on their own regional forces (such as the Puntland Security Forces, which have made genuine gains against ISIS) while the federal army engages in political sabotage.
Given the evidence of misappropriation and strategic myopia, the U.S. decision to terminate funding is not merely a diplomatic rebuke; it is a rational financial and strategic imperative. International military aid is inherently conditional. Donors do not provide tanks, ammunition, and salaries to facilitate internal power struggles; they provide them to eliminate transnational and domestic terrorism. By using American-funded bullets to settle political scores in the Federal Membre States rather than eliminating Al-Shabaab hideouts in the hinterlands, the Somali government has breached the explicit and implicit conditions of its aid package. Washington has a fiduciary responsibility to its taxpayers to ensure that their money furthers American security interests. When that money is diverted to destabilize internal rivals, the United States is effectively subsidizing civil conflict rather than counterterrorism. The diversion of resources is not just a legal violation; it is counterproductive to the stated goal of stability.
By attacking Jubaland, Southwest State and Puntland, the federal government weakens the very regional administrations that act as buffer zones against Al-Shabaab. An unstable Puntland benefits ISIS and Al-Shabaab, as it creates vacuums and distracts regional security forces from their own counterterrorism operations. By funding a government that actively destabilizes its own member states, international.
Djama Mahamoud Ali
Email: djama_m@yahoo.om